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This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to understand the significance
of, the most important judicial decisions and administrative rulings and regulations promulgated
by the Internal Revenue Service and Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months
- and sometimes a little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or
outrageous. Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they cannot be discussed
in detail and, anyway, only a devout masochist would read them all the way through; just the
basic topic and Jundamental principles are highlighted - unless one of us decides to go nuts and
spend several pages writing it up. This is the reason that the outline is getting to be as long as it
is. Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not discussed except to the extent
that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they have led to administrative rulings and
regulations, (3) they have affected previously issued rulings and regulations otherwise covered
by the outline, or (4) they provide Dan and Marty the opportunity to mock our elected
representatives; again, sometimes at least one of us goes nuts and writes up the most trivial of
legislative changes. The outline focuses primarily on topics of broad general interest (to the
three of us, at least) - income tax accounting rules, determination of gross income, allowable
deductions, treatment of capital gains and losses, corporate and partnership taxation, exempt
organizations, and procedure and penalties. It deals summarily with qualified pension and proJit
sharing plans, and generally does not "deal with international taxation or specialized industries,
such as banking, insurance, and financial services. Please read this outline at your own risk; we
take no responsibility.for any misinformation in it, whether occasioned by our advancing ages or
our increasing indijjerence as to whether we get any particular item right. Any mistakes in this
outline are Marty's responsibility; any politic;al bias or offensive language is Ira's; and any
useful information is Dan's.

I.

ACCOUNTING
A.
Accounting Methods
1.
New and improved automatic consent procedures for changes of
accounting methods. Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-2 C.B. 587 (8/19/08). This revenue procedure
provides automatic consent procedures for a wide variety of accounting method changes. Rev.
Proc. 2002-9, 2002-1 C.B. 327, as modified and clarified, is clarified, modified, amplified, and
superseded.
.
a.
Automatic consent updated. Rev. Proc. 2009-39, 2009-38 I.R.B.
371 (8/27/09). The IRS has updated the procedures for obtaining automatic consent and advance
consent to change accounting methods. A taxpayer who complies with applicable provisions of
this revenue procedure has the IRS's consent to change an accounting method. The extensive list
1

of changes is in the Appendix. Rev. Proc. 97-27, 1997-1C.B. 680 is modified and clarified, and
Rev. Proc. 2008-52, 2008-2 CB 587 is amplified, clarified, and modified.
•
Normally, when automatic consent is sought from the IRS,
there is no acknowledgment of the request.
2.
Is the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the intensive
care unit? Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 8/22/08) (2-1), cert.
granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (5/18/09). Judge Rogers held that the Article n Appointments Clause
was not violated by having members of the PCAOB appointed by the SEC commissioners, nor
was the separation of powers doctrine violated by the for-cause limitation on removal ofPCAOB
members.
•
Judge Kavanaugh dissented strongly, stating:
The two constitutional flaws in the PCAOB statute are not matters of mere
etiquette or protocol. By restricting the President's authority over the Board, the
Act renders this Executive Branch agency unaccountable and divorced from
Presidential control to a degree not previously countenanced in our constitutional
structure. This was not inadvertent; Members of Congress designed the PCAOB
to have "massive power, unchecked power." 148 CONG.REC. at S6334 (statement
of Sen. Gramm). Our constitutional structure is premised, however, on the notion
that such unaccountable power is inconsistent with individual liberty. "The
purpose of the separation and equilibration of powers in general, and of the
unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure effective government but
to preserve individual freedom." Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the
branches seek to transgress the separation of powers."). The Framers of our
Constitution took great care to ensure that power in our system was separated into
three Branches, not concentrated in the Legislative Branch; that there were checks
and balances among the three Branches; .and that one individual would be
ultimately responsible and accountable for the exercise of executive power. The
PCAOB contravenes those bedrock constitutional principles, as well as longstanding Supreme Court precedents, and it is therefore unconstitutional.
a.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. There is. less to
this decision than meets the eye because the PCAOB continues to operate as before but its
members may be removed without cause by the SEC. _ U.S. _ (6/28/10) (5-4, with the usual
liberals dissenting). The Court held that the for-cause limitations on the removal of PCAOB
members contravene the Constitution's separation of powers but that the unconstitutional
provisions are separable from the rest of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The consequence is that the
Board may continue to function as before, but its members may be removed at will by the
Commission.
3.
Just because you might have to perform work in the future and incur
future costs doesn't necessarily mean you have a long-term contract eligible for deferred
reporting of income. Koch Industries v. United States, 603 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 4/27/10). In
connection with a contract to construct a highway for the State of New Mexico, the taxpayer and
New Mexico entered into a "rehabilitation" contract under which the taxpayer provided a
"pavement warranty" that required it to perform all work necessary to assure performance of the
pavement for a period 21.5 years and a "structures warranty" to perform all work necessary to
assure performance of the bridges, drainage, and erosion structures for 11.5 years, in
consideration ofa $62,000,000 payment. The taxpayer had no obligation to perform any work on
the highway or structures unless and until the highway and/or structures failed to meet
performance standards included in the warranty agreements. The taxpayer sought to use the
percentage of completion method under § 460 to report the income, but the Court agreed with the
IRS that the percentage of completion method was unavailable. Neither warranty was a longterm contract under § 460 because under Reg. § 1.460-1(b)(2)(i) "to be classified as a long-term
2

(

(

(

(

(

contract, 'manufacture, building, installation, or construction of property [must be] necessary for
the taxpayer's contractual obligations to be fulfilled,'" which "necessarily entails a fixed and
definite obligation on the part of the contractor to provide specified construction services." This
standard was not met because even though it was virtually certain that some work would be
performed at some point, the taxpayer "had no obligation to perform any work on the highway
unless and until the highway andlorstructures thereon failed to meet the performance standards
included in the warranty agreements." The contracts were "warranties" within the meaning of
Reg. § 1.460-1(d)(2), and thus the consideration was not eligible for reporting under the
percentage of completion method.
B.
Inventories
C.
Installment Method
D.
Year of Inclusion or Deduction
1.
The taxpayer won the substantive issue, but foot-faulted on seeking a
change in method of accounting, so most of the deficiency is upheld. But in future years, it's
"ooh la la" for the taxpayer! Capital One Financial Corp. v. Commissioner; 133 T.C. No.8
(9/21109). This case involved two issues and over $280 million - $175 million for one year
alone - (apart from penalties). The first issue was the time that third-party credit card issuers
are required to recognize credit card income known as interchange. Interchange is the difference
between the amount charged on a credit card and the lesser amount remitted to the merchant by
the issuing bank. Interchange resembles interest in that it is expressed as a percentage of the
amount lent, usually with an additional nominal fee, although it is not time-sensitive and does
not vary as interest rates fluctuate. The government argued that interchange income was credit
card fee income that was recognized under the all events test at the time the interchange accrued
- when the cardholder's credit card purchase was settled through either the Visa or MasterCard
system - while the taxpayer argued that the interchange income was original issue discount
(OID) that was properly recognized under § 1272(a)(6)(C)(iii), which was added to the Code in
1997, over the anticipated life of the pool of credit card loans to which the interchange related.
The Tax Court (Judge Haines) agreed with the taxpayer and held that the interchange income
was OID. Interchange is not a fee for any service other than the lending of money. However,
because the taxpayer failed to follow proper procedures to change its accounting methods, the
OID method was not available for credit card rece.ivables creating or increasing OID in 1998 or
1999. With certain modifications, the method used by the taxpayer to compute the OID income
(using a model developed by KPMG) was reasonable.
•
A second issue was whether the taxpayer could currently
deduct the estimated cost of future redemptions of "miles" it issued to cardholders that could be
redeemed for airline tickets, the cost of which would be paid by the taxpayer. The court held that
under § 461(h) and Reg. § 1.461-4, those expenses could not be deducted currently, but instead
were deductible only to the extent that the amounts were fixed and known under the all events test
and for which economic performance had occurred.
II.
BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A.
Income
1.
This looks pretty good, but at first a few serious questions were
lurking. The 2009 ARRA, § 1231(a), added Code § 108(i), which defers and then ratably
includes income arising from business indebtedness discharged by the reacquisition of a debt
instrument. This new provision allows a taxpayer to irrevocably elect to include cancellation of
debt income realized in 2009 and 2010 ratably over five tax years, rather than in the year the
discharge occurs, if the debt was issued in connection with the conduct of a trade or business or
by a corporation. For partnerships and S corporations, the election is made by the partnership or
corporation, not by the individual partners or shareholders. I.R.C. § 108(i)(5)(B)(iii). Under the
§ 108(i) election, income from a debt cancellation in 2009 is recognized beginning in the fifth
taxable year following the debt cancellation; the income is recognized ratably in each of 2014
.through 2018. Income from a debt cancellation in 2010 is recognized beginning in the fourth
3

taxable year following the debt cancellation; the income is recognized ratably in each of 2014
through 2018. If a taxpayer elects to defer debt cancellation income under § 108(i), the § 108(a)
exclusions for bankruptcy, insolvency, qualified farm indebtedness, and qualified real property
business indebtedness do not apply to the year of the election or any subsequent year.
§ 108(i)(5)(C). Thus, the election cannot be used to move the year of inclusion to a year in which
it is expected that one of the exceptions will apply. Once the election is made, inclusion is
inevitable; the statute requires acceleration of inclusion to the taxpayer's final return in the event
of the intervening death of an individual or liquidation or termination of the business of an entity.
§ 108(i)(5)(D). The acceleration rule also applies in the event of the sale or exchange or
redemption of an interest in a partnership or S corporation by a partner or shareholder.
•
Although the statute speaks in terms of cancellation of debt
income arising from "reacquisition" of a "debt instrument," the statutory defmitions of
"reacquisition" and "an applicable debt instrument," respectively, are broad enough the provision
applies to most situations in which the debt is cancelled. Section 108(i)(3)(B) broadly defines "debt
instrument" to include a bond, debenture, note, certificate, or any other instrument or contractual
arrangement constituting indebtedness within the meaning of §1275(a). Section 108(i)(4)(B) defmes
"acquisition" to include (I) an acquisition of the debt instrument for cash, (2) the exchange of the
debt instrument for another debt instrument, including an exchange reSUlting from a modification of
the debt instrument (which includes a reduction of the principal amount of the debt), (3) the
exchange of the debt instrument for corporate stock or a partnership interest, (4) the contribution of
the debt instrument to capital, and (5) the complete forgiveness of the indebtedness by the holder of
the debt instrument.
•
However, the statutory definition of "acquisition" appears to
omit the cancellation of a debt in connection with a property transfer, for example, a deed in lieu of
foreclosure, although the legislative history contains some indication that this type of debt
cancellation is included.
•
Query when and to what extent real estate ownership
qualifies as a trade or business.
a.
Many of the questions are answered. Rev. Proc. 2009-37, 200936 I.R.B. 309 (8/17/09). This revenue procedure provides the exclusive procedure for taxpayers
to make § 108(i) elections. Debt cancellation in connection with a property transfer is included in
§ 108(i). Section 4.04(3) permits partial elections, with the partnership permitted to determine
"in any manner" the portion of the COD income that is the "deferred amount" and the portion of
the COD income that is the "included amount" with respect to each partner. Section 4.11 permits
protective elections where the taxpayer concludes that a particular transaction does not generate
COD income but fears that the IRS may determine otherwise. A partner's deferred § 752(b)
amount, arising from a decrease in his share of partnership liabilities, will be treated as a current
distribution of money in the year that the COD income is included. Taxpayers are allowed an
automatic one-year extension from the due date to make the election, and taxpayers who made
elections before the issuance of the revenue procedure will be given until 11116/09 to modifY
(but not revoke) their existing elections. Corporate taxpayers making a § 108(i) election are
required to increase earnings and profits for the year of the election.
b.
Temporary Regulations allocate deferred cancellation of debt
income. T.D. 9498, Application of Section 108(i) to Partnerships and S Corporations, 75 F.R.
49380 (8/13/10). Section 108(i) provides an election to include cancellation of indebtedness
income resulting from a reacquisition (broadly defined in § 108(i)(4)) of a debt instrument,
issued by a C corporation or other person engaged in a trade or business, ratably over five years
beginning with the fifth year following reacquisition occurring in 2009, and the fourth year
. following reacquisition in 2010. Under § 108(i)«5)(B)(iii) an election is made by the
partnership, not the partners individually. Section 108(i)(6) requires a partnership to allocate the
COD income to partners according to partnership share on the day immediately preceding
reacquisition and provides that the discharge will not trigger § 752(b) recognition under § 731
because of a reduction in a partner's share of partnership liabilities.
•
Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(d)(1) provides five safe harbors
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where debt instruments issued by a partnership or S corporation will be treated as issued in a trade
or business: (1) The gross fair market value of the trade or business assets of the partnership or S
corporation represent at least 80 percent of the fair market value of all of its assets on the date of
issuance, (2) trade or business expenses of the partnership or S corporation represent at least 80
percent of all expenditures, (3) at least 95 percent of the interest paid on the debt instrument is
allocable to trade or business expenditures under the interest allocation rules of Reg. § 1.163-8T, (4)
at least 95 percent of the proceeds from the debt instrument were used to acquire trade or business
assets within six months of the issue of the debt, or (5) the partnership or S corporation issued the
debt instrument to the seller of a trade or business to acquire the trade or business. Absent anchoring
in one of the safe harbors, qualification of a trade or business debt is a matter of facts and
"
circumstances.
While § 108(i)(5)(B)(iii) requires the election to be made at
•
the partnership level, Temp. Reg. § 1.1 08(i)-2T(b)(1), allows the partnership to allocate both
deferred and included portions of COD income to the partners. The temporary regulations first
require that COD income be allocated to the partners in the partnership immediately before the
reacquisition in the manner the income would be included in distributive shares under § 704, then
the partnership must determine the amount of COD income from the applicable instrument that is
"the deferred amount includible in the partner's share and the amount that is immediately includible.
With respect to deferred COD income of an S corporation, the Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(I)
requires that on an election by the S corporation, deferred income must be shared pro rata on the
basis of stock ownership immediately prior to the reacquisition.
•
Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(b)(2) provides that a partner's
basis is not adjusted under § 705(a) to account for the partner's share of partnership deferred COD
income until the deferred item is recognized by the partner. Likewise, § 1.108(i)-2T(c)(2) provides
that neither an S corporation shareholder's basis under § 1367 nor the shareholder's accumulated
adjustment account is adjusted for deferred COD income until the shareholder recognizes the
deferred COD income.
•
Following the rules of Rev. Proc. 2009-37, and applying the
rules of § 108(i)(6), Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(b)(3) provides that reduction in a partner's share of
partnership liabilities is determined under § 752(b) when a debt instrument is reacquired, but that
the reduction in liabilities is not treated as a distribution of money until deferred COD income is
recognized by the partner. The temporary regulations provide additional rules for determining a
partner's deferred amounts where the partner would recognize § 731 gain in the year of the
reacquisition.
"•
Partners' capital accounts are adjusted as if no § 108(i)
election were made.
•
Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)-2T(d)(3) provides that gain
attributable to a reduction in a partner's or S corporation shareholder's amount at-risk under
§ 465(e) will not be taken into account in the year of reacquisition and will be deferred to the date
the COD income in recognized.
•
In the case of an acceleration event under § 108(i)(5)(D) that
requires a partnership or S corporation to recognized deferred items, under Temp. Reg. § 1.108(i)2T(c)(3) the partners or S corporation shareholders must account for deferred COD in the year that
the accelerating event takes place. In addition, the temporary regulations described various
circumstances in which a partner or S corporation shareholder terminates the interest in the entity
that will" require acceleration of deferred COD income, including death, liquidation, sale or
exchange, redemption, or abandonment.
•
Identical proposed regulations were issued simultaneously.
REG-144762-09, Application of Section 108(i) to Partnerships and S Corporations, 75 F.R. 49427
(8113110).
c.
Significant guidance on a soon to expire beneficial Code section
that leaves a nasty hangover. T.D. 9497, Guidance Regarding Deferred Discharge of
Indebtedness Income of Corporations and Deferred Original issue Discount Deductions, 75 F.R.
49394 (8/13110). The IRS and Treasury have promulgated Temp. Reg. §§ 1.108(i)-OT through
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1.108(i)-3T providing detailed rules for C corporations regarding the acceleration of deferred
COD income and deferred OlD deductions under § 108(i)(5)(D), and the calculation of earnings
and profits as a result of an election under § 108(i). The regulations also provide rules applicable
to all taxpayers regarding deferred OlD deductions under § 108(i) as a result of a reacquisition of
an applicable debt instrument by an issuer or related party.
•
Identical proposed regulations were issued simultaneously.
REG-142800-09, Guidance Regarding Deferred Discharge of Indebtedness Income of Corporations
and Deferred Original Issue Discount Deductions, 75 F .R. 49428 (8/13/1 0).
2.
Rev. Rul. 2010-10, 2010-13 I.R.B. 461 (3/25/10) provides standard
industry fare level cents-per-mile rates and terminal charges for the fIrst half of 2010 for
determining the value of noncommercial flights on employer provided aircraft.
B.
Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization
1.
Who says § 1060 prevents allocating basis in excess of fair market to
tangible assets? Not Judge Kroupa of the Tax Court. West Covina Motors. Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-:291(12/16/09). The taxpayer purchased the assets of another
corporation and paid various legal and other transactional fees in connection with the acquisition.
Most, but not all, of the fees were related to a seller-financing arrangement for the purchased
assets. The parties stipulated that the taxpayer paid $6,050,601 for specific assets, including
(1) $250,001 for fixed assets, (2) $3.5 million for goodwill, and (3) $2,300,600 for the inventory
of used vehicles, parts, and miscellaneous items, as well as acquiring $6,258,074 worth of new
and demonstrator vehicle inventory that was subject to a $6,421,047 floor plan line of credit.
Those legal and transactional fees that were attributable to inventory financing and physical
inventory were allocated to the inventory to be taken into account in determining cost of goods
sold. The IRS argued that because the acquisition was an "applicable asset acquisition" to which
§ 1060 applied, the remaining legal fees, which were not specifically related to any particular
asset, were required to be allocated to goodwill and going concern value under § 1060 because
the fair-market-value limitations of § 1060· precluded an allocation to any other assets. In a
stunning decision, Judge Kroupa rejected the IRS's position and held that even though the
acquisition was an "applicable asset acquisition" as defined in § 1060, where the parties, i.e., the
taxpayer and the IRS, have stipulated "the cost of each asset ... section 1060 does not apply."
Accordingly, she agreed with the taxpayer that the legal fees should be allocated proportionately
among all of the acquired assets to increase their bases - 2.03% to fixed assets, 18.69% to used
vehicles and parts inventory, 50.84% to new and demonstrator vehicles, and 28.44% to goodwill.
•
Former Temp. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(e), which was the
controlling regulation for the year of the transaction, specifically stated: "Allocation not to exceed
fair market value. The amount of consideration allocated to an asset (other than Class IV assets)
[defmed therein as 'intangible assets in the nature of goodwill and going concern value'] shall not
exce,ed the fair market value of that asset on the purchase date." Although Judge Kroupa's opinion
cited that provision, she somewhat mysteriously stated that "[the Commissioner] cites no authority
requiring legal fees to be allocated under the fair-market-value limitations of section 1060 where the
parties have stipulated the cost of each asset, and we find none." We on the other hand believe that
former Temp. Reg. § 1.1060-1T(e) does precisely what Judge Kroupa believed that no authority
required. Former Temp. Reg. § 1. 1.1060-1T(e) was mirrored in former Temp. Reg. § 1.338(b)2T(c)(1), and that provision continues to apply in current Reg. § 1.338-6(c)(1). In addition, current
Reg. § 1.338-6(a)(2)(ii) specifically provides that "[t]ransaction costs are not taken into account in
allocating ADSP or AGUB to assets in the deemed sale (except indirectly through their effect on the
total ADSP or AGUB to be allocated)." Even more to the point, current Reg. § 1.1060-1(c)(3) now
clearly specifically precludes the result in West Covina Motors from occurring:
The seller and purchaser each adjusts the amount allocated to an individual asset
to take into account the specific identifiable costs incurred in transferring that
asset in connection with the applicable asset acquisition (e.g., real estate transfer
costs or security interest perfection costs). Costs so allocated increase, or
decrease, as appropriate, the total consideration that is allocated under the residual
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method. No adjustment is made to the amount allocated to an individual asset for
general costs associated with the applicable asset acquisition as a whole or with
groups of assets included therein (e.g., non-specific appraisal fees or accounting
fees). These latter amounts are taken into account only indirectly through their
effect on the total consideration to be allocated.
•
Although current Reg. § 1.1060-1(c)(3) post-dates the
transaction in West Covina Motors, and thus was not technically controlling, it is merely a more
specific statement of the rule in current Reg. § 1.338-6(a)(2)(ii), which in tum merely clarifies
current Reg. § 1.338-6(c)(I), which is identical to former Temp. Reg. § 1.338(b)-2T(c)(l), which
mirrored former Temp. Reg. § 1.1060-1 T(e), which should have been controlling in West Covina.
•
The bottom line: Don't take the holding in this case too
seriously. Its reasoning is suspect.
2•
Those fancy Pyrex® and Oneida® branded kitchen products are
made by Robinson Knife Manufacturing, which is required to capitalize license fees.
Robinson Knife Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-9 (1/14/09). The
taxpayer designs and produces kitchen tools for sale to large retail chains. To enhance its
marketing, the taxpayer paid license fees to Coming for use of the Pyrex trademark and Oneida
for use of the Oneida trademark on kitchen tools designed and produced by the taxpayer. The
taxpayer's production of kitchen tools bearing the licensed trademarks was subject to review and
quality control by Coming or Oneida. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer's licensing fees were
subject to capitalization into inventory under § 263A under Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(ii)(u), which
expressly includes licensing and franchise fees as indirect costs that must be allocated to
produced property. Agreeing with the IRS, the court (Judge Marvel) rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the licensing fees, incurred to enhance the marketability of its produced products,
were deductible as marketing, selling, or advertising costs excluded from the capitalization
requirements by Reg. § 1.263A-1(e)(3)(iii)(A). The court noted that the design approval and
quality control elements of the licensing agreements benefited the taxpayer in the development
and production of kitchen tools marketed with the licensed trademarks. The court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that Rev. Rul. 2000-4, 2000-1 C.B. 331, which allowed a current deduction
for costs incurred in obtaining ISO 9000 certification as an assurance of quality processes in
providing goods and services, was applicable to. the quality control element of the license
agreements. The court noted that although the trademarks permitted the taxpayer to produce
kitchen tools that were more marketable than the taxpayer's other products, the royalties directly
benefited and/or were incurred by reason of the taxpayer's production activities. The court also
upheld the IRS's application of the simplified production method of Reg. § 1.263A-2(b) to
allocate the license fees between cost of goods sold and ending inventory as consistent with the
taxpayer's use of the simplified production method for allocating other indirect costs.
But the Second Circuit disagrees. Robinson Knife Manufacturing
a.
Co. v. Commissioner, 600 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 3/16/10). Like the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals
rejected Robinson's arguments that the royalty payments were deductible as marketing, selling,
advertising or distribution costs under Reg. § 1.263-1(e)(3)(iii)(A), or that the royalty payments
were deductible as not having been incurred in securing the contractual right to use a trademark,
corporate plan, manufacturing procedure, special recipe, or other similar right associated with
property produced under Reg. § 1.263A-l(e)(3)(ii)(U). The Court of Appeals concluded,
however, that "royalty payments which are (1) calculated as a percentage of sales revenue from
certain inventory, and (2) incurred only upon sale of such inventory, are not required to be
capitalized under the § 263A regulations." The court held that the royalties were neither incurred
in, nor directly benefited, the performance of production activities under Reg. § 1.263A1(e)(3)(i). Unlike license agreements, the court concluded that Robinson could have
manufactured the products, and did, without paying the royalty costs. The royalties were not,
therefore, incurred by reason of the production process. The court also concluded that since the
royalties were incurred for kitchen tools that have been sold, "it is necessarily true that the
royalty costs and the income from sale of the inventory items are incurred simultaneously." The
7

court noted further that had Robinson's licensing agreements provided for non-sales based
royalties, then capitalization would have been required.
3.
Legal fees incurred resisting states' attorney general challenges to the
privatization of Blue Shield are capital expenses. Wellpoint. Inc. v. Commissioner, 599 F.3d
641 (7th Cir. 3/23110). The taxpayer provides health insurance coverage through operating
subsidiaries that are licensees of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association and are a result of
mergers with Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations that were once characterized as taxexempt charitable entities. Several state attorneys general brought cy-pres or charitable trust
actions against the taxpayer claiming assets of the charitable organizations that were impressed
with charitable trusts. The taxpayer made payments of nearly $114 million to settle these actions.
The Circuit Court affirmed the Tax Court holding (T.C. Memo. 2008-236) that the taxpayer's
legal fees and settlement payments were incurred in a dispute over the equitable ownership of
assets allegedly impressed with charitable trust obligations, and that the fees and payments were
thus required to be capitalized. Judge Posner described an expenditure as a capital expense "if its
'utility ... survives the accounting period' in which it is made" (citing Sears Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 1966)) and added that "expense incurred to enhance"
the value of a capital asset must be capitalized, and thus amortized over the asset's remaining
life." The court concluded that the settlement was based on claims involving Wellpoint's title to
the assets acquired from the formerly tax-exempt entities. The court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the payments were incurred to protect its business practices.
4.
Starting-up is cheaper. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 increases
the amount of deductible § 195 start-up expenses for investigating or creating an active trade or
business from $5,000 to $10,000 for expenses incurred in a year beginning in 2010. The phase
out amount is also increased from $50,000 to $60,000.
C.
Reasonable Compensation
1.
Throwing the TARP over compensation of insurance executives even
though they never received a TARP. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 162(m) by adding
subsection (m)(6) to limit deductions for compensation paid by health insurance providers,
which is defmed as any employer that is a health insurance issuer (as defined in § 9832(b)(2) of
the Act) not less than 25 percent of the gross premiums of which are received from providing
health insurance coverage (as defined in § 9832(b)(1) of the Act) "that is minimum essential
coverage." The deduction for compensation for services rendered in any year is limited to
$500,000, regardless of whether the compensation is paid during the taxable year or in a
subsequent taxable year. As under § 162(m)(5) for remuneration from TARP participants, there
are no exceptions for performance based compensation or compensation under existing binding
contracts. The limitation applies not only to all officers, directors, and employees, but also to any
other service providers, such as consultants, performing services for or on behalf of a covered
health insurance provider. The provision is effective for remuneration paid in taxable years
beginning after 2012 with respect to services performed after 2009.
•
OMG - Does it apply to outside counsel?
2•
Multi-Pak Corporation v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-139 (6/22110).
In this case appealable to the Ninth Circuit, the Tax Court (Judge Goeke) allowed deductions for
the full amount of compensation paid to the taxpayer's sole shareholder/CEO and COO, for 2002
in the amount of $2,020,000, but reduced the allowable compensation deduction for 2003 from
$2,058,000 to $1,284,104. Both amounts were greater than the $665,000 and $660,000 amounts
that the IRS asserted as reasonable. The court applied the five factor test of Elliotts, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1241, 1243-1245 (9th Cir. 1983): (1) The employee's role in the
company; (2) comparison with other companies; (3) the character and condition of the company;
(4) potential conflicts of interest; and (5) internal consistency in compensation. The court
rejected the opinions of dueling experts, noting that neither expert looked to companies
comparable to the taxpayer. The court also faulted the taxpayer's expert for not performing the
"analysis, required in the applicable caselaw, of whether an independent investor would have
been satisfied by his or her return on investment." Noting that the Court of Appeals in Elliotts
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found that a 20 percent return on equity would satisfy the hypothetical investor, the court
indicated that the taxpayer's 2.9 percent return in 2002 supported the salary in light of an
impressive growth in sales, but the -15.8 percent return in 2003 called into question the amount
of compensation paid in that year. Finally, the court refused to apply a § 6662(a) accuracy
penalty.
D.
Miscellaneous Deductions
1.
The ms responds to high gasoline prices. Announcement 2008-63,
2008-2 C.B. 114 (6/23/08), modifying Rev. Proc. 2007-70. The IRS announced that the business
mileage rate for the second half of 2008 will be 58.5 cents per mile - an increase of 8 cents per
mile - and that the medical/moving rate will also increase by 8 cents per mile to 27 cents per
mile. The statutory rate for charitable mileage under § 170(i) remains at 14 cents per mile.
a.
But gas prices abruptly declined in fall 2008. Rev. Proc. 200872, 2008-50 I.R.B. 1286 (11/24/08). The business mileage rate for 2009 will be 55 cents per mile
- a decrease of 3.5 cents per mile - and that the medicaVmoving rate will decrease by three cents
to 24 cents per mile. The statutory rate for charitable mileage under § 170(i) remains at 14 cents
per mile.
b.
Mileage rates for 2010. Rev. Proc. 2009-54, 2009-51 I.R.B. 930
(12/03/09). Mileage rates for business travel after January 1, 2010 drop to 50 cents per mile,
remain at 14 cents for charitable use, and drop to 16.5 cents for medical or moving use.
2.
Throw another log on the fire! Loss of contemporaneous § 274(d)
mileage log in a fire doesn't cause loss of mileage deductions too. Freeman v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2009-213 (9/16/09). Judge Gustafson allowed the taxpayer a deduction, at mileage
rates, for business use of his automobile on the basis of the taxpayer's credible testimony
regarding the route he drove in connection with his auto parts delivery business. The taxpayer
had maintained and at one time possessed adequate documentation, in the form of a daily log, to
comply with § 274(d), but his failure to produce that daily log was the result of an accidental fire
that destroyed his house and the logbook. Reg. § 1.274-5T(c)(5) allows a taxpayer to
"substantiate a deduction by reasonable reconstruction of his expenditures or use" when records
are lost through circumstances beyond the taxpayer's control, including a fire.
a.
But if you lose the mileage log books due to CRS [misplacing
them], or they're just plain s****y [smudgy?], you're out of luck. Royster v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2010-016 (2/1/10). The taxpayer was denied a deduction for claimed 2003 business
mileage because he had "lost" his log books. But it probably didn't matter. He was also denied
any deductions for 2004 and 2005 business mileage because his log books recorded only the
odometer readings at the beginning and end of each day and had no indications of the business
purpose of the trips or the destinations.
3.
Revised per diem rates for lodging, meal, and incidental expenses.
Rev. Proc. 2009-47, 2009-42 I.R.B 524 (9/30/09). The IRS has provided up dated rules for
employer provided per diem allowances that do not require substantiation, and which may be
used by self-employed persons and employees who are not reimbursed for travel expenses. Per
diem rates for travel within the U.S. are the rates for government travel set forth in 41 C.F.R. ch.
301, appx. A. Travelers may use the rates in effect for the first nine months of 2009 for all travel
within 2009, or may use the updated rates for travel between October l.and December 31, 2009.
Rates for travel outside the continental United States (including Alaska and Hawaii) are
published by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and are updated monthly. The
rates are available at www.gsa.gov. A traveler may use per diem allowances for meals and
incidental expenses along with actual lodging expenses. The revenue procedure also provides
fixed high-low per diem rates of $258 for a high cost locality, with a list provided, and $163 for
travel to any other locality.
4•
Holding herself out as a contract attorney did not establish a trade or
business. Forrest v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-228 (10/5/09). Before 1988 the taxpayer
worked as a contract attorney performing work for other attorneys. She then went to work for the
California Department of Corporations, but was terminated from that position in 2000. She
9

worked as a contract attorney in 2000, but not in 2001 and 2002. In 2003 the taxpayer attempted
again to work as a contract attorney, incurring expenses, before she was reinstated with the
Department of Corporations in 2003. The court (Judge Vasquez) held that the taxpayer's
activities were not sufficiently regular or continuous to qualify as a trade or business. The court
also concluded that, even if the taxpayer's prior activities were sufficient to qualify as a trade or
business, there was insufficient continuity into her activities in 2003 to constitute a continuation
of her previous trade or business. The court also noted that the taxpayer's attendance at a four
day ABA meeting and attempts to solicit contract work were not regular and continuous business
activates, that she did not negotiate or perform contract attorney services during the year, and
that her efforts were terminated when she resumed employment with the Department of
Corporations.
5.
The IRS rescues OlD interest deductions for borrowers that recognize
COD income under the Cottage Savings regulations as a result of loan modifications that
don't reduce principal. Notice 2010-11, 2010-4 I.R.B. 326 (12/24/09). Pursuant to
§ 163(e)(5)(f)(iii), the IRS has extended through 12/31/10 the suspension of the application of
§ 163(e)(5), which partially disallows interest deductions with respect to certain applicable high
yield discount obligations (AHYDOs), for "qualified obligations." An obligation is a "qualified
obligation" only if: (I) the AHYDO is issued after December 31, 2009, and on or before
December 31, 2010, in exchange (including an exchange resulting from a modification of the
debt instrument) for an obligation that is not an AHYDO; (2) the issuer (or obligor) of the
AHYDO is the same as the issuer (or obligor) of the obligation exchanged for the AHYDO;
(3) the AHYDO does not pay interest that would be treated as contingent interest for purposes of
§ 871(h)(4) (without regard to § 871(h)(4)(D)); (4) the AHYDO is not issued to a related person
(within the meaning of § 108(e)(4)); (5) the issue price of the AHYDO is determined under
§§ 1273(b)(I), 1273(b)(2), 1273(b)(3), or 1274(b)(3), whichever is applicable, and the
regulations thereunder; and (6) the AHYDO would not otherwise be an AHYDO if its issue price
were increased by the amount of any discharge of indebtedness income realized by the issuer (or
obligor) upon the exchange.
6.
Restitution of insurance fraud proceeds is deductible. Cheating wife
produces business losses. Cavaretta v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-4 (1/5/10). The
taxpayer dentist's wife, who managed the billing for the taxpayer's dental practice, billed an
insurance company for work that had not been done. The dentist was unaware of his wife's false
claims, but unfortunately for her the insurance company figured it out. She subsequently pled
guilty to criminal health-care fraud and received a prison sentence followed by supervised
release. Restitution was not ordered in the criminal proceeding, but the wife had agreed to repay
$600,000 in civil restitution before sentencing and compliance with the restitution agreement
was required as condition or supervised release from prison. The repayment was made by the
taxpayer over three taxable years. The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) held, first, that the restitution
payments, which were made by the husband, were deductible because payment was
compensatory, not punitive, and thus § 162(f) did not disallow the deduction. He agreed with the
taxpayer's claim that the repayments were deductible as losses incurred in a trade or business
under § 165(c)(I) and rejected the IRS's argument that the payments constituted restitution
deductible as a loss in a transaction entered into for profit under § 165(c)(2), which is not eligible
for carryback under § 172(d). The court refused to apply the holding of Stephens v.
Commissioner, 905 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1990), that states that a payment constituting "restitution"
is never deductible under § 162 and only sometimes deductible under § 165. The court concluded
that the "restitution" label does not make a repayment automatically ineligible for deduction as a
business expense. The court distinguished Stephens as involving restitution for criminal fraud
and embezzlement without any connection to a separate trade or business. The court also rejected
the IRS argument that because the payments were expenses of committing fraud they cannot be
considered as business expenses. The court found that the repayment was an ordinary and
necessary expense of the dental practice.
7.
Multi-employer life insurance plan too good to be true? Yes, says the
Tax Court. Curcio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-115 (5/27110). This case consolidated
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IRS assessments and penalties against three companies that had been involved in The Benistar
419 Plan and Trust, established by Daniel Carpenter and promoted in a book entitled A
Professional's Guide to 419 Plans. Participating companies contributed money to a trust account
which in tum acquired cash rich life insurance policies covering employees insured by the plan.
Benistar withdrew 9 percent of the surrender value of the policies to cover its expenses.
Promotional materials promised unlimited deductions, contribution rates that are variable from
year to year, benefits that could be provided to key employees on a selective basis, that
contributions to the plan are not limited by qualified plan rules and will not interfere with
qualified plans, funds inside the Benistar trust accumulate tax free, death benefits are income and
estate tax free, arrangements can be made for later tax-free distributions, and the funds are secure
from creditors. Section 419(a) provides that contributions to a welfare benefit fund are
deductible, limited under § 419(b) to the plan's qualified cost, but only if the contributions are
otherwise deductible under Chapter 1 of the Code. Section 419(f)(6) provides that contributions
to a mUlti-employer plan are not subject to the limit of § 419(b). The court (Judge Cohen) held
that contributions to the plans were not deductible under § 162 because the taxpayers had the
right to receive the value reflected in the underlying insurance policies in the Benistar plan, and
that the taxpayers used the plan to funnel pretax business profits into cash-laden life insurance
policies over which they retained control. The court also held that contributions to the plan were
constructive dividends rather than deductible expenses. The court found that the costs of
insurance policies under the plans claimed as deductions far exceeded the costs of providing term
life insurance to the covered employees, that the taxpayers treated the underlying policies as their
own, and that the policies could be withdrawn from the plan without cost.
•
With respect to S corporation employee shareholders in one
.
of the cases, the court pointed out that deductions claimed and denied for 2002 would properly
increase income under § 1366 and basis under § 1367 which would offset subsequent distributions.
With respect to the S corporation shareholder involved, since the corporation claimed a deduction in
2002, a year not before the court, and the actual contribution was paid in 2003, there was no
increase in income in 2003 to create basis. Absent evidence regarding basis at the end of 2002, the
court presumed that the basis was zero.
•
The· court also affirmed accuracy related penalties assessed
under § 6662(a), rejecting both the taxpayers' arguments that their positions were supported by
substantial authority and that they reasonably relied on professionals. On the latter point the court
found that the accountants on whom the taxpayers asserted reliance had no expertise in employee
benefit rules and the insurance agents had no tax expertise on which reliance was reasonably
warranted.
a.
And another one goes down. McGehee Family Clinic. P.A. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-202 (9/15/10). Same book, same plan, same judge (Cohen, J.),
different taxpayer, same result with penalties.
8.
This mountain does not blossom into cost of goods. D.L. White
Construction, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C Memo. 2010-141 (6/28/10). The taxpayer, a C
corporation, purchased 80 acres in Idaho with plans to construct four houses for sale to
customers. Unfortunately the access road to the property was owned by another who disputed in
the Idaho courts the taxpayer's right to an easement. As a consequence the taxpayer claimed the
purchased land was worthless and claimed the loss as a cost of goods sold. The Tax Court (Judge
Marvel) rejected the taxpayer's argument that the purchased land represented a cost of goods
sold. The court noted that § 471 generally prohibits inventory accounting for property that is not
merchandise and added that that land is not merchandise. The court also rejected the taxpayer's
claim that it was entitled to a business loss under § 165(a) holding that the taxpayer's claimed
loss is not evidenced by a closed and completed transaction because the adjacent land owner's
lawsuit was not finally resolved.
9.
Have you documented that your own cell phone is used for business
rather than personal purposes? Tash v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-120 (4/29/08).
Among the many deductions claimed by a lawyer that Judge Haines disallowed was the
deduction claimed for his cellular telephone, because "[t]he record did not indicate whether
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petitioner used his cellular telephone for business and/or personal calls." Inasmuch as cell phones
are listed property, Reg. § 1.274-5(c) and (t) require substantiation for the deduction.
a.
How do you steer the car? It might or might not be OK to
drive while talking on your cell phone, but it is imperative to take notes in your log book
while chatting on the phone. Alami v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-42 (2/23/09). Judge
Vasquez denied the taxpayer's claimed business deductions for cellular telephone service
because the taxpayer failed to establish the amount of time he used his cell phone for business
and personal purposes. A cellular phone is "listed property" that is subject to the strict
. substantiation requirements of § 274(d) pursuant to § 280F(d)(4)(A)(v), and a taxpayer must
establish the amount of business use and the amount of total use for the property to substantiate
the amount of expenses for listed property. An alternative ground for denying the deduction was
that the taxpayer's employer did not require that he have a cell phone.
eQuery whether there are employer reporting obligations with
respect to cell phones furnished to employees who fail to keep records?
b.
But, simplified methods for reporting cell phone use are under
consideration. Notice 2009-46, 2009-23 I.R.B. 1068 (6/8/09). IRS is considering methods to
simplify treatment of employer-provided cell phones, including a (1) "minimal personal use
method" (if the employee accounts to the employer that he has a personal cell phone for use
during business hours); and (2) a safe harbor method under which an employer would treat 75
percent of each employee's use ofthe cell phone as business usage.
e
In a letter to Representative Skelton, INFO 2009-0141
(7/8/09), the IRS advised that it is seeking clarifying legislation from Congress. 20091NT 216-62.
c.
And the Prez says to Congress "delist" cell phones. President
Obama's Fiscal Year 2011 Budget calls for Congress to amend § 280F to remove cellular
telephones from the category of listed property, thereby "effectively removing the requirement of
strict substantiation and the limitation on depreciation deductions." Department of the Treasury,
General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal Year 2011 Revenue Proposals 26 (February
2010). The substantiation requirements are "burdensome for employers"; it is difficult to
document the cost of cell phone calls, and "the cost of accounting for personal use often exceeds
the amount of any resulting income." The proposal specifically contemplates that "a cell phone
(or other similar telecommunications equipment) provided primarily for business purposes would
be excluded from gross income."
d.
Finally, there is no longer a need to keep a log book on the
front seat of your car. Section 2043 of the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 removed "cellular
telephones and similar telecommunications equipment" from the definition of "listed property"
contained in § 280F(d)(4) for taxable years beginning after 12/31109. This, in tum, eliminates the
§ 274(d) substantiation requirement for business cell phone use.
E.
Depreciation & Amortization
1.
Now that's a whole lotta expens'n goin' on! For taxable years beginning
in 2008 and 2009, the 2009 ARRA, § 1202, increases the § 179 maximum deductible amount to
$250,000 and provides a phase-out threshold of $800,000. The maximum amount allowed to be
deducted under § 179 is increased by another $35,000 for (a) qualified enterprise zone property,
I.R.C. § 1397(a)(1), and (b) qualified renewal community property acquired and placed in
service after 2001 and before 2010. I.R.C. § 1400J. In addition, for both qualified enterprise zone
property and qualified renewal community property, only fifty percent of the cost of property in
excess of the threshold for the phase-out is taken into account. I.R.C. § 1397(a)(2). I.R.C.
§ 179(e) increases the maximum amount allowed to be deducted under § 179 by $100,000, and
increases the phase-out threshold by $600,000, for qualified disaster assistance property placed
in service after 2007 (with respect to disasters declared after that date) and before 2010. The
increased expensing and ceiling limits under the 2009 ARRA also affect the special expensing
rules for enterprise zone property, renewal property, and for qualified disaster assistance
property. Thus, the maximum § 179 deduction for qualified enterprise zone and renewal property
is $285,000 for 2008 and 2009 ($250,000 + $35,000). For qualified disaster assistance property
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in 2008 and 2009 the maximum deduction is $350,000 ($250,000 +$100,000), and the phase-out
threshold is $1,400,000 ($800,000 + $600,000).
a.
And the tide of the expens'n rolls on. The 2010 HIRE Act
extended the increased $250,000 ceiling on deducting the cost of equipment under § 179, and the
increased phase-out threshold of $800,000, through taxable years beginning before 2011.
b.
Rev. Proc. 2010-24, 2010-25 I.R.B. 764 (6/1/10). The Revenue
Procedure modifies Rev. Proc. 2009-50, 2009-45 I.R.. B. 617, ~ 3.08, to update inflation adjusted
§ 179 first year depreciation to reflect increases provided by the 2010 HIRE Act increasing for
taxable years beginning in 2010 the aggregate cost of § 179 property eligible for expensing to·
$250,000 and the amount above which the deduction is red~ced to $800,000.
c.
The tide is growing into a tsunami. The Small Business Jobs Act
of 2010 increases the § 179 increases the deductible amount to $500,000 for tax years beginning
in 2010 or 2011 and increases the phase-out threshold to $2,000,000.
d.
And certain real property becomes eligible. The Small Business
Jobs Act of 2010 extends the § 179 deduction to "qualified real property" as defined in § 168(e).
Section 179(t) allows the deduction of up to $250,000 of capital expenditures for qualified
leasehold improvement property, qualified restaurant property, and qualified retail improvement
property. The qualified real property allowance is within the overall $500,000 expenditure limit
of § 179 and is limited to depreciable real property used in the taxpayer's trade or business.
e.
If that's not enough, 50 percent bonus depreciation is extended
for 2010. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 extends application of the 50 percent bonus
depreciation allowance of § 168(k) for one year to property placed in service before 1/1/11. The
50 percent allowance is available for depreciable machinery and equipment and most other
tangible personal property, and is available for computer software and certain leasehold
improvements, the first use of which began with the taxpayer.
.
2.
Converting corn to ethanol is waste reduction and resource recovery,
not a chemical process. Notice 2009-64, 2009-36 I.R.B. 307 (8/24/09). The notice contains a
proposed revenue ruling to classify tangible assets used to convert com into fuel grade ethanol as
belonging to asset class 49.5 of Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674, ten year property with a
seven year MACRS recovery period. The IRS concludes that such assets are not properly
assigned to asset class 28, manufacture of chemicals and allied products, which has a 9.5 year
class life and five year MACRS recovery period.
3.
Stimulate the economy, buy a new car, light truck or van and claim
$100 more depreciation. Rev Proc 2010-18, 2010-9 I.R.B. 427 (2/18/10). The annual dollar
limit on depreciation for passenger automobiles placed in service in 2010 is generally increased
by $100 for the first year as follows: $3,060 for the placed in service year, $4,900 for the second
tax year, $2,950 for the third tax year, and $1,775 for each succeeding year. The limits for light
trucks and vans are: $3,160 for the placed in service year, $5,100 for the second tax year, $3,050
for the third tax year, and $1,875 for each succeeding year.
4.
Ouch! Fifteen year recovery period for a one-year lived asset.
Covenant not to compete from a minority S corporation shareholder is a § 197 intangible.
Recovery Group, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-76 (4/15/10). The taxpayer S
corporation paid a retiring 23 percent shareholder/employee $400,000 for a one-year covenant
not to compete. The taxpayer asserted that the acquisition of a 23 percent interest was not
"entered into in connection with an acquisition (directly or indirectly) of an interest in a trade or
business or substantial portion thereof' as provided in § 197(d)(I)(E), and claimed a full year's
deduction for the amount paid. The court (Judge Gustafson) upon a careful analysis of the
statutory phrase concluded that the covenant was part of an acquisition of an interest in a trade or
business, that the interest was "substantial," and that in any event the term "thereof' in the
statutory language does not modify "an interest," which, therefore, need not be substantial.
5.
Fiat Lux but only for seven years. Street lights are not land
improvements. Here, it's better not to be assigned an asset class. PPL Corporation v.
Commission, 135 T.C. No.8 (7/28/10). The taxpayer public utility company claimed that
streetlights were depreciable over seven years, as property for which there is no assigned
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recovery period, while the IRS asserted that the proper recovery period for the streetlights was 20
years, as electric utility transmission and distribution plant, or alternatively 15 years, as land
improvements. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that street lighting, including lamps, poles
and wiring, owned and installed by an electric utility for public and private customers were held
to constitute property without a class life and were thus eligible for seven year MACRS recovery
under § 168(e)(2) & (3). Judge Halpern found that the streetlights were neither (1) electric utility
transmission and distribution plant, because they were "'primarily used' to make light, not to
distribute electricity," and not used in the distribution of electricity for sale, nor (2) land
improvements, because they were bolted to wood poles and buildings and not affixed to anything
in an inherently permanent way. Judge Halpern applied the six factors of Whiteco Industries, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 664 (1975), which focus on the permanence of the depreciable
property and the damage caused to it or to realty upon removal of the depreciable property:
(l) "Is the property capable of being moved, and has it in fact been moved?" (2) "Is the property
designed or constructed to remain permanently in place?" (3) "Are there circumstances which
tend to show the expected or intended length of affixation, i.e., are there circumstances which .
show that the property mayor will have to be moved?" (4) "How substantial ajob is removal of
the property and how time-consuming is it? Is it 'readily removable'?" (5) "How much damage
will the property sustain upon its removal?" and (6) "What is the manner of affixation of the
property to the land?" Every factor suggested that street lights, including poles bolted to concrete
foundations, which were easily moved, were not land improvements.
a.
Entergy Corporation & Affiliated Subsidiaries v. Commissioner,
T.C .Memo 2010-166 (7/28/10). Follows PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.8 (7/28/10),
on essentially similar facts.
F.
Credits
1.
A credit for Vinny Gambini hiring disconnected "yutes." The 2009
ARRA, § 1221, added two new categories of eligible employees for 2009 and 2010 under the
existing Code § 51 Work Opportunity Tax Credit: unemployed veterans and "disconnected
youths." To qualify as an unemployed veteran, the employee (1) must have been discharged from
active duty in the military (after serving at least 180 days or being discharged for a serviceconnected disability) during the five-year period eriding on the hiring date, and (2) must have
received unemployment compensation for at least four weeks during the one-year period ending
on the hiring date. A disconnected youth is an individual certified by the designated local agency
who is (1) at least age 16 but not yet age 25 on the hiring date, (2) not regularly attending any
secondary, technical, or post-secondary school during the six-month period preceding the hiring
date, (3) not regularly employed during the six-month period preceding the hiring date, and
(4) not readily employable by reason of,1acking a sufficient number of skills.
a.
Disconnected yutes defined. Notice 2009-28, 2009-24 I.R.B.
1082 (5/28/09), 2009 ARRA amended § 51 to add two new targeted groups for purposes of the §
51 work opportunity credit: unemployed veterans and disconnected youths who begin work for
an employer during 2009 or 2010. This provides guidance on the definition of "disconnected
youth." It also provides transition relief for employers who hire unemployed veterans or
disconnected youths after 12/31108, and before 7/17/09.
b.
The IRS is paying you not to fire newly hired people. Code
§§ 38(b) and 39, as amended by the 2010 HIRE Act, provide a credit for retaining newly hired
workers. The amount of the credit is the lesser of (1) $1,000 or (2) 6.2 percent of the wages paid
to the worker during the 52 week period following the commencement of employment in a tax
year ending after 3/18/10. The credit is not available unless the employee's wages (as defined for
income tax withholding in § 3401(a)) during the last 26 weeks of the period are at least 80
percent of the wages for the first 26 weeks of that period. The credit is allowed in the year in
which the 52 period ends. No portion of the unused business credit under § 38 for any tax year
that is attributable to the increased credit under the 2010 HIRE Act may be carried to a tax year
beginning before 3/18/10.
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2.
There is no research credit for foreign research, but foreign gross
receipts do count in calculating the amount of the allowable credit. Deere & Company v.
Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 11 (10/22/09). As in effect for the year at issue, § 41(c)(4) provided
that the § 41 (a) increasing research credit was equal to the sum of 2.65 percent of so much as of
the qualifying research expenses for the taxable year as exceeded one percent of the average
annual gross receipts of the taxpayer for the 4 taxable years preceding the credit year, 3.2 percent
of the amount of qualifying research expenditures that exceed 1.5 percent of the average gross
receipts, and 3.75 percent of the qualifying research expenditures that exceed 2 percent of the
average gross receipts for the four year period. The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) rejected the
taxpayer's assertion that average gross receipts under this provision is calculated by excluding
the annual gross receipts from foreign branches. The court concluded that nothing in the
structure of § 41 nor the legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to include
_ foreign gross receipts in the § 41(c)(4) calculation. The court indicated that if Congress had
intended to exclude foreign gross receipts, it would have so mandated. The court also concluded
that including the foreign gross receipts is not inconsistent with the focus of the research credit
on increases in domestic research activities.
3.
Property sold to customers is "supplies." Huh? TG Missouri
Corporation v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 13 (11112/09). The § 41 research credit includes in
qualified research expenses the cost of "supplies used in the course of qualified research." Under
§ 41(b)(2)(C) supplies include tangible personal property, but do not include property subject to
the allowance for depreciation. The taxpayer manufactures automobile parts for customers. In the
course of designing and producing new parts the taxpayer designs and engineers production
molds that it purchases from a third-party tool maker. Once the production molds are ready for
the production of parts for the customer the taxpayer sells the molds to the customer. However,
the taxpayer retains possession of the molds as it produces parts for the customer. The IRS
asserted that the molds are property of a character subject to the allowance for depreciation
regardless of whether the molds are depreciable property in the taxpayer's hands. The Tax Court
(Judge Marvel) accepted the taxpayer's interpretation of § 41(b)(2)(C) that the exclusion from
supplies applies to property that is subject to the allowance for depreciation in the hands of the
taxpayer. The court examined language in § 174(c) to conclude that for both purposes the
exclusion applicable to depreciable property is applicable to property that is accounted for by the
taxpayer as depreciable property. By virtue of its sale of the molds to customers, taxpayer did not
retain an economic interest in the molds entitling it to claim depreciation deductions,
notwithstanding the taxpayer's continued possession of the molds. The court also looked to
§§ 1239 and 453 to conclude that references in the Code to depreciable property are not limited
to the extrinsic nature of the property alone, but depend upon the property being depreciable in
the hands of the holder.
4•
The research credit is available for the whole boat. Trinity Industries,
Inc. v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 688 (N.D. Tex. 1129/10). For purposes of the § 41 research
credit, research undertaken for the discovery of technological infonnation, substantially all of the
research activities must constitute elements of a process that related to a new or improved
function. The tests of § 41 are applied to each "business component" of the taxpayer, which is a
product or process held for sale or used in the business. § 41(d)(2). A Trinity subsidiary designed
and built six prototype "first in class" ships. The court rejected the IRS'argument that the special
order ships were not held for sale because they were not sold out of inventory. The court also
refused to accept the assertion that because each ship consisted of numerous existing
subassemblies incorporated into a ship design that the total development cost of each ship does
not constitute a qualified research expense. Citing Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(6), the court held that as long
as the taxpayer can demonstrate that 80 percent of a first-in-class ship was part of a process of
experimentation, the entire cost is a research expenditure. The court also indicated that the
taxpayer failed to offer evidence from which the court could detennine the amount of research
expenditure relating to any business component smaller than the entire ship. The court then
found that 80 percent of the costs of two of the six projects for which the. taxpayer claimed the
research credit represented qualified experimentation.
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5.
Who says Congress doesn't love small bidnesses? Big bidnesses are
required to buy health insurance for their employees and must pay excise taxes if they
don't; small bidnesses, which aren't required to buy health insurance for their employees
get, a tax credit if they do. New § 45R, added by the 2010 Health Care Act, adds to the § 38
general business credit a credit for health insurance expenses of small business· employers,
effective for taxable years beginning after 2010. This provision is generally intended to
encourage small employers, who are not required to provide health insurance to their employees
under other provisions of the Act, to provide health insurance benefits to their employees. Some
amount of the credit is available to a business employer with no more than 25 full-time
equivalent employees (2,080 hours is an FTE), if the employees have average annual full-time
equivalent wages of no more than $50,000 (as adjusted for inflation after 2014). The full amount
of the credit is available only to an employer with 10 or fewer full-time equivalent employees,
whose employees have average annual full-time equivalent wages from the employer of less than
$25,000 (as adjusted for inflation after 2014). Seasonal workers are not taken into account.
Employer aggregation rules apply. Self-employed individuals, including partners and sole
proprietors, two percent shareholders of an S Corporation, and five percent owners of the
employer (as defined in § 416(i)(I)(B)(i)) are not treated as employees, and sole proprietors
cannot claim the credit with respect to employees who are family members. The credit applies
only to contributions under a plan that requires the employer to make a nonelective contribution
on behalf of each employee who enrolls in certain defined qualifying health insurance offered to
employees by the employer equal to a uniform percentage (not less than 50 percent) of the
premium cost of the qualifying health plan. Before the phase-out rules are applied, the amount of
the credit equals the "applicable percentage" of the employer's mandatory health insurance
premium for each covered employee; amounts paid under a cafeteria plan are not taken into
account. For 2010 through 2013, the applicable percentage is 35 percent; for years after 2013, the
applicable percentage is 50 percent. However, the credit cannot exceed the applicable percentage
multiplied by the contributions that the employer would have made during the taxable year if
each employee had enrolled in coverage with a "small business benchmark premium" (as defined
in the statute). The phase out formula depends on (1) whether the employer has more than 10
employees, (2) whether the employees' average wages exceed $25,000, (3) whether both (1) and
(2) apply, and whether the year is claimed, i.e., the year after the taxable year with respect to
which the credit is claimed, is 2011 through 2013 or after 2013. We will not provide the gory
details. The credit is nonrefundable, but may offset AMT liability. The employer's § 162
deduction is reduced by the amount of the credit.
a.
Healthy credits. Rev. Rul. 2010-13, 2010-21 I.R.B. 691 (5/3/10).
Section 45R enacted in the Health Care Act, provides a credit to eligible small employers (fewer
than 25 employees with average annual wages around $50,000), including tax exempt
employers, who make nonelective contributions (contributions that are not part of a salary
reduction agreement) towards employee health care based on a percentage of the lesser of (1) the
amount of nonelective contributions paid by the small employer and (2) the amount of
nonelective contributions the employer would have paid if employees were enrolled in a plan
that required the average premium for the small group market in the state in which the employer
is offering health care coverage. The ruling sets forth the average premiums for the small group
market in each state for the 2010 taxable year. The tables include average premiums for both
single coverage and family coverage.
b.
The IRS tells employers how to count, and throws in some
transition relief. Notice 2010-44, 2010-22 I.R.B. 717 (5/17/10). This notice provides
comprehensive (?) guidance regarding the § 45R credit for small employers that make
nonelective contributions towards their employees' health insurance premiums, including
guidance for determining eligibility for the credit, calculating the credit, and claiming the credit.
It explains how to determine the number of hours of service worked by employees during the
taxable year and how to compute FTEs. The credit is available for add-on dental and vision
coverage was well as for traditional health insurance. Because the § 45R credit applies to taxable
years beginning in 2010, including the period in 2010 before its enactment, the notice provides
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transitional relief under which an employer will be deemed to satisfy the requirement that the
employer pay a uniform percentage, not less than 50 percent, of the premium cost of the health
insurance coverage. For taxable years beginning in 2010, this uniformity requirement will be
deemed to have been met if the employer pays an amount equal to at least 50 percent of the
premium for single (employee-only) coverage for each employee enrolled in coverage offered to
employees by the employer, even if the employer does not pay the same percentage of the
premium for each such employee.
6.
It will be difficult for Alliantgroup to be retrospectively generating
these new research credits for clients. Section 48D, added by the 2010 Health Care Act,
provides a 50 percent nonrefundable investment tax credit for qualif1ed investments in qualifying
"therapeutic discovery projects," which is a term with a complicated definition. The credit is
available only to companies having 250 or fewer employees, and the right to claim the credit
must be awarded by the Treasury company-by-company, in consultation with HHS, to
companies that apply. Oh, yeah, only a total of $1 billion can be awarded. The many small
details will probably bore you.
a.
The IRS creates the program. Notice 2010-45, 2010-23 I.R.B.
734 (5/22/10). This notice establishes the qualifying therapeutic discovery project program and
provides the procedures under which an eligible taxpayer may apply for certification from the
IRS of a qualified investment with respect to a qualifying therapeutic discovery project as
eligible for a credit, or for certain taxpayers, a grant under the program.
7.
Leveraging the new markets tax credit is OK! Rev. Rul. 2010-17, 201026 I.R.B. 769 (6/24/10). Rev. Rul. 2010-17, 2010-26 I.R.B. 769 (6/8/10). Section 45D(b)
provides that an equity investment in a qualified community development entity eligible for the
new markets tax credit is a qualified equity investment in cash. The IRS ruled that, consistent
with the holding of Rev. Rul. 2003-20, 2003-1 C.B. 465, that an equity investment by an LLC
which is funded with a nonrecourse loan to the LLC qualifies for the new markets tax credit, an
equity investment includes cash from a recourse loan obtained by an LLC.
8.
Mid-audit CCA changing the IRS's view doesn't cut the mustard as
authority to support an asserted deficiency. The Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, 106
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5433 (S.D. Ohio 6/25/10). Section 41 (a)(1) allows a credit of 20 percent of the
amount by which the taxpayer's qualified research expenditures for the year exceed the
taxpayer's "base amount" of qualified research expenditures. Generally speaking, the "base
amount" is the company's "fixed base percentage" - the percentage of the company's gross
receipts expended for research from 1984 through 1988(subject to a 16 percent ceiling) multiplied by the company's average annual receipts for the preceding four years (but the base
will not be less than 50 percent of the qualified research expenses for the credit year). Section
41(f) provides that for purposes of computing the credit, all members of the same controlled
group of corporations will be treated as a single corporation. Reg. § 1.41-6(b), as well Temp.
Reg. § 1.41-6T(b), which was the controlling regulation for the years in question, provides that
"[t]he group credit is computed by applying all of the section 41 computational on an aggregate
basis." Pursuant to § 41(f)(5), a "controlled group" is defmed by a cross reference to § 1563(a),
substituting 50 percent for 80 percent, and thus should include foreign group members In
computing its credit, P&G excluded from gross receipts from intercompany transactions within
its group, including transactions with foreign members. This method was acceptable to the IRS
under CCA 200233011, but during the course of the audit, the IRS issued CCA 200620023,
which provided that only research expenditures and not gross receipts within a controlled group
should be disregarded, the position that the government maintained in the litigation. The court
held that P&G had properly computed the § 41 research credit by disregarding both research
expenditures and gross receipts within its controlled group. The court rejected the government's
argument that Deere & Company v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 11 (10122/09), supported its
position, concluding that Deere was not relevant because specific statutory and regulatory
language was controlling.

17

Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
HIRE tax credits explained. Notice 2010-35, 2010-19 I.R.B. 660
(4/26/1 0). The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act provides for an irrevocable election
to receive direct payment of otherwise allowable tax credits to holders of new clean renewable
energy bonds (§ 54C), qualified energy conservation bonds (§ 54D), qualified zone academy
bonds (§ 54E), and qualified school construction bonds (§ 54F) that are issued after 3/18/1 O.
Direct Pay Tax Credit Bonds provide a federal borrowing subsidy through payment of a
refundable tax credit to issuers with respect to each interest payment. The credit is the lesser of
(1) the amount of interest payable, or (2) 100 percent of the interest on school construction and
qualified zone academy bonds and 70 percent of the interest on clean renewable energy bonds
and qualified energy conservation bonds that .would have been payable if· the interest were
determined at the tax credit bond rate under § 54A(b)(3). The notice describes requirements for
qualifying an issue as a direct pay tax credit bonds and requires issuers to elect that status the day
before issue. Issuers are required to file a revised Form 8038-CP to request payment of a
refundable credit. The credit will be paid contemporaneously with the applicable interest
payment date of fixed rate bonds. Payments will be made quarterly with respect to variable
interest rate bonds. The notice also specifies reporting requirements.
H.
Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs
1.
Carry me back to those long ago days of yore, when (here were profits
to be offset by today's NOL. The 2009 ARRA, § 1211(b), amended Code § 172 to permit an
"eligible small business" to elect to extend the carryback period for a net operating loss arising in
2008 to any number of years greater than two or fewer than six - i.e., the elected carryback
period may be five, four, or three years. (Absent an election the normal two year carryback rule
still applies.) An "eligible small business" is defined in § 172(b)(I)(H)(iv) (through cross
references to § 172(b)(1)(F») as a corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship with average
annual gross receipts of $15 million or less. An election under § 172(b)(1 )(H) must be made by
the due date (including extensions) for filing the taxpayer's return for the year the net operating
loss arose (i.e., 2008). If the taxpayer is on a fiscal year, the election can be made with respect to
either the taxable ending in 2008 or the taxable year beginning in 2008, but not with respect to
both taxable years. § 172(b)(1 )(H)(ii),(iii). The election is irrevocable.
a.
And here's instructions on how to get back to those days of
yore. Rev. Proc. 2009-19, 2009-14 IRB 747 (3/16/09). This revenue procedure provides
guidance under § 1211 of 2009 ARRA, which amended § 172(b)(1 )(H) to allow a taxpayer that
is an eligible small business to elect a 3-, 4-, or 5-year NOL carryback for a taxable year ending
after 2007.
b.
Rev. Proc. 2009-19 was modified and superseded by Rev. Proc.
2009-26. Rev. Proc. 2009-26, 2009-19 I.R.B. 935 (4/25/09). This revenue procedure was issued
because many eligible small businesses inadvertently failed to make valid elections that
.
complied with Rev. Proc. 2009-19.
c.
Now the carryback is available to larger businesses as well.
Section 13 of the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 (WHABA)
amends § 172 to permit larger businesses to make the 2009 ARRA 2008 and 2009 NOL
carryback election of up to five years. The election applies with respect to NOLs incurred in
either 2008 or 2009, but not both years. In addition, 2008 or 2009 NOLs can be used to offset
only fifty percent of the taxable income earned in the fifth prior taxable year. This 50 percent
limit does not apply to carrybacks of 2008 losses by "eligible small businesses." In addition, an
"eligible small business" may take advantage of the extended carryback rules with respect to
both 2008 and 2009 losses, rather than the losses of only one of those years. Generally, the
extended NOL carry back election is not available for TARP recipients or corporations that, at
any time during 2008 or 2009 were a member of an affiliated group including a T ARP recipient.
•
This provision also increases the use of NOLs to offset a
corporation's alternative minimum taxable income by the NOLs the taxpayer elects to carry back up
to five taxable years and removes the 90 percent AMT limit.
G.
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d.
More instructions. Rev. Proc. 2009-52, 2009-49 I.R.B. 744
(11/20/09). This revenue ruling provides guidance regarding procedures for making the election
and its effect. The revenue procedure explains which business can elect the net operating loss
carry back periods provided by WHABA.
e.
Notice 2010-58, 2010-37 I.R.B. _
(8/20/10). This notice
provides guidance in Q&A format regarding twenty particular issues that have arisen regarding
the election to carryback NOLs for three, four, or five years under § 172(b)(1 ) (H), as amended
by the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of2009.
2.
Life for those outside the Rev. Proc. 2009-20 Madoff safe-harbor rule
is tough. Vincentini v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-255 (11/9/09). Judge Marvel held that
the taxpayer could not deduct any portion of a $511,500 theft loss incurred in fraudulent
investment scheme because he failed to prove that he had no reasonable prospect of recovery.
The taxpayer offered no evidence regarding (1) whether he had received or would receive any
restitution, (2) the status of any restitution payments, (3) the availability of funds from the
substantial forfeitures ordered by the state court, (4) whether the perpetrators were judgment
proof or had insufficient assets to satisfy the restitution orders, (5) that the forfeitures did not
occur as ordered, or (6) that it was otherwise improbable that he would receive restitution
pursuant to the restitution orders.
I.
At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses
1.
Limited Liability Partnership and Limited Liability Company
membership interests are not presumptively limited partnership interests under the passive
activity loss rules. Garnett v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 19 (6/30/09). The taxpayers held a
number of direct and. indirect interests in limited liability partnerships and LLCs that were
engaged in agribusiness. Section 469(h)(2) provides that a limited partnership interest will not be
treated as an interest with respect to which a taxpayer is a material participant, except as
provided in regulations. Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3) provides that a limited partner materially
participates in a partnership activity only if (1) the taxpayer devotes more than 500 hours to the
activity in the year, (2) the taxpayer materially participates in the activity for five of the
preceding ten taxable years, or (6) the activity is a personal service activity in which the
taxpayer materially participated for any. three preceding years. defines a limited partnership
interest as an interest designated as a .limited partner interest in a partnership agreement or an
interest for which the partner has limited liability. Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)(ii) has an
exception from the material participation rule for an interest of a limited partner who also holds a
general partner interest. The court (Judge Thornton) concluded that in the case of an interest in a
limited liability partnership or a limited liability company, both of which the court describes as
different from a limited partnership, the interests are not to be treated as limited partnership
interests under § 469(h)(2). Holders of such interests are not barred by state law from materially
participating in the affairs of the entity and thus hold their interests as general partners within the
meaning of the temporary regulations. Thus, whether or not the taxpayer is a material participant
requires a full factual inquiry and an LLC member can satisfy the material .participation
requirement under any of the seven tests in Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a).
a.
The Court of Federal Claims agrees. Thompson v. United States,
87 Fed. Cl. 728 (7/20/09). The court (Judge Block) granted summary judgment treating the
taxpayer member/manager of an LLC as a material participant. The taxpayer's degree of
participation was stipulated and the only question was whether § 469(h)(2) precluded treating the
taxpayer as a material participant in a Texas LLC. The court noted that § 469(h)(2) treats limited
partners differently because of an assumption that limited partners do not materially participate
in their limited partnerships. In an LLC, on the other hand, all members have limited liability but
members may participate in management. The court noted that Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3)
treats a partnership interest as a limited partner interest if the holder has limited liability "under
the law of the State in which the partnership is organized." The court held that the quoted
language applies only to an entity that is a partnership under state law, which does not include an
LLC that isa different state law entity that is treated as a partnership for tax purposes. The
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taxpayer was both a member and manager of the LLC. Unlike a limited partner, a member
manager does not lose limited liability by participation in the management of the LLC. The court
also recognized that shareholders of an S corporation have limited liability as shareholders, but
participate in management, and are not subject to being automatically treated as passive
participants. The taxpayer, therefore, was "able to demonstrate his material participation in the
activity by using all seven of the Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a) tests."
b.
Ditto. Hegarty v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Ope 2009-153
(10/6/09), is to the same effect.
c.
Ditto again. Newell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-23
(2/16110). Relying on Garnett v. Commissioner, supra, Judge Marvel held that the interest of a
managing member of a California LLC was not a limited a partnership interest for purposes of
Reg. § 1.469-5T(c)(1). Taxpayer's losses were not passive activity losses because the IRS
conceded that the taxpayer met the "significant participation" test of Temp. Reg. § 14695T(a)(4).
d.
The IRS acquiesces. AOD 2010-02, 2010-14 I.R.B. _ (3/9/10).
The IRS acquiesces in the result in Thompson.
2.
Deciding on whether to uphold the Commissioner's rejection of this
horse lover's losses is like pulling teeth. Cunningham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-194
(8/31/09). The' taxpayer, a New York dentist, claimed losses from five partnership horse
activities in California on returns prepared by a tax return preparer. The court (Judge Cohen)
found that the taxpayer had no knowledge of whether or not the horse activities occurred as
represented in the partnership returns. He relied on representations by the return preparer in
deducting the partnership losses against their other income. The taxpayer's suggestion that the
court Google the return preparer to ascertain that the taxpayer was mislead by a charlatan and
that paying the tax would result in financial hardship did not impress Judge Cohen, and the
deficiency was upheld. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that he had reasonable
cause for failing to file a timely return and imposed penalties under § 6651(a)(I).
3.
Reporting self-help slicing, dicing, gluing, and pasting of passive
activities. Tell the IRS about grouping trade or business activities. Rev. Proc. 2010-13, 20104 I.R.B. 329 (1/6/10). This revenue procedure requires taxpayers to report to the IRS their
groupings and regroupings of activities and the addition of activities within their existing
groupings of activities under Reg. § 1.469-4(c) for purposes of § 469. A written statement must
be filed with the original income tax return for the first taxable year in which two or more trade
or business activities or rental activities are originally grouped as a single activity. The statement
must contain a declaration that the grouped activities constitute an appropriate economic unit for
the measurement of gain or loss under § 469. A similar statement must be filed with a return for
first taxable year of a regrouping or the taxable year in which a new trade or business activity or
a rental activity to an existing grouping. A partnership or S corporation must disclose as required
on the entity's tax return and by separately stating the amounts of income and loss for each
grouping, and a partner or shareholder is not required to make a separate disclosure unless the
partner or shareholder (l) groups together any of the activities that the entity does not group
together, (2) groups the entity's activities with activities conducted directly by the partner or
shareholder, or (3) groups the entity's activities with activities conducted through other entities.
•
A taxpayer is not required to file a report of groupings in
existence prior to the 112511 0 effective date of the revenue procedure.
a.
Contrary to Jackie Gleason, this was not a "good group."
Grouping activities under § 469 requires an explicit election, not merely a reporting
position. Trask v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-78 (4115/10). The taxpayer failed to make
an explicit election on his return to aggregate rental real estate activities as required by Reg.
§ 1.469-9(g). the Tx Court (Judge Goeke) held that merely aggregating real estate rental activity
losses on his returns was not an effective election. Thus, although the taxpayer established that
he was a "real estate professional" as defmed in § 469(c)(7), all of the claimed losses were
disallowed because he failed to prove that he materially participated any of the rental activities
on an activity-by-activity basis.
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b.
Elect to aggregate, or be segregated. Shiekh v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2010-126 (6/10/10). On facts substantially similar to the facts in Trask, .the Tax
Court (Judge Wells) reached a similar result. The taxpayer materially participated in the
operation of rental properties in Miami Beach, Florida, and owned additional properties
including properties in Ventura and Culver City, California. The taxpayer did not file the election
required by § 469(c) which would have allowed the taxpayer, as a real estate professional, to
aggregate all of his real estate activities into a single activity for purposes of treating all of the
real estate income and losses as active. The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that aggregating
properties on a return filed in the year the taxpayer claimed ordinary loss on the sale of his
Ventura property was not adequate notice of an election to aggregate properties under Reg.
§ 1.469-9(g)(3). The taxpayer was found not to be a material participant with respect to his
Ventura and Culver City properties. The taxpayer was allowed to reduce capital gain in the year
he sold the Ventura property by expenses incurred in the year of sale.
4.
A song and a dance doesn't make the law practice a professional real
estate business, but renting your building to the law practice is active. Langille v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-49 (3118110). The taxpayer Deanna Langille, formerly known
as Deanna Birdsong, worked long hours in her law practice and devoted somewhat less of her
time to her rental real estate activities. Unfortunately for the taxpayer she resigned from her law
practice in lieu of disciplinary proceedings implemented for misappropriation of funds from her
firm's client trust accounts. To make matters worse, after an unsuccessful negotiation for the sale
of her law practice, the potential buyer reported to the IRS that the taxpayer maintained two sets
of books for the practice, which resulted in a criminal investigation and a guilty plea to one count
of a tax fraud indictment. In the civil tax matter the Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) found that the
taxpayer willfully failed to report income from her law practice and residential real estate rental
activities (from which she had no profit). The taxpayer was unable to establish the number of
hours she worked on her residential real estate activities and thus was unable to establish herself
as a real estate professional under the 50 percent of all personal services requirement of
§ 469(c)(7)(B)(i) or that she satisfied the 750 hour requirement of § 469(c)(7)(B)(ii). In addition,
the court held that income from the taxpayer's rental of office space to her law practice in which
she was a material participant was not passive activity income under Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6).
5.
An activity log that reflects work days in excess of 24 hours isn't very
. credible (unless you were on an airplane to the West Coast). Goolsby v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2010-64 (4/1/10). The taxpayers owned several rental real estate properties with respect
to which they claimed net losses. The IRS disallowed the losses as passive activity losses, and
the taxpayers claimed that one of them spent more than 750 hours a year managing the properties
and that under the § 469(c)(7)(B) real estate professional rule, the losses were treated as active
business losses. Judge Wells rejected the taxpayers' arguments. He found that the activity log
purporting to document the hours of management activity was not credible. It was created after
the taxpayers' return was selected for audit and solely for purposes of the case in controversy.
The taxpayers "presented no evidence of contemporaneous records, such as appointment books,
calendars, or narrative summaries, that would credibly support the ... activity log. Incredibly, the
... activity log lists days during which [the taXpayer] allegedly logged more than 24 hours of
work."
6.
New market tax credits are not treated as passive activity credits. Rev.
Rul. 2010-16, 2010-26 I.R.B. 769 (6/8/10). Section 45D provides a new market credit for an
equity investment in a qualified community development entity, an entity that invests in or loans
money to a qualified active low-income community business, purchases loans from another
qualified community development entity, provides fmancial counseling to residents of lowincome communities, or loans money or makes an equity investment in a qualified community
development entity. A qualified community development entity does not itself need to be
engaged in a trade or business. Thus, the Ruling concludes that when an individual acquires an
equity investment in a qualified community development entity that is not in connection with the
conduct of a trade or business by the individual, § 45D credits are not passive activity credits
under § 469(d)(2) because a passive activity is defined in §469(c) as an activity that is a trade or

21

business in which the taxpayer does not materially participate. The ruling also concludes that
new market credits derived from acquisition of an equity interest in a qualified community
development entity by a partnership that is not in connection with the partnership's conduct of a
trade or business are not passive activity credits.
7.
Here's an example of why Tax Court Summary Opinions aren't and
shouldn't be precedential. Ajah v Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-90 (7/8/10). This
otherwise unremarkable summary opinion, denying the taxpayer's claim that he rental real estate
losses from two properties were not subject to the § 469 passive activity loss rules because she
was real estate professional under § 469(c)(7) is notable only for a glaring error of law that likely
did not affect the outcome, but demonstrates that some decided cases contain statements that are
just flat out wrong and should be ignored. The taxpayer was held not to qualify because her
"method of calculating her time spent participating in the rental activities constitutes an
impermissible 'ballpark guesstimate'" that under Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(:t)(4) was not an
acceptable method of establishing her participation She had no records and simply testified that
she worked at least 20 hours a week for 52 weeks on the two rental properties. Not content to
stop there, the judge continued by finding that the taxpayer had failed to properly aggregate the
two rental properties into a single activity because merely aggregating items on Schedule E is
insufficient - a point on which he was correct - and then concluding that because she had not
aggregated the activities, to qualify as a real estate professional under § 469(c)(7)(B) she "would
need to perform 750 hours of service for each rental real estate interest for a total of 1,500 hours
to meet the test" - a conclusion that every kindergartner knows is not what is required by the
statute.
•
Section 469(c)(7)(B)(ii) requires that "such taxpayer
performs more than 750 hours of services during the taxable year in real property trades or
businesses in which the taxpayer materially participates." This langliage clearly means that the 750
hours requirement refers to the aggregate number of hours in all real property trades or businesses in
which the taxpayer materially participates and is not a property-by-property requirement. Only
material participation· is determined on a property-by-property basis, except with respect those
properties. Trask v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-78 (4/15/10), which was cited in this case as
the basis for the errant holding, did not so hold. A careful reading of Trask indicates that in that
because the taxpayer who was able to prove that he devoted more than one-half of his time and
more than 750 hours of total time to managing over thirty rental properties he was held to qualify as
a real estate professional under § 469(c)(7)(B), but because he failed properly to elect to treat all of
his rental properties as a single activity for purposes of § 469(c)(7)(A) and he "did not contend that
he materially participated in each of his rental activities when viewed separately," he did not qualify
for the exception. Section 467(c)(7) removes from the passive activity basket only those rental
activities in which the real estate professional materially participates.
8.
Estate of K. Roberts v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-165 (7121110).
The deceased taxpayer was the sole owner of a leasing LLC organized for the purpose of leasing
trucking equipment to the taxpayer's solely owned S corporation. The taxpayer "lent" the LLC
$425,000 for a promissory note. The LLC issued a cashier's check in the same amount which
was used to fund a portion of the $1.4 million purchase price of a luxury RV. The court (Judge
Goeke) found that the RV was not used by the LLC in its leasing activity and therefore the
taxpayer was not at-risk under § 465 for the contribution to the LLC because the funds were not
borrowed for use "in an activity" as required by § 465(b)(2).
9.
Stangeland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-185 (8/16/10). The
deceased taxpayer was an investor in numerous business enterprises, all of which were
independently managed. One of the businesses, R&L Air, L.L.C. was formed to own and lease
two airplanes. The airplanes were managed by a third party under contract. The taxpayer also
maintained a consulting business as a sole-proprietor to help manage his businesses. He worked
approximately 50 hours per week for the consulting business. The taxpayer periodically leased
the R&L airplanes for use in his consulting business and also used the airplanes in the course of
charitable activities and in pursuit of private investment activities .. The court (Judge Cohen) first
held that the taxpayer's consulting activities did not constitute a trade or business but described
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the consulting activity as being engaged to increase the value of the taxpayer's numerous
investments. The court thus disallowed deductions of expenses incurred in the consulting
activity. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that the consulting business should be
combined the airplane leasing business as a single activity in which the taxpayer participated for
more than 500 hours. To combine the two activities under Reg. § 1.469-4(c), both must be found
to constitute a trade or business, a test which the consulting activity failed. The court also
rejected the taxpayer's argument that his participation in the two activities qualified under the
significant participation test of Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(4), again because the consulting activity
failed to qualify as a trade or business. However, for one of the three tax years at issue, the court
. found that the taxpayer participated in activities of various businesses for more than 500 hours
and in the activities of the airplane leasing activity for at least 100 hours, and that the losses from
the airplane leasing activity were not passive activity losses for that year.
10.
Time off from the nuclear power plant is not being a real estate
professional. Moss v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 18 (9/20/10). The taxpayer, who worked full
time as a maintenance planner at a nuclear power plant, owned several rental real estate
properties. The taxpayer recorded the days, but not the time worked in maintenance on the rental
properties in a daily calendar. The taxpayer claimed that he worked a total of 645 hours on rental
properties (including travel time) and attempted to add time that he was "on-call" anytime he
was not working at the power plant in order to satisfy the minimum 750 hour requirement of
§ 469(c)(7)(B)(ii) to qualify as a real estate professional. The court (Judge Wells) held that only
time for services actually performed could be counted towards the 750 hour requirement, which
did not include time while the taxpayer was on call. However, the court also found that the
taxpayer actively participated in the rental real estate activities and was, therefore, entitled to the
§ 469(i) $25,000 allowance, but subject to being phased out to the extent the taxpayer's income
exceeded $100,000. The court also held that the taxpayer was subject to the § 6662 accuracy
related penalty.
ITI.
INVESTMENT GAIN AND INCOME
A.
Gains and Losses
1.
Gross income without cash upon surrender of life insurance policy
with outstanding policy loans. Barr v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-250 (11/3/09). When
an insurance company withholds from the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy upon its
surrender amounts necessary to repay policy loans, the withheld amount is constructively
realized by the owner of the policy and is included in the amount taxable under § nee).
2.
Pizza is the eighth deadly sin, and the ninth is stealing the sausage
process, even if the damages are taxable. Freda v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-191
(8/25/09). The taxpayer supplied Pizza Hut with pre-cooked sausage prepared with the
taxpayer's patented process. The taxpayer also entered into license and royalty agreements to
provide its trade secrets to other Pizza Hut suppliers. After discovering that Pizza Hut disclosed
the process to an unlicensed supplier who also sold pre-cooked sausage to Pizza Hut, the .
taxpayer recovered damages from Pizza Hut for misappropriation of trade secrets. The court
(Judge Chiechi) held that the damages were received as compensation for lost profits, and thus
were taxable as ordinary income. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the damages
were for injury to or destruction of the trade secret, a capital asset.
.
3.
New rules for determining basis in securities. The Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], Act § 403, amends § 1012 to create new rules
for determining the basis of securities acquired after 12/31/10. The FIFO or other conventions
for determining the basis of securities when sold must be applied on an account-by-account
basis. Thus, with· respect to a taxpayer who holds the same stock in more than one account,
determining the basis of sold securities from any account will be determined solely with regard
to the basis of securities in that account. In addition, § 1012(d) provides for averaging the basis
of stock acquired in a dividend reinvestment plan. Stock in a dividend reinvestment plan is
treated as held in a separate account for purposes of determining basis.
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a.
No more fooling the IRS about basis. The Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 [Division B], § 403, adding § 6045(g), requires brokers to report the
customer's basis in a "covered security" and whether gain or loss is long-term or short-term, in
addition to the existing requirement that the broker report gross sales proceeds. In general, the
customer's basis is to be reported on a first-in first-out method, unless an average basis method is
permissible. Covered securities include securities acquired through an account with the broker or
transferred to the broker from another account on or after an applicable date. January 1,2011, is
the applicable date for stocks. January 1,2012, is the applicable date for stocks unde.r the average
basis method. January 1, 2013, or such later date as specified by the IRS, is the applicable date
for any other security. Under § 6045A, a taxpayer transferring securities to a broker will be
required to report information required by regulations necessary to permit the broker to meet its
reporting requirements. Section 6045B requires the issuer of any security to report information
describing any organizational action that affects the basis of the security.
.
b .
And the IRS begins to gear up. REG-l 0 1896-09, Basis Reporting
by Securities Brokers and Basis Determination for Stock, 74 F.R. 67010 (12/17/09). These
proposed· regulations relate to reporting sales of securities by brokers (prop .. Reg. § 1.6045-1)
and determining the basis of securities. (prop. Reg. § 1.1012-1). The proposed regulations reflect
changes in the law made by the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 that require
brokers when reporting the sale of securities to the IRS to include the customer's adjusted basis
in the sold securities and to classify any gain or loss as long-term or short-term. The proposed
regulations under § 1012 alter how taxpayers compute basis when averaging the basis of shares
acquired at different prices and expand the ability of taxpayers to compute basis by averaging
. with respect to RIC shares and shares specifically held in a dividend reinvestment plan. Brokers
must furnish information statements to customers by February 15th. The proposed regulations
provide for the implementation of new reporting requirements imposed upon persons that
transfer custody of stock and upon issuers of stock regarding organizational actions that affect
the basis of the issued stock. It also contains proposed regulations reflecting changes in the law
that alter how brokers report short sales of securities.
4•
Question: When is the amount for which you could sell something
much less than its value for determining a bargain purchase? Answer: When it's a whole
life insurance policy sold from a pension plan to the insured plan participant. Matthies v.
Commissioner, 134 T.e. No.6 (2/22110). Pursuant to a prearranged plan, the taxpayer rolled
over approximately $1.3 million from an IRA to a profit sharing plan; the profit sharing plan
then purchased a life insurance policy on the insured for $1.3 million and sold the policy to the
taxpayer for approximately $300,000; and the taxpayer transferred the life insurance policy to a
trust for estate planning purposes. At the time of the sale of the policy from the profit sharing
plan to the taxpayer, the life insurance policy had an "account value" of approximately $1.3
million, but was subject to a "surrender charge" of approximately $1,000,000, thereby reducing
its cash surrender value to approximately $300,000. The surrender charge would diminish over
time and be completely phased out after 20 years. The IRS asserted that the taxpayer recognized
$1,000,000 of income on the bargain purchase because it was not an arm's length transaction,
and Judge Thornton agreed with the IRS. First, he found that on the facts, the transaction was not
arm's length because the only trustees of the profit sharing plan were the taxpayer and his wife.
Turning to the valuation issue, Judge Thornton rejected the taxpayer's argument that the value of
the insurance policy was its cash surrender value, which was equal to the amount the taxpayer
paid the profit sharing plan for the policy. He reached the same result as the IRS, but via a
slightly different road. Judge Thornton concluded that under §§ 402 and 72(e), the amount of a
distribution in the form of a life insurance policy is the cash surrender value determined without
any surrender charges, rather than the new surrender value. Finally, he concluded that the excess
of the cash surrender value determined without any surrender charges, minus the amount paid by
the taxpayer - approximately $1,000,000 - was gross income under § 61.
S.
Ex-post recharacterization is not an option for taxpayers. United
States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569 (4th Cir. 4/16/10). The Fourth Circuit affirmed a summary
judgment for the government in an erroneous refund suit. The taxpayer exchanged her
24

(

(

(

(

partnership interest in Ernst & Young for stock of Cap Gemini, a corporation' acquiring E&Y' s
consulting business, in a transaction that was not a statutory nonrecognition event; however, the
stock was held in escrow to enforce a forfeiture provision if the seller-taxpayer failed to perform
certain services as an employee of the acquiring corporation. The taxpayer initially reported that
all of the Cap Gemini shares received vested in the year 2000 (the year of the exchange), but
after the stock declined in value took the position that income was realized in 2000 only to the
extent of cash received in that year and the remainder of the income was recognized in 2003
(when the stock was worth less than one-fifth of its 2000 value). The court held that if a taxpayer
exchanges one property for a different property, the gain realized on the exchange must be
recognized in the year the exchange occurs, even though the property received in the exchange is
forfeitable if contractual provisions or representations in the contract for exchange are not
subsequently satisfied and even though the property received in the exchange is held in escrow to
assure enforcement of the forfeitability provisions. Furthermore, the court refused to accept the
taxpayer's argument that the transaction could be recast into a form different than that which it
had taken.
To put it plainly, we have bound taxpayers to "the 'form' of their transaction"
when they attempt to recharacterize an otherwise valid agreement bargained for in
good faith. [citation omitted] We have also refused to entertain arguments "that
the 'substance' of their transaction triggers different tax consequences." [citation
omitted] This precept not only maintains the vital public policy of enforcing
otherwise valid contracts, but also assures the reliability of agreed tax
consequences to the public fisc ....
There is no "disparity" in allowing "the Commissioner alone to pierce formal"
agreements as "taxpayers have it within their own control to choose in the first
place whatever arrangements they care to make." [citation omitted]
'.
Earlier cases that reached the same result for other taxpayers
involved in the same transaction include United States v. Fletcher, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 4/10/09);
United States v. Cu/p, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-618,2007-1 U.S.T.C. ~50,399 (M.D. Tenn. 12/29/06);
and United States v. Nackel, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-474 (C.D. Cal. 10/20/09).
6.
When does a debt instrument that has in effect become a proprietary
interest because the creditor is insolvent remain a debt instrument? REG-106750-10,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Public Hearing, Modifications of Debt
Instruments, 75 F.R. 31736 (6/4/10). The Treasury Department has proposed amendments to
Reg. § 1.1001-3, which deals with when a modification of a debt instrument results in an
exchange for purposes of § 1001 (gain or loss realization by creditor) and § 61(a)(l2) (realization
of COD income by debtor). Under Reg. § 1.1001-3(e)(5), a modification of a debt instrument
that results in an instrument or property right that is not debt for tax purposes is a significant
modification. An analysis of all of the factors relevant to a debt determination of the modified
instrument at the time of an alteration or modification is required. However, Prop. Reg. § 1.10013(f)(7) would clarify that any deterioration in the financial condition of the issuer between the
date the debt instrument was issued and the date it was altered or modified, insofar as it relates to
the issuer's ability to repay the debt instrument, will not be not taken into account in determining
whether the instrument has been c·onverted to another type of interest, unless there is a
substitution of a new obligor or the addition or deletion of a co-obligor. Thus, any decrease in the
fair market value of a debt instrument (whether or not publicly traded) is not taken into account
to the extent that the decrease in fair market value is attributable to the deterioration in the
financial condition of the issuer, rather than to a modification of the terms of the instrument, but
only for purposes of determining the nature of the instrument. According to the preamble,
"[c]onsistent with this rule in the proposed regulations, if a debt instrument is significantly
modified and the issue price of the modified debt instrument is determined under Reg. § 1.12732(b) or (c) (relating to a fair market value issue price for publicly traded debt), then any increased
yield on the modified debt instrument attributable to this issue price generally is not taken into
account to determine whether the modified debt instrument is debt or some other property right
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for Federal income tax purposes. However, any portion of the increased yield that is not
attributable to deterioration in the fmancial condition of the issuer, such as a change in market
interest rates, is taken into account."
The provisions of Prop. Reg. § 1.1001-3(:£)(7) will be
•
effective upon fmalization, but taxpayers may rely on paragraph (:£)(7) of this section for alterations
of the terms ofa debt instrument occurring before that date. See Prop. Reg. § 1.1001-3(h)(2)
7.
Should the name of the promoter of this tax scam been "Devious,"
instead of "Derivium?" Calloway v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.3 (7/8/10) (reviewed). In
2001 the taxpayer entered into an agreement with D~rivium Capital LLC pursuant to· which he
transferred 990 shares of ffiM common stock to Derivium under its 90-percent-stock-Ioan
program. The terms of the agreement characterized the transaction as a loan, with the mM stock
pledged as collateral. (Derivium was not registered with the New York Stock Exchange or the
National Association of Securities DeaIerslFinancial Industry Regulatory Authority.) The
purported loan was nonrecourse; interest accrued but was not payable until maturity; all
dividends were applied against interest due; prepayment during the 3-year term of the purported
loan was prohibited. The terms of the agreement allowed Derivium to sell the stock and retain
the proceeds, which it did immediately upon receipt, receiving $103,918.18. The taxpayer
received $93,586.23 from Derivium, the amount of the payment being determined, and payment
being made, only after Derivium had sold the stock. Upon maturity of the 'loan," the taxpayer
had the option of (1) paying the balance due and having an equivalent amount of mM stock
returned to him, (2) renewing the purported loan for an additional term, or (3) satisfying the
"loan" by surrendering any right to receive mM stock. At maturity in August 2004 the balance
due was $124,429.09, which was $40,924.57 more than the then $83,318.40 value of the mM
stock. (Derivium had credited against the accrued interest the amount of dividends that would
have been received had the stock not been sold, but the taxpayer never received a Form-1099DIV or included any dividends in income.) The taxpayer elected to satisfy his purported loan by
surrendering any right to receive ffiM stock. The taxpayer never made any payments toward
either principal or interest on the purported loan. Citing Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324
U.S. 331 (1945), and Gregory v. Haltering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), for the proposition that
substance controls over form, the Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion by Judge Ruwe (with no
dissents but Judges Halpern, Wherry, and Holmes concurring in result only), held that the 2001
transaction between taxpayer and Derivium was a sale, not a loan, under the test factors set forth
in Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221(1981). The taxpayer had
transferred all the benefits and burdens of ownership of the stock to Derivium. Legal and
equitable title, as well as possession and control of the stock were transferred in exchange for
$93,586.23 with no obligation to repay that amount. "At best [the taxpayer] had an option to
purchase an equivalent number of ffiM shares after 3 years at a price equivalent to $93,586.23
plus 'interest.'" The transaction was not a true loan because "[fjor a transaction to be a bona fide
loan the parties must have actually intended to establish a debtor-creditor relationship at the time
the funds were advanced." There was no such intent. After the 2001 transaction the taxpayer
never treated the transaction as a loan; in 2004 he did not report either a sale of the stock or
cancellation of debt income, positions which were inconsistent with treating the transaction as
loan. Because Derivium was not acting as a broker, the court also rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the transaction was analogous to the securities lending arrangement in Rev. Rul.
57-451, 1957-2 C.B. 295, which held that no sale occurred when the owner of stock deposited
shares with a broker who could lend the securities until such time as the shareholder received
from the broker property other than identical securities. Nor was the transaction equivalent to a
securities lending arrangement under § 1058, because the agreement did not meet the
requirements of that provision, which under Samueli v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 37 (2009),
requires that the transferor of the stock retain "all of the benefits and burdens of ownership of the
transferred securities" and the right to "be able to terminate the loan agreement upon demand."
Because the taxpayer could not regain possession of the stock for three years, his opportunity for
gain was diminished.
•
Section 6662 accuracy related penalties were sustained.
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Judge Hapem's concurring OpInIOn emphasized that the
Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. test, while appropriate for determining whether there had been a sale of
property that was not fungible, were not useful in the of fungible property, such as corporate stock.
It was enough for him that the taxpayer "gave Derivium the right and authority to sell the IBM
common stock in question for its own account, which Derivium in fact did."
Holmes's concurring opinion emphasized that the majority's
•
test for a sale was too broad and could be applied to treat too wide a range of collateralized
nonrecourse loan arrangements as sales. He concluded that the majority erred in treating the
taxpayer's transfer of the stock to Derivium and Derivium's subsequent sale of the stock as one
integrated transaction, because Derivium had represented to its customers that it would hold the
stock and never told them of the quick sale. Instead, he would have treated Derivium's sale of the
stock as the event triggering recognition by the taxpayer, under the Tufts principle that "when a
nonrecourse liability is discharged by sale of collateral, the borrower must recognize income at that
point - the amount realized is the amount of nonrecourse liability discharged as a result of the sale,"
since Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(4)(i) provides that "the sale ... of property that secures a nonrecourse
liability discharges the transferor from the liability." He recognized that under his analysis, ''the tax
consequences to Calloway would be remarkably similar to those flowing from the result reached by
the majority."
The Tax Court majority opinion noted in a footnote that other
•
cases involving Derivium transactions are pending in the Tax Court. From 1998 to 2002 Derivium
engaged in approximately 1,700 similar transactions involving approximately $1 billion. The
Government estimated the total tax loss associated with Derivium's scheme to be approximately
$235 million.
.
•
Nagy v. United States, 104 AF.T.R.2d 2009-7789, 2010-1
U.S.T.C. ,50,177 (D. S.C. 2009), and United States v. Cathcart, 104 AF.T.R.2d 2009-6625,20092 U.S.T.C. '50,658 (N.D. Calif. 2009) held, in § 6700 penalty cases, that the 90-percent stockloan-program transactions offered by Derivium were sales of securities, not bona fide loans.
a.
District Court had enjoined Derivium Capital USA from promoting
its 90 percent loan program. United States v. Cathcart, 105 AF.T.R.2d 2010-1293 (N.D. Calif
3/5/10).
.
b.
Does this case make Monty Python "substantial authority"?
Shao v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-189 (8/26/10). As in Calloway v. Commissioner, 135
T.C. No.3 (7/8/10), the taxpayer in this case engaged in transaction with Derivium Capital under
its "90-percent-stock-loan program." In this case, however, the taxpayer conceded that she had
sold her stock and the only issue was whether the § 6662 accuracy related penalty the IRS
asserted would be upheld. The taxpayer asserted a reasonable cause and good faith defense to the
penalty, and the Tax Court (Judge Holmes) agreed with the taxpayer. The court reasoned as
follows.
In Shao's case we don't find the circumstances that led the Court to penalize
Calloway - there is no evidence of a wink-wink-nudge-nudge-say-no-mote
arrangement with Derivium. See Monty Python's Flying Circus: How To
Recognise Different Types of Trees From Quite a Long Way Away (BBC 1
television broadcast Oct. 19, 1969). Shao had legitimate, nontax motivations for
wanting to structure her deal as a loan instead of a sale-she wanted to reduce risk
and use some of the stocks' value without selling her nest egg. Her naivete, but
not (we expressly find) her negligence, is especially prominent in her renewal of
the loan at a steep price after three years. Unlike Calloway, Shao treated her
transaction like a loan throughout its existence, provitig her good faith.
S•
When all is said and done, the sum of the parts of the deal was really a
current sale of stock. Anschutz Co. v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 5 (7/22/10). An S
corporation, through a Q-Sub (TAC) entered into transactions with Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette
Securities (DLJ) involving appreciated stock that it owned. The agreements were merriorialized
by a master stock purchase agreement (MSPA) that included "Prepaid Variable Forward
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Contracts" (PVFCs) and share-lending agreements (SLAs) with respect to the shares subject to
the PVFCs. The PVFCs required DLJ to make an upfront payment to TAC in exchange for a
promise by TAC to deliver a variable number of shares to DLJin ten years. The amount of the
payment was 75 percent of the fair market value of the shares subject to the PVFCs. If the stock
subject to the PVFCs appreciated over the term of the contract, TAC was entitled to retain 50
percent of the appreciation, and the remainder accrued to DLJ. TAC pledged the shares of stock
at issue in the PVFCs as collateral for the upfront payment and to guarantee TAC's performance
under the PVFC. The pledged shares were delivered to a trustee. Before each stock transaction
DLJ executed short sales of that stock in the open market. After TAC lent shares to DLJ pursuant
to the SLAs, DLJ used the shares to close out the short sales. TAC received upfront payments
under the PVFCs totaling $350,968,652 and $23,398,050 in prepaid lending fees under the
SLAs.
•
The taxpayer claimed that TAC executed two separate
transactions- PVFCs and SLAs - and neither constituted a current sale for tax purposes, relying,
in part, on § 1058. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) agreed with the IRS that the shares subject to the
PVFCs and lent pursuant to the SLAs were sold for income tax purposes. The transaction consisted
of two integrated legs, one of which called for share lending, but the two legs were clearly related
and interdependent. Analyzing the MSPA as a whole, in exchange for valuable consideration TAC
transferred to DLJ the benefits and burdens of ownership, including (l) legal title to the shares;
(2) all risk of loss; (3) a major portion of the opportunity for gain; (4) the right to. vote the stock; and
(5) possession of the stock. Although the SLAs provided that TAC could terminate share loans and
recall the shares, in reality any share recalls were really TAC borrowing shares from DLJ. Because
DLJ closed out its original short sales with the lent shares, the shares later transferred to TAC were
in substance DLJ borrowing shares from third parties and delivering them to TAC. Gain was
recognized with respect to the upfront cash payments received in the transactions. The taxpayer's
reliance on § 1058 was rejected because it relied on the argument that the PVFCs were separate
from the SLAs. The MSPA violated the requirement of § 1058(b)(3) that the agreement not limit the
lender's risk of loss or opportunity for gain, because the agreements eliminated TAC's risk of loss
with regard to the lent shares.
•
On the bright side ©, Judge Goeke rejected the IRS's
alternative argument that the transactions were also either a constructive short sale by TAC under
§ 1259(c)(l)(A) or a constructive forward contract sale under§ 1259(c )(l)(C). TAC did not enter
into any short sale because DLJ was acting as a principal and not as an agent in making the short
sales. the transactions were not forward contract constructive sales because they were not forward
contracts as defined in § 1259(d)(l) in that they did not provide for delivery of a substantially fixed
amount of property for a substantially fixed price.
9.
The small business act helps small business stock. Gain realized on a
sale or exchange of Qualified Small Business stock under § 1202, which is acquired after the
date of enactment of the 2010 Small Business Act (9127/10) and before 1/1/11, is subject to 100
percent exclusion from gross income. The Act also changed the period for exclusion of 75
percent of such gain from 2/17/09 to the date of enactment (previously the 75 percent rate would
have applied up to 1/1/11). Gain attributable to Qualified Small Business stock acquired between
9127/10 and 1/1/11 is not treated as an AMT preference item. The exclusion is applicable to
noncorporate shareholders who acquire stock at original issue and hold the stock for a minimum
of five years. Under the former 50 percent and 75 percent exclusions, included gain was subject
to tax at the 28 percent capital gains rates. The amount of excluded gain attributable to anyone
corporation is limited to the greater often times the taxpayer's basis in a corporations stock sold
during the taxable year or $10 million reduced by gain attributable to the corporation stock
excluded in prior years. Qualified Small Business Stock is stock issued by a C corporation
engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business with gross assets (cash plus adjusted basis of
assets) not in excess of $50 million.
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Interest, Dividends, and other Current Income
Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
1.
Dang that AMT. Gralia v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2009-219
(9/21/09). The taxpayer diverted funds from an S corporation in which another shareholder held
a minority interest, and by which both shareholders were employed. When the minority
shareholder sued him, the taxpayer settled the suit by paying substantial damages. Judge Halpern
held that the damage payments, as well as the taxpayer's attorney's fees to defend the suit, were
deductible only as either § 212 expenses or employee business expenses under § 162, and thus
were miscellaneous itemized deductions. Because the taxpayer was in the AMT, no tax savings
resulted from the deductions.
2.
The IRS still can't figure out Knight. Notice 2010-32, 2010-16 I.R.B.
594 (4/1/10). This notice provides that pending further guidance, taxpayers are not required to
determine the portion of a "bundled fiduciary fee" that is subject to the § 67 two-percent of AGI
floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions for any taxable year beginning before 1/1/10.
Taxpayers may deduct the full amount of the bundled fiduciary fee; payments by the fiduciary to
third parties for expenses subject to the two-percent floor must be treated separately. It modifies
and supersedes Notice 2008-116, 2008-11 I.R.B.593, which provided similar relief for years
beginning before 1/1/09.
D.
Section 121
1.
"Congress intended the terms 'property' and 'principal residence' to
mean a house or other dwelling unit in which the taxpayer actually resided." Gates v.
Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.1 (7/1/10) (reviewed, 8-5). The married taxpayers had owned and
occupied a house as a principal residence for at least two years. They wanted to enlarge and
remodel the house but were advised by an architect that more stringent building and permit
restrictions had been enacted since the house was built. In 1999, rather than remodel the house,
they completely demolished it and constructed a new house on the property. The taxpayers never
occupied the new house, and in 2000 they sold it for $1,100,000, realizing a gain of $591,406.
They claimed that $500,000 of the gain was excludable under § 121, but the IRS took the
position that they did not qualify for the § 121 exclusion because they had never occupied the
new structure and it thus never was their "principal residence," even though it occupied land on
which had been located their former principal residence. The IRS's argument interpreted "the
term 'property' [in § 121(a)] to mean, or at least include, a dwelling that was owned and
occupied by the taxpayer as his "principal residence" for at least 2 of the 5 years immediately
preceding the sale." The taxpayers argued that the term "property" in § 121(a) includes not only
the dwelling but also the land on which the dwelling is situated, and that the requirements of
§ 121(a) are satisfied if the taxpayer lived in any dwelling on the property for the required 2-year
period, even if that dwelling is not the dwelling that was sold. Under this theory, because they
used the original house and the land on which it was situated as their principal residence for the
required term, the land and building that were sold qualified as their principal residence. Finding
that the statute did not define the terms "property" and principal residence," the Tax ·Court in a
divided (8-5) opinion by Judge Marvel looked to dictionaries and the legislative history for
guidance. After examining the background of § 121, including its statutory predecessors, former
§ 1034 and its predecessor in the 1939 Code, the majority held that:
Congress intended the term "principal residence" to mean the primary dwelling or
house that a taxpayer occupied as his principal residence .... Although a principal
residence may include land surrounding the dwelling, the legislative history
supports a conclusion that Congress intended the section 121 exclusion to apply
only if the dwelling the taxpayer sells was actually used as his principal residence
for the period required by section 121(a).
•
The majority found further support for its conclusion in the
case law under former § 1034.
•
In a footnote the court's opinion noted that Reg. § 1.1211(b)(3), as currently in effect allows gain from the sale ofland alone to qualify under § 121 if the
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taxpayer also sells "a 'dwelling unit' that meets the requirements under sec. 121 within 2 years
before or after the sale of the land."
A concurring opinion by Judge Cohen (in which 6 other
•
members of the majority joined) noted that the taxpayers did not argue in the alternative for a partial
exclusion of gain attributable to the sale of the land and did not introduce any evidence that would
have permitted the court to allocate gain between the new house and the land.
•
The dissent by Judge Halpern would have allowed the
exclusion, treating the demolition and reconstruction no differently from a renovation. It expressed
concern that drawing the line between a "remodeling," which presumably would not start the 2-year
clock running anew and a "rebuilding," which under the majority opinion does start the 2-year clock
running anew is a difficult line to draw: "is there some level of remodeling that does (1) terminate
the use of the home as the taxpayer's principal residence, and (2) set the temporal clock to zero?"
E.
Section 1031
1.
"[1]t appears that these transactions took their peculiar structure for
no purpose except to avoid § 1031(1)." Teruya Bros., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 580 F.3d 1038
(9th Cir. 9/8/09), qff'g 124 T.C. 45 (2005). The taxpayer transferred properties to a qualified
intermediary, who sold them to unrelated third parties and used the proceeds to purchase likekind replacement property from a related party. In the Tax Court, Judge Thornton held that the
transactions were economically equivalent to direct exchanges between the taxpayer and related
party, followed by the related party's sale of the properties to unrelated third parties, and that
they were structured to avoid the purposes of § 1031(t). He further held that taxpayer failed to
prove that avoidance was not one of the principal purposes of the transactions under the
§ 1031(t)(4) exception. The taxpayer argued that even though more gain was recognized by the
related party on some of the properties, the only tax consequences of the gain recognition were
reduction of the related party's net operating loss - as opposed to current taxation for taxpayer.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Curt's decision, stating, "it appears that these transactions
took their peculiar structure for no purpose except to avoid § 1031(t)"; "Teruya could have
achieved the same property dispositions through far simpler means."
2.
Don Quixote tilted at the windmill and deflected only the penalty, not
the deficiency. Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.6 (3/31/09). This opinion
by Judge Halpern applied § 1031(t) to deny tax-free like-kind exchange treatment in the
following situation: (1) The taxpayer transferred appreciated real property (Wesleyan Station) to
a qualified intermediary; (2) an unrelated third party purchased the Wesleyan Station property
from the qualified intermediary for cash; (3) a partnership related to the taxpayer sold like-kind
property (Barnes & Noble Comer) to the qualified intermediary for cash; and (4) the qualified
intermediary transferred the like-kind Barnes & Noble Comer property to the taxpayer. But for
the application of § 1031(t)(4), the exchange with the qualified intermediary would have
qualified for § 1031 nonrecognition. The taxpayer, who wanted the replacement property to be in
the same general geographic area, Le., middle Georgia, as the surrendered property, argued that
the reason for the acquisition of replacement property from a related person was that it was
unable to locate a suitable replacement property within the time limits imposed on deferred likekind exchanges by § 1031(a)(3) and Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(b). A careful reading of the facts,
however, reveals that the taxpayer entered into the agreement to acquire the replacement
property only five days after the relinquished property was sold and actually closed the purchase
before the 45-day identification period had even lapsed. As argued by the Commissioner, Judge
Halpern held that § 1031(t)(4) required recognition because the taxpayer had "structured" the
transaction "to avoid the purposes" of the rule of § 1031 (t) denying non recognition for an
exchange to a related person if the transferee sells the property within two years. Based on the
legislative history, he concluded that the "basis shifting" that resulted from the transaction
"suppl[ied] the principal purpose of tax avoidance." The basis shift effected an approximately
$1.8 million reduction in taxable gain, because if the related party had acquired Wesleyan Station
from the taxpayer in a like-kind exchange for Barnes & Noble Comer, the related party's
substituted basis in Wesleyan Station, which in the taxpayer's hands was only around $716,164,
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would have been $2,554,901 (equal to the related person's basis in Barnes & Noble Comer). In
addition, if § 1031 applied, the gain on the sale of Wesleyan Station would have been taxed at
only 15 percent, the applicable rate for capital gains taxed to the partners of the related
partnership, instead of the 34 percent rate that would have applied had the taxpayer sold the
property. Judge Halpern further found the case to be substantially similar to Teruya Bros., Ltd. &
Subs. v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 45 (2005), in which the taxpayer transferred properties to a
qualified intermediary, who sold them to unrelated third parties and used the proceeds to
purchase like-kind replacement property from a related party. In Teruya Bros., Judge Thornton
held that the transactions were economically equivalent to direct exchanges between the taxpayer
and related party, followed by the related party's sale of the properties to unrelated third parties,
and that they were structured to avoid the purposes of § 1031 (t). The taxpayer argued that unlike
the taxpayer in Teruya Bros., it did not have a prearranged plan to use property from a related
person to complete a like-kind exchange, but Judge Halpern found that the presence of the
prearranged plan in Teruya Bros. was not a critical element of the holding in that case.
Nevertheless, the taxpayer avoided the § 6662 negligence penalty because (1) the return
reporting the transaction as a § 1031 like-kind exchange was prepared by an accountant with
extensive experience in representing real estate developers, (2) the accountant was aware of all
relevant facts, and (3) when the taxpayer filed its return, the Tax Court had not yet decided
Teruya Bros., and while Rev. Rul. 2002-83, 2002-2 C.B. 927 (presaging the result in Teruya
Bros.) had been issued, Judge Halpern did "not think that the ruling left the result free from
doubt."
a.
"Congress enacted § 1031 (t) because of its disapproval of
taxpayers' use of § 1031 to cash-in on a low-basis investment property, but to pay taxes as if it
were cashing in on the high basis property; here, Ocmulgee Fields and Treaty Fields cashed in on
the low-basis property, Wesleyan Station, but paid taxes only on the gains from Treaty Fields'
sale of the high-basis property, the Barnes & Noble Comer." Ocmulgee Fields, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 2010-2 U.S.T.C. ~50,565, 106 AF.T.R.2d 2010-_ (11th Cir. 8/13/10). In an
opinion by Judge Ebel, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision. The court
characterized the taxpayer's argument as being based on the proposition that neither it nor the
related party "had any intent to circumvent the purposes of § 1031(t)," which it described as a
challenge to the Tax Court's fact finding that the taxpayer "engaged in a series of transactions
structured to avoid the related party rules, cash in on its investment in Wesleyan Station, and
avoid taxation," and affirmed because the Tax Court's finding was not clearly erroneous. The
court found evidence of the taxpayer's intent in the use of the a qualified intermediary in a multicornered exchange, stating that,
[W]e can look to the unneeded complexity in the series of transactions to help us
in inferring Ocmulgee Fields' intent. ... Ocmulgee Fields could have achieved the
same result by simply engaging in a direct exchange of property with Treaty
Fields, and Treaty Fields could have then sold Wesleyan Station .... If Ocmulgee
Fields had taken this approach, however, § 1031(t)(1) would have automatically
disallowed nonrecognition treatment for the exchange because Treaty Fields
disposed of Wesleyan Station within two years of the exchange.
•
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the related
party exchange was "merely a fall-back position," because that argument was inconsistent with the
fact that the taxpayer had examined only a small number of alternative properties and entered into
the transaction after only six days.
3.
I woulda completed my like-kind exchange, but the QI went belly-up.
Can you help me Mr. Commish? No; unfortunately, there is no relief which would allow
the taxpayer to complete the § 1031 exchange. Rev. Proc. 2010-14, 2010-12 I.R.B. 456
(3/5/10). This revenue procedure provides a safe harbor method for reporting gain or loss by
taxpayers who are unable to complete deferred like-kind exchange solely because the QI has
defaulted on its obligation to acquire and transfer replacement property as a result of the QI's
bankruptcy or receivership under federal or state law, provided three additional conditions have
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been met. The taxpayer must have (1) transferred the relinquished property to a QI in accordance
with Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1(g)(4); (2) properly identified replacement property within the
identification period (unless the Ql's default occurs during that period); and (3) not actually or
constructively receive any proceeds from the disposition of the relinquished property (excluding
the Ql's assumption of debts on the relinquished property) before the QI entered bankruptcy or
receivership. Under the safe-harbor, the taxpayer may report gain ,under a "safe harbor gross
profit ratio method" provided in the revenue procedure, which is essentially the § 453 installment
method. However, unlike normal § 453 installment reporting, § 1245 and § 1250 recapture gain
may be reported under the "safe harbor gross profit ratio method"; however, depreciation
recapture income is recognized before any § 1231 or capital gain is recognized. Interest must be
imputed under § 483 or § 1274, as appropriate. For this purpose, the taxpayer is treated as selling
the relinquished property on the date of the confirmation of the bankruptcy plan or other court
order that resolves the taxpayer's claim against the QI. Thus, if the only payment in full
satisfaction of the taxpayer's claim is received by the taxpayer on or before the date that is six
months after the safe harbor sale date, then no interest is imputed. If a loss is realized, the timing
of a loss deduction is governed by normal § 165 principles.
•
We think this could result in open transaction treatment for
,
loss recognition.
4.
The April's Fool joke is on the taxpayer. Goolsby v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2010-64 (4/1/10). A residence acquired in an exchange was not property held for
investment or for use in a trade or business and the exchange of the surrendered property did not
qualify for nonrecognition under § 1031, even though the taxpayer made minimal efforts to rent
out the property before taking up residence. The taxpayer moved into the property within months
after acquiring it, and the residence was more than temporary. The contract for purchase was
contingent upon the sale of the taxpayer's prior principal residence. The taxpayer's interaction
with the qualified intermediary evidenced a lack of investment intent at the time of the exchange.
Before purchasing the property, the taxpayer sought advice regarding whether he could move
into the property if renters could not be found, evidencing contemplation of use of the property
as a personal residence. In addition, the taxpayer began preparations to improve the property as a
personal residence within weeks of purchasing the property.
F.
Section 1033
Section 1035
G.
H.
Miscellaneous
1.
Sorting out derivatives in this "major/minor" transaction. The
treatment turns on the nuances ofthe definitions. Summitt v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 12
(5/20/10). An S corporation of which the taxpayer was a shareholder acquired reciprocal put and
call foreign currency options that exactly offset each other. Subsequently, the corporation
assigned a depreciated major currency (euro) call option and an appreciated minor currency
(Danish krone) call option to a charity pursuant to an agreement in which the charity was
substituted with respect to the obligations under the call options. The taxpayer took the position
that the depreciated major currency call option was a "foreign currency contract" subject to the
mark-to-market rules of § 1256, which were triggered by § 1256(c) upon the disposition, but that
the appreciated minor currency call option was not so treated. The taxpayer argued that there are
no economically significant differences among foreign currency forwards, futures, and options.
The Tax Court (Judge Haines) held that foreign currency options are not "foreign currency
contracts" as defined in § 1256(b)(2) and (g)(2) and the mark-to-market rules of § 1256 thus do
not apply. The only options subject to § 1256 are listed nonequity options, dealer equity options,
and options on dealer securities futures, all of which are traded on a qualified board or exchange.
An interbank market is not' a qualified board or exchange, and because the options in question
were purchased in an interbank market, they could not be "nonequity options" under § 1256.
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IV.

COMPENSATION ISSUES
A.
Fringe Benefits
1.
Involuntarily terminated employees will receive assistance with their
COBRA premiums for a while. The 2009 ARRA § 3001 (in Title III - Premium Assistance for
COBRA Benefits) provides premium assistance for COBRA benefits to the extent of 65 percent
of the otherwise applicable COBRA premium. Eligibility for this benefit is more restrictive than
eligibility for COBRA, wit~ elimination of the premium subsidy for high-income individuals as
well as· for those eligible for another form of medical coverage, e.g., retiree medical. The DOL
has provided a model notice to individuals pursuant to ARRA § 3001.
~
The premium subsidy is only provided with respect to
involuntary terminations that occur on or after 9/1/08 and before 1/1/10.
a.
And for a while longer. H.R. 3326, § 1010, extends the COBRA
subsidy period from nine months to 15 months and extends the subsidy to terminations occurring
in the first two months of2010. Notification requirements are provided for individuals who may
have previously lost assistance but became eligible for the extended subsidy period.
b.
Another COBRA subsidy extension is provided, but no more
extensions will be needed as President Obama focuses with "laser-like intensity" on the jobs
issue. The Temporary Extension Act of2010 extends the COBRA subsidy for another month to
cover terminations that took place from 9/1/08 through 3/31/10.
c.
Wrong again, Moosebreath. The Continuing Extension Act of
2010 extends the COBRA subsidy to 5/31/10.
d.
A further extension of the COBRA subsidy is included in the
pending Small Business Jobs Tax Relief Bill of 2010, H.R. 5486, which passed the House on
6/15/10.
2.
New tax Code rules permeate every nook and cranny of health care
reform: American Health Benefit Exchanges can't work as substitutes for employerprovided health insurance without special tax rules. Pursuant to § 10108 of the 2010 Health
Care Act, employers offering minimum essential health care coverage through an eligible
employer-sponsored plan and paying a portiori of that coverage must provide "qualified
employees" with a voucher whose value can be applied to purchase a health plan through an
American Health Benefit Exchange established under § 1311 of the Act. (An American Health
Benefits Exchange must be established by each state (the cost of the establishment of which is
subsidized by the U.S. Treasury) to facilitate the purchase of qualified health insurance plans.)
"Qualified employees" are employees (1) whose (a)required contribution for employer
sponsored minimum essential coverage exceeds 8 percent, but does not exceed 9.5 percent of the
employee's household income for the taxable year, and (b) total household income does not
exceed 400 percent of the poverty line for the family, and (2) who do not participate in the
employer's health plan. The value of a voucher equals the employer's contribution to the
employer's health plan. Vouchers can be used to purchase a qualified health plan in the
Exchange. If the value of the voucher exceeds the premium, the employee receives cash for the
excess value. Under new § 139D, added to the Code by the 2010 Health Care Act, the value of
the voucher is not includable in gross income to the extent it is used for the purchase of a health
plan. But any rebate received by the employee is includable in the employee's gross income. If
an individual receives a voucher, the individual is disqualified from receiving any tax credit or
cost sharing credit for the purchase of a plan in the Exchange. New § 162(g) allows the employer
a deduction for the amount of the voucher. This provision is effective after 12/31/13.
3.
A little added tax benefit to encourage the kids not to cut the apron
strings. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 amended § 105(b) of the
Code to extend the exclusion for reimbursement of medical care expenses under an employerprovided accident or health plan to any child of an employee who has not attained age 27 by the
close of the taxable year, without regard to whether the child is the taxpayer's dependent. A
similar amendment to § 162(1) to allows self-employed individuals a deduction for any such
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child of the taxpayer. Similar amendments to §§ 401 and 501 apply to VEBAs and qualified
plans providing retiree health benefits. The new rules are effective as of the date of enactment.
a.
With a little leeway for the year the kid turns 26. Notice 201038, 2010-20 I.R.B. 682 (5/17/10). This notice provides guidance on the exclusion from
employees' gross income under §§ 105 and 106 for employer-provided accident and health plan
coverage for employees' children under age 27, on the employment tax treatment of these
benefits, and on the parallel amendments to § 401(h) for retiree health accounts in pension plans,
§ 501(c)(9) for VEBAs, and the deduction under § 162(1) for self-employed individuals. The
value of any employer-provided health coverage for an employee's child for the entire taxable
year the child turns 26 may be excluded under § 105 if the coverage continues until the end of
that taxable year. For example, if a child turns 26 in March, but stays on the plan past December
31st (the end of most individual's taxable year), the health benefits up to December 31st are a
tax-free fringe benefit.
b .
Health insurance that covers dependent children is no longer a taxfree fringe benefit unless all of the employee's kids under age 27 are covered. T.D. 9482, Interim
Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Dependent
Coverage of Children to Age 26 Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 F.R.
27122 (3/13/10). The Affordable Care Act amended the Public Health Service Act (PHS Act) to
add § 2714, which requires group health. plans and health insurance issuers that provide
dependent coverage of children to continue to make such coverage available for an adult child
until age 26. This requirement is incorporated by § 9815 of the Code. These interim final
regulations, Reg. § 54.9815-2714T, provide that for a health insurance (or self-insured) plan that
makes available dependent coverage of children to qualify under § 105, the plan may not deny or
. impose special requirements for coverage of either minor children or adult children under age 26.
With respect to a child who has not attained age 26, a plan or issuer may not define dependent
for purposes of eligibility for dependent cov~rage of children other than in terms of a relationship
between a child and the participant. Thus, for example, a plan or issuer may not deny or restrict
coverage for a child who has not attained age 26 based on the presence or absence of the child's
financial dependency (upon the participant or any other person), residency with the participant or
with any other person, student status, employment, or any combination of those factors. Nothing
in the regulations requires an employer's plan to cover dependent as a condition for eligibility to
be a tax-free fringe benefit. The regulation applies for phm years beginning on or after 9123110,
and the regulation expires "on or before" 5/13/13. Transition rules are provided.
4.
How about a little consistency in tax-free drug use? The 2010 Health
Care Act added § 106(f), dealing with employer sponsored Health Flexible Spending
Arrangements and Health Reimbursement Arrangements, and amended § 223(d)(2), dealing with
HSAs (for individuals with high deductible health plans, whether through an employer or
individually) and § 220(d)(2), dealing with individual Archer MSAs, to disallow reimbursement
under any such plan for the cost of over-the-counter medicines unless the medicine is prescribed
by a physician. Thus, reimbursement is allowed only if the medicine or drug is a prescribed drug,
without regard to whether such drug is available without a prescription, or is insulin, which is the
rule for deductibility of medicine as a medical expense under § 213. The new provisions are
effective after 12/31/10.
a.
And the IRS takes steps to make it more difficult to buy beer
and cigs using health FSA and HRA debit cards. Notice 2010-59, 2010- 39 I.R.B. _
(9/311 0). Current debit card systems are not capable of substantiating compliance with § 106(f)
with respect to over-the-counter medicines or drugs because the systems are incapable of
recognizing and substantiating that the medicines or drugs were prescribed. For expenses
incurred on' and after January 1, 2011, health FSA and HRA debit cards may not be used to
purchase over-the-counter medicines or drugs. Nevertheless to facilitate the significant changes
to existing systems necessary to reflect the statutory change, the IRS will not challenge the use of
health FSA and HRA debit cards for expenses incurred through January 15,2011 if the use of the
debit cards complies with prior guidance. However, on and after January 16, 2011, over-thecounter medicine or drug purchases at all providers and merchants (whether or not they have an
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inventory information approval system (lIAS)) must be substantiated before reimbursement may
be made. Substantiation is accomplished by sUbmitting the prescription (or a copy of the
prescription or other documentation that a prescription has been issued) for the over-the-counter
medicine or drug, and other information from an independent third party that satisfies the
requirements under Prop. Reg. § 1.125-6(b)(3)(i).
.
•
Sections 106(f), 220(d)(2) and § 223(d)(2)(A) do not apply to
items that are not medicines or drugs, including equipment such as crutches, supplies such as
bandages, and diagnostic devices such as blood sugar test kits; such items may qualify as medical
care if they otherwise meet the defmition of medical care in § 213(d)(1).
b.
Rev. Rul. 2010-59, 2010-39 I.R.B. _
(9/3/10). To reflect the
limitations in § 106(f), the IRS has obsoleted Rev. Rul. 2003-102, 2003-2 C.B. 559, which had
held that reimbursements by the employer of amounts expended for medicines or drugs available
without a prescription are excludable from gross income under § 105(b).
5.
No more deduction for spending tax-free government subsidies on
drugs for retirees. However, companies that made required balance sheet adjustments
became subject to congressional hazing because they made Obama look bad. Section 139A
excludes from gross income federal subsidy payments, made pursuant to 42 USC § 1395w-132,
to a sponsor of a qualified retiree prescription drug plan. The 2010 Health Care Act amended
§ 139A to provide that for taxable years beginning after 12/31/12, the amount of any deduction
allowable for retiree prescription drug expenses is reduced by the amount of the excludable
subsidy payments received. .
6.
Enlisting cafeteria plans in health insurance reform.
a.
Congress forces employees to pay more of the health care costs
with after-tax dollars to fight rising health care costs. The 2010 Health Care Act amended
§ 125 by adding new § 125(i) (and renumbering former §§ 125(i) and (j) as §§ 125(j) and (k)) to
limit allowable salary reduction contributions to a health flexible spending under a cafeteria plan
to $2,500. The 2010 Reconciliation Act extended the effective date until years after 12/31/12.
The $2,500 limitation is indexed for inflation after 2013. A plan that does not include the $2,500
ceiling does not qualify as a cafeteria plan under § 125.
b.
Employers can't easily duck the responsibility to pay a healthy
chunk on health insurance premiums by putting the whole kit and caboodle into a cafeteria plan.
Section 125(f )(3), added by the 2010 Health Care Act, restricts the ability of employers to
provide reimbursement, or direct payment, under a cafeteria plan for the premiums for coverage
under any qualified health plan offered through an American Health Benefits Exchange. Such a
benefit qualifies only if the employer is a "qualified employer" as defined in § 1312(f)(2) of the
Act. A "qualified employer" is a small employer that elects to make all its full-time employees
eligible for one or more qualified plans offered in the small group market through an Exchange.
For this purpose, a "small employer" (defined in § 1304(b)(2) of the Act) is an employer who
employed an average of not more than 100 employees on business days during the preceding
calendar year and who employs at least 1 employee on the first day of the plan year. Unless it
qualifies under § 125(f)(3), reimbursement (or direct payment) for the premiums for coverage
under any qualified health plan offered through an Exchange is not a qualified benefit under a
cafeteria plan. Thus, any employer that is not a qualified employer cannot offer to reimburse an
employee for the premium for a qualified plan that the employee purchases through the
individual market in an Exchange as a health insurance coverage option under its cafeteria plan
without disqualifying the plan. This provision applies to taxable years beginning after 12/31/13.
c.
To us, the new "Simple Cafeteria Plan" rules appear to be just as
complex as the old, still generally applicable cafeteria plan rules. The 2010 Health Care Act
amended § 125 by adding new § 1250) (and renumbering former §§ 1250) and (k) as §§ 125(k)
and (l)) to provide for "simple cafeteria plans" for "eligible small employers," to which the
otherwise generally applicable nondiscrimination requirements, for both the cafeteria plan itself
and benefits under the plan (e.g., group term life insurance, self-insured medical expense
reimbursement plan, and dependent care assistance program), do not apply. Under the safe
harbor, a cafeteria plan and the specified qualified benefits are treated as meeting the
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nondiscrimination rules if the cafeteria plan satisfies special (1) minimum eligibility and
participation requirements and (2) minimum employer contribution requirements. The eligibility
requirement is met only if (1) all employees (other than excludable employees) are eligible to
participate, and (2) each eligible employee may elect any benefit available under the plan under
terms and conditions applicable to all participants. Excludable employees include employees who
(1) have not attained the age of 21 before the close of a plan year, (2) have fewer than 1,000
hours of service for the preceding plan year, (3) have not completed one year of service with the
employer as of any day during the plan year, or (4) are covered under a collective bargaining
agreement if there is evidence that the benefits 90vered under the cafeteria plan were the subject
of good faith bargaining. Shorter service and younger age requirements can apply only if the
shorter service or younger age applies to all employees. The minimum contribution requirement
requires the employer to make a contribution for each nonhighly compensated employee
(employee who is not a highly compensated employee (as defined in § 414(q)) or a key
employee (as defined in § 416(i)) in addition to any salary reduction contributioris made by the
employee. The minimum contribution may be either a matching contribution or a "nonelective
contribution," but the same method must be used for calculating the minimum contribution for
all nonhighly compensated employees. The minimum matching contribution is the lesser of
(1) 100 percent of the salary reduction contribution made by the employee for the year or (2) six
percent of the employee's compensation for the year. Matching contributions in excess of the
minimum may be made only if matching contributions with respect to any highly compensated
employee or key employee are not at a higher percentage than the matching contributions for any
nonhighly compensated employee. Under the nonelective contribution method the employer
must contribute is an amount equal to a uniform percentage (not less than two percent) of each
eligible employee's compensation for the year, whether or not the employees makes any salary
reduction contribution. Generally speaking, an eligible small employer is an employer who
employed an average of 100 or fewer employees on business days during either of the two
preceding years. If an employer was an eligible employer and maintained a simple cafeteria plan,
but subsequently employs more than 100 employees, it remains an eligible small employer until
the year after which it employs an average of 200 or more employees during the year. There are
aggregation rules for controlled groups and special rules treating leased employees as employees.
•
The devil might be in the details that we have omitted in the
name of quasi-brevity.
B.
Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
1.
Section 72(t) has no catchall hardship exception. Dollander v.
Commissioner, T.e Memo. 2009-187 (8/19/09). There is no general exception to the § 72(t)
penalty tax for premature withdrawals from a qualified retirement plan based on the need to
withdraw funds due to general "fmancial hardship."
C.
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and Stock Options
1.
My employer cheated on me (and a lot of others) but it's still income.
Gourley v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6119 (Fed. Cl. 8/26/09). The taxpayer, a
WorldCom employee, exercised nonqualified stock options for 90,300 shares of WorldCom
stock valued at $42,125 per share on January 28,2000. The value of the stock was reflected in a
W-2 issued to the taxpayer by WorldCom. The taxpayer disposed of the stock during 2000 and
2001. On June 25, 2002, WorldCom announced a major restatement of its financials admitting
that because of fraudulent accounting practices it incurred undisclosed losses from 2000 to 2001.
The taxpayer thus claimed in a refund action that the stock he received in January 2000 was
worth only $12.52 per share and that the W-2 issued by WorldCom was grossly inflated. The
court rejected the refund action pointing out that the known fair market value of the WorldCom
stock on the date of the taxpayer's exercise formed the basis of the taxpayer's gross income. The
court pointed out that the market price based on imperfect information is nonetheless the
prevailing market price.
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D.

Individual Retirement Accounts
1.
An employment tax penalty injury leads to an income tax insult.
Swanton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-140 (6/24110). The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held
that $289,017 seized from taxpayer's IRA by the IRS in satisfaction of a § 6672 penalty tax
liability constituted a distribution from the IRA includable in gross income.
V.
PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A.
Rates
1.
The government isn't mandating anybody have health insurance, it's
just raising your taxes if you don't. Beginning in January of2014, new § 5000A (which all by
itself constitutes new Chapter 48 of the Code), added by the 2010 Health Care Act, imposes a
penalty - that's exactly the concise and elegant statutory language - on any individual who
does not maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage, unless the individual is exempt.
Minimum essential health insurance coverage includes government sponsored programs, eligible
employer-sponsored plans, plans in the individual market, grandfathered group health plans and
other coverage as recognized by HHS in coordination with the Treasury. The penalty is phased in
over the period 2014-2016 and becomes fully effective in 2016. The penalty applies month-bymonth, but there is a once a year exception for a coverage gap of less than three consecutive
months. The monthly penalty is 1112 of an annualized penalty amount. Starting in 2016, the
annualized penalty is the greater of: (1) 2.5 percent of the amount by which the taxpayer's
household income for the taxable year exceeds the threshold amount of income requiring an
income tax return to be filed for that taxpayer, or (2) $695 per uninsured adult in the household
(indexed for inflation after 2016) .. (Household income is the sum of gross income (including all
foreign earned income) and tax-exempt interest, minus trade and business deductions, allowable
losses from sales of property, deduction attributable to rent and royalty income, and alimony.
Note that deductions for contributions to IRAs, Archer MSAs, etc., are not allowed for this
purpose.) The penalty for an uninsured individual under age 18 is one-half of the penalty for an
adult. (If an individual without minimum essential health insurance coverage is a dependent of
another taxpayer, the other taxpayer is liable for the penalty with respect to the individual.)
During the phase-in, the flat sum adult penalty is $95 for 2014, and $325 for 2015; the household
income penalty percentage is 1 percent for 2014 and 2 percent for 2015. The total household
penalty may not exceed the lesser of (1) three times the adult penalty, or (2) the national average
annual premium for bronze level health plan - exactly what is a bronze level health plan is way
too difficult to explain here - offered through an American Health Benefits Exchange that year
for the taxpayer's household size. (An American Health Benefits Exchange must be established
by each state (the cost of the establishment of which is subsidized by the U.S. Treasury) to
facilitate the purchase of qualified health insurance plans.) Individuals who cannot afford
coverage because their required contribution for employer sponsored coverage or the lowest cost
bronze plan in the local American Health Benefits Exchange exceeds eight percent (indexed after
2014 for increases in health insurance premium costs) of household income for the year are
exempt from the penalty. In years after 2014, the eight percent exemption is increased by the
amount by which premium growth exceeds income growth. (Members of a recognized religious
sect exempt from self-employment taxes and members of Indian tribes also are exempt, as are
prisoners.) The penalty is due upon notice and demand, and is subject to normal assessment
procedures. However, it cannot be collected by lien and levy. Thereare no criminal or civil
penalties for failure to pay, and interest does not run on late payment.
2.
Even though it's domiciled in new Chapter 2A, and titled 'Unearned
Medicare Contribution," it feels like an income tax surtax on investment income. New Code
§ 1411 of the Code, added by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010,
imposes a 3.8 percent tax on investment income of individuals, estates, and trusts in taxable
years beginning after 12/31112. For individuals (except nonresident aliens), the tax applies only
to the lesser of (1) net investment income or (2) the excess of adjusted gross income (increased
by net foreign earned income excluded under §·911(a)(I» over a threshold amount. The
threshold amount is $250,000 for spouses filing a joint return or a surviving spouse, $125,000 for
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married individuals filing separate returns, and $200,000 for single taxpayers (including heads of
household). Modified adjusted gross income is adjusted gross income increased by the amount
(net of the deductions and exclusions disallowed with respect to the foreign earned income). For
estates and trusts, the tax is levied on the lesser of (1) undistributed net iIivestment income, or
(2) the excess of adjusted gross income (as defined in § 67(e» over the dollar amount at which
the highest income tax bracket applicable to an estate or trust begins. The tax does not apply to a
trust that is tax-exempt under § 501, is a charitable remainder trust tax-exempt under § 664, or all
of the interests of which are devoted to charitable purposes. Net investment income is investment
income reduced by the deductions allocable to that income. Investment income is the sum of
(1) gross income from interest, dividends, annuities, royalties, and rents (other than income
derived from any trade or business to which the tax does not apply), (2) other gross income
derived from any business to which the tax applies, and (3) net gain (to the extent taken into
account in computing taxable income) attributable to the disposition of property other than
property held in a trade or business to which the tax does not apply. The § 1411 tax applies to
trade or business income from (1) a passive activity, and (2) trading financial instruments or
commodities (as defined in § 475(e)(2». It does not apply to any other trade or business income.
Gain or loss from the disposition of a partnership interest or stock in an S corporation is taken
into account only to the extent gain or loss would be taken into account by the partner or
shareholder if the entity had sold all its properties for fair market value immediately before the
disposition. Thus there is a deemed basis adjustment that has results in taking into account only
the net gain or loss attributable to the entity's property that is not attributable to an active trade or
business. However, all income, gain, or loss on working capital is subject to the tax. Investment
income does not include any distributions from a qualified retirement plan or any income subject
to self-employment tax. Unlike self-employment taxes, no part of the § 1411 tax is deductible in
computing taxable income under Chapter 1.
3.
Domestic partners = one; breeders = zero. PLR 201021048 (5/5/10).
Registered California domestic partners must each report one-half of the combined income
earned from the performance of personal services and one-half of the combined income derived
from their community property assets. The resulting income is then taxed to each of the domestic
partners at the more favorable § l(c) single rates, as opposed to the higher rates paid by married
couples. Also, no federal gift tax is payable on the vesting of earnings of one partner in the other
partner under California law.
•
See also, ILM 201021049 (5/6/10) (holding that the IRS
could consider the assets of taxpayer's registered domestic partner when determining whether to
accept an Offer in Compromise); and ILM 201021050 (5/5/10) (the treatment of a registered
domestic partner who reported earned income in accordance with CCA 200608038 in years
beginning before 6/1/10).
B.
Miscellaneous Income
1.
Treasury proposes to reverse. a principle established in a Supreme
Court decision that the government won. REG-127270-06, Damages Received on Account of
Personal Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness, 74 F.R. 47152 (9/15/09). The Treasury has
published proposed regulations (prop. Reg. § 1.104-1(c» under § 104(a)(2) to reflect
amendments to § 104 enacted since the current regulations were promulgated and certain judicial
decisions. The proposed regulations provide that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies to personal
physical injuries or physical sickness. Emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or
physical sickness. However, the proposed regulations provide that dainages for emotional
distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excludable under § 104(a)(2).
Under the proposed regulations, the term damages means an amount received (other than
workers' compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or through a settlement
agreement entered into in lieu of prosecution. Notably, the proposed regulations eliminate the
requirement in the current regulations that to be excludable under § 104(a)(2) the damages must
be "based upon tort or tort type rights." Thus, damages for physical injuries may qualify for
exclusion under § 104(a)(2) even though the injury giving rise to the damages is not defined as a
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tort under state or common law. The reason for the change was the Treasury Department's
concern that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the tort type rights test in United States v.
Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992), limiting the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages for personal injuries
for which the full range of tort-type remedies is available, could precluded an exclusion under
§ 104(a)(2) for redress of physical personal injuries under a "no-fault" statute that does not
provide traditional tort-type remedies.
•
Taxpayers may apply the proposed regulations· to amounts
paid pursuant to a written binding agreement, court decree, or mediation award entered into or
issued after September 13, 1995 and received after August 20, 1996.
2.
Some bad tax news for over-burdened consumer credit card debtors
who beat the bank. They don't beat the mS! Forgiven accrued but unpaid interest on a
consumer loan is COD income. Payne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-66 (3/18/08). Judge
Haynes held that the compromise of credit card debt, including interest, incurred for personal
living expenses resulted in recognition of COD income for a cash method taxpayer. The §
108(e)(5) exception for cancellation of purchase money debt did not apply because the only
relationship between the debtor and creditor was the debtor-creditor relationship and there Was
no property sale and purchase between the creditor and debtor that gave rise to the debt.
a.
The result must have been so obvious that the Tax Court was
affirmed per curiam. Payne v. Commissioner, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7783 (8th Cir. 12/22/09).
3.
The out of pocket cost of compromising consumer debt does not
reduce the amount of COD income. Melvin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-199 (9/8/09).
The taxpayers owed Chase Manhattan Bank $13,084 on a consumer credit cards, and Chase
agreed to accept $4,579 to settle the debt. The taxpayers paid a third party (Arbitronix) 25
percent of the $8,505 savings, or $2,126 to negotiate the compromise. The Tax Court (Judge
Halpern) held that the taxpayers recognized COD income in the full amount of the cancelled
debt. The "[taxpayers] received goods and services (and cash advances) on credit; when Chase
relieved them of their corresponding obligation to pay, petitioners without question received an
'accession to income.'" The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that under § 61(a)(12) itself
only the net benefit of the debt cancellation was includable in gross income - that is they should
have been allowed to offset their "phantom' income" with the "loss" they suffered when they
paid the fee. Judge Halpern held that § 61(a)(12) "manifestly does not provide for any kind of
deduction." The taxpayers did not argue for a deduction under § 162 because they acknowledged
that the amount was not paid with respect to a business, and they did not argue for a § 212
deduction because they were in the AMT.
•
One of our colleagues who specializes in consumer law
commented, "What a rip-off. If the people had called Chase themselves they probably could have
gotten an even better deal than the third party did, and saved 25 percent."
4.
The IRS was not entitled to rely on a naked Form l099-C to show
cancellation of indebtedness income occurred in a particular year. Linkugel v.
Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-180 (12/1/09). The taxpayer's house was foreclosed upon
in 2000, and the mortgagee secured a deficiency judgment in the amount of $35,247, which it
made no effort to collect. Citigroup acquired the mortgagee in late 2000 and also engaged in no
efforts to collect upon the judgment. In 2007, a Citigroup subsidiary issued a Form 1099-C in the
deficiency amount for the 2006 taxable year. The taxpayer failed to include the cancellation of
indebtedness income on his 2006 return, and IRS determined a deficiency. The taxpayer asserted
that the cancellation of debt income occurred in an earlier year. Special Trial Judge Armen held
that taxpayer was entitled to a shift in the burden of proof under § 6201 (d), which required the
IRS to present other evidence to support the incidence of the cancellation of debt income in
2006. The IRS failed to meet its burden of production.
•
The court relied on Portillo v. Commissioner, 932 F.2d 1128
(5th Cir. 1991), which was codified as § 6201(d) in the 1996 second Taxpayer Bill of Rights.
5.
Police arrest procedures did n()t result in "physical injury." Stadnyk v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-289 (12/22/08). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that
damages received on account of false imprisonment were not excludable under § 104(a)(2), even
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though the taxpayer was detained, handcuffed and searched, because she suffered no physical
harm. The damages received in the settlement compensated the taxpayer for "the ordeal ...
suffered as a result of her arrest, detention, and indictment" as the result of her bank erroneously
stamping a check ''NSF'' when it had been stopped for "dissatisfied purchase." The damages
were "stated in terms of recovery for nonphysical personal injuries: Emotional distress,
mortification, humiliation, mental anguish, and damage to reputation." Judge Goeke also rejected
summarily the taxpayer's claim that damages received for personal injuries are not gross income
within the meaning of § 61(a) and that "section 104(a)(2) conflicts with section 61(a) and
violates the Sixteenth Amendment to the extent that it taxes compensatory damages received for
personal injuries."
a.
The Sixth Circuit agrees that police arrest procedures did not
result in "physical injury." Stadnyk v. Commissioner, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1130 (6th Cir.
2/26/10), qff'g T.C. Memo. 2008-289 (12/22/08). In an nonprecedential opinion, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court opinion (Judge Goeke) holding that damages received on account
of false imprisonment were not excludable under § 104(a)(2), even though the taxpayer was
detained, handcuffed and searched, because she suffered no physical harm. The Tax Court found
that the damages received in the settlement compensated the taxpayer for "the ordeal ... suffered
as a result of her arrest, detention, and indictment" as the result of her bank erroneously stamping
a check ''NSF'' when it had been stopped for "dissatisfied purchase." The damages were "stated
in terms of recovery for nonphysical personal injuries: Emotional distress, mortification,
humiliation, mental anguish, and damage to reputation." The Court of Appeals declined "to
create a per se rule that every false imprisonment claim necessarily involves a physical injury,"
stating as follows:
To be sure, a false imprisonment claim may cause a physical injury, such as an
injured wrist as a result of being handcuffed. But the mere fact that false
imprisonment involves a physical act-restraining the victim's freedom-does
not mean that the victim is necessarily physically injured as a result of that
physical act.
•
Section 104(a)(2) did not apply, because the taxpayer
"unequivocally testified that she suffered no physical injuries as a result of her physical restraint."
thus she had not suffered personal physical injuries or physical sickness.
•
The Court of Appeals also rejected as meritless the
taxpayer's claim that damages received for personal injuries are not gross income within the
meaning of § 61(a) and that "§ 104(a)(2), as amended by Congress in 1996, violates the Sixteenth
Amendment to any extent that it purports to subject compensation for personal injuries to income
tax."
•
Apparently the government did not cross appeal the Tax
Court's failure to impose penalties. In the Tax Court Judge Goeke had refused to uphold the
penalties asserted by the IRS because taxpayers had received "disinterested advice" that the
damages were not includable in income. The advice came from taxpayer's lawyer, the defendant's
lawyer, and the mediator who negotiated the settlement. He concluded that the taxpayers "acted
reasonably and in good faith when following their advice and preparing their own return as they
have done for over 40 years, because "[a]lthough though none of those individuals had specialized
knowledge in tax law, they were experienced in personal injury lawsuits and settlements."
6.
It looks like damages for physical sickness caused by emotional
distress can be excluded if they go beyond mere symptomatic manifestations of the
underlying emotional distress. Domenyv. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010.:.9 (1113110). The
taxpayer received approximately $33,000 in settlement of a claim for claims for wrongful
termination of employment one-third of amount received in settlement of claims for wrongful
termination of employment and violations of various civil rights statutes. The taxpayer's former
employer paid approximately $8,000 to her that was reflected on a .Form W-2 as employee
compensation, $8,000 to the taxpayer's lawyer, for which no information return was filed, and
$17,000 to the taxpayer that was reflected on a Form 1099-MISC as "nonemployee
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compensation." The Tax Court (Judge Gerber) held that the $8,000 paid directly to the taxpayer
was includable wage compensation, and the remaining amount was excludable under § 104(a)(2)
as damages for physical injuries attributable to exacerbation of multiple sclerosis caused by a
hostile work environment. The payor-former employer's intent in settlement of the claim was
evidenced by the issuance of separate checks and different information returns; these facts
indicated that the former employer intended amount in excess of wages due to be in settlement of
tort claims for physical injuries attributable to the exacerbation of mUltiple sclerosis.
•
The legislative history indicates that physical manifestations
of emotional distress, such as insomnia, headaches, and stomach disorders, are not to be treated as
physical injuries. H.R. Rep. No. 737, 104thCong., 2d Sess. 143, n.56 (1996).
7.
When the taxpayer lives in Florida, the gross income tax a/k1a the
AMT doesn't bite as hard. Campbell v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.3 (1121110). The taxpayer
recovered a gross award of $8.75 million as a relator in a qui tam action on behalf of the United
States government against a military contractor, and paid $3.5 million of attorney's fees, which
amount was retained by the taxpayer's attorney to whom the $8.75 million had been remitted; the
taxpayer received only $5.25 million from his attorney. The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that
entire gross award of $8.75 million was includable in gross income, and the $3.5 million of
attorney's fees was deductible as a miscellaneous itemized deduction.
•
"Qui tam" is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase "qui tam pro
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitor," which means "who pursues this action on our
Lord the King's behalf as well as his own."
The tax year involved in this case (2003) pre-dates the
•
effective date of 2004 amendments to § 62(a), which now permits attorney's fees in a False Claims
Act case to be an above-the-line deduction.
S.
Protecting the tax-free treatment of Indian medical care provided
from casino profits. The 2010 Health Care Act added new § 139D, which expressly excludes
from gross income the value of certain Indian tribe health care benefits.
•
These benefits might have been excludable in any event
under the 'common law" general welfare exclusion, but Congress was concerned by statements of .
some IRS officials to the effect that the general welfare exclusion might not apply universally to
Indian tribe health care benefits. Although the exclusion extends only to specified, benefits, it
broadly covers most health insurance, medical benefits, and accident coverage..
9.
BP is gonna have to send out a whole lot of Form 1099s. This will
result in some claimants having to file tax returns for the first time in their lives. IR-201O078 (6/25/10), http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=224886,00.html. The IRS has
published guidance for individuals and businesses affected by the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
(1) Taxpayers must include in gross income payments received for lost business income, lost
wages or lost profits. (2) Self-employed individuals who receive a payment that represents
compensation for lost income of the individual's trade or business must include the amount of
the payment in calculating of the self-employment tax. (3) A payment to an individual to
compensate for lost wages is subject to the social security tax Medicare taxes, and generally is
not subject to income tax withholding, unless backup withholding applies. (4) A person making
payments to an individual or partnership (including an LLC) for lost business income, lost
wages, or lost profits must report the payments on a Form 1099-MISC, Miscellaneous Income, if
the payments aggregate $600 or more.· The document also describes the standard rules regarding
casualty loss deductions and involuntary conversions, and the inclusion in gross income of
damages for emotional distress.
•
The obvious remedy is for BP to gross up its payments for
the taxes claimants would not have paid absent the oil spill.
10.
Having a heart attack can improve your tax heath. Parkinson v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-142 (6/28/10). The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held that onehalf of the amount received by the taxpayer in settlement of suit for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was excludable under § 104(a)(2), because the payor intended it to be
compensation for a heart attack suffered as a result of the emotional distress. He reasoned that "a
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heart attack and its physical aftereffects constitute physical injury or sickness rather than mere
sUbjective sensations or symptoms of emotional distress." The other one-half of the settlement
was not excludable because it was compensation for the emotional distress itself.
C.
Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation Homes
1.
Mucking stalls for 60 horses helps avoid the hobby loss limitations.
Helmick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-220 (9/22/09). The taxpayers' conducted a horse
breeding activity involving 40-60 horses on property on which they lived. They incurred
substantial losses for eleven consecutive years and never made a profit. Their other income was
a modest salary. Judge Gustafson allowed the claimed losses, and stated:
Although their intention to make the activity eventually profitable was objectively
unreasonable, it was their genuine subjective intention. By the time of the years in
issue, the Helmicks had invested so much time and effort in this failing activity
that they could see no way out except to somehow make the thing work. No other
possible purpose explains their willingness to persist in an activity that had
become so frustrating and unpleasant.
2.
She bet that the ball wouldn't stop on § 183 and won the right to
deduct gambling losses on schedule C instead of on Schedule A. Chow v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2010-48 (3/18/10). Judge Cohen applied Reg. § 1.183-2(b) to determine that the
taxpayer's gambling activity was engaged in for profit. Accordingly, the taxpayer was a
professional gambler, and her losses were deductible on Schedule C, rather than as itemized
deductions. Nevertheless pursuant to § 165(d), her losses were not deductible to the extent they
exceeded her gambling winnings.
Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
D.
1.
Helping entry-level homebuyers invest in the bear housing market.
Code § 36, added by the Housing Assistance Tax Act of 2008, provides a refundable credit for a
"first-time home buyer" who purchases a principal residence on or after 4/9/08, and before
111109. The amount of the credit is the lesser of 10 percent of the purchase price or $7,500
($3,750 in the case of a married individual filing a separate return). If two or more unmarried
persons purchase a principal residence together, the total amount of the credit will be allocated
among them as prescribed by the IRS. The credit is phased out over the modified adjusted
income range of $75,000 to $95,000 ($150,000 to $170,000 in the case of a joint return). A
person qualifies as a "first-time homebuyer" if neither the person nor the person's spouse (if any)
owned a principal residence at any time during the three-year period ending on the date of
purchase of the credit-generating residence. The credit is not available if the taxpayer purchased
the property from a related person or acquired it by gift, or if the taxpayer's basis in the property
is determined under § 1014. (Persons are related for this purpose if they are related for purposes
of § 267 or § 707, except that the family of an individual under § 267(c)(4) is limited for this
purpose to his spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants.) The credit is also not available: (1) if a
credit under § 1400C (relating to first-time homebuyers in the District of Columbia) has ever
been allowable to the taxpayer; (2) if the taxpayer's financing is from tax-exempt mortgage
revenue bonds; (3) if the taxpayer is a nonresident alien; or (4) if the taxpayer disposes of the
residence or ceases to use it as his principal residence before the close of the taxable year.
•
The amount of the credit is recaptured ratably over the 15year period beginning with the second taxable year following the taxable year in which the creditgenerating purchase was made. For example, if a taxpayer properly claimed a credit of $7,500 for a
purchase in 2008, the recapture amount would be $500 in 2010, with another $500 recapture
amount in each of the next 14 years. Thus, the credit actually functions as an interest-free loan from
the government to the taxpayer. If, prior to the end of the 15-year recapture period, a taxpayer
disposes of the credit-generating residence or ceases to use it as his principal residence, the
recapture of any previously unrecaptured credit is accelerated. ill the case of a sale of the principal
residence to an unrelated person, the recapture amount is limited to the amount of gain (if any) on
the sale. There is no recapture (either regular or accelerated) after the death of a taxpayer, and there
is no accelerated recapture following an involuntary conversion of a residence if the taxpayer
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acquires a new principal residence within the next two years. If a credit-generating residence is
transferred between spouses or incident to a divorce, in a transaction subject to § 1041, any
remaining recapture obligation is imposed solely on the transferee.
•
Although the credit is ordinarily allowed with respect to the
year in which the credit-generating purchase occurred, a taxpayer purchasing a home in 2009
(before July 1) may elect to treat the purchase as having been made in 2008, for the purpose of
claiming the credit on his 2008 tax return. If the election is made, the fIrst year of the recapture
period will be 2010, rather than 2011.
.
a.
The homebuyer credit started out as an interest-free loan, but
now it's outright free money from the federal government. Section 1006 of the 2009 ARRA
amended Code § 36(h) to extend the life of the fIrst-time homebuyer credit through November
30,2009, and to increase the amount of the credit to $8,000 for 2009. It also amended § 36(f) to
eliminate the recapture of the credit for ahome purchased in 2009, unless the home is sold or
ceases to be the taxpayer's principal residence within 36 months of the date of purchase.
b.
Extended and modified in the Worker, Homeownership, and
Business Act of 2009. Section 11 of the WHABA of 2009 amends Code § 36 to extend the
credit for homespufchased before 5/1/10 (before 7/1/10, if subject to a binding contract before
5/1/10).
•
An individual (and, if married, the individual's spouse) who
has maintained the same principal residence for any fIve-cons~cutive year period during the eightyear period ending on the date of the purchase of a subsequent principal residence is treated as a
fIrst-time homebuyer. The maximum allowable credit for such taxpayers is $6,500. This provision
applies to residences purchased after 11/30/09.
There are, of course, income limitations for the credit, with
•
phaseouts between $225,000 and $245,000 of AGI, as well as a purchase price limit of $800,000.
c.
Closing deadline extended to give banks (and Congress) time to
do the paperwork. The Homebuyer Assistance and Improvement Act of 2010 extended the
closing deadline for the § 36 homebuyer's credit from 6/30/10 to 9/30/10 for any eligible
homebuyer who entered into a binding purchase contract on or before 4/30/10 to close on the
purchase of the home on or before 6/30/10. The new law addresses concerns that many
homebuyers might be unable to meet the original 6/30/10 closing deadline because of
circumstances beyond their control. One of these circumstances is the failure of Congress to
provide for the extension of federal flood insurance after the former program expired.
2.
The IRS recedes from Tax Court victories on the scope of "home
equity indebtedness." ILM 200940030 (8/7/09). Home mortgage indebtedness in excess of
$1,000,000 may qualify as home equity indebtedness under § 163(h)(3)(C). The position taken in
the memo is inconsistent with Pau v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-43, and Catalano v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-82, but it is consistent with the instructions in IRS Pub. No.
936, Home Mortgage Interest Deduction.
•
Shouldn't this position be stated in a published revenue
ruling since Tax Court decisions are the law and instructions in IRS Publications are not the law?
3.
Taxpayer whose blood contained 0.09 percent alcohol was not drunk
enough to be grossly negligent. At .least he drove more than 400 yards before crashing.
Rohrs v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-190 (12/10/09). The Tax Court (Judge Gerber)
held that a taxpayer who totaled his 2Y2-month-old $40,000 pickup truck was entitled to a
$33,629 casualty loss deduction because driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.09 percent is
not "willful negligence" for purposes of Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3). The court held that taxpayer took
care to secure transportation to and from a party he attended, and believed he was not impaired
when he drove to his parents' house and failed to successfully negotiate a tum resulting in his
truck sliding off an embankment and rolling over. The court saw no reason to rely on public
policy to deny the loss deduction, and the court held that taxpayer was not liable for the
§ 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty.
4.
Sex reassignment surgery is not nondeductible cosmetic surgery, but
the boob job is. O'Donnabhain v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.4 (2/2/10). The taxpayer was a
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genetic male who suffered from gender identity disorder, which is a condition recognized in
medical reference texts, in which an individual experiences persistent psychological discomfort
.concerning his or her anatomical gender. Pursuant to medical advice the taxpayer underwent sex
reassignment surgery, including breast augmentation surgery, and claimed a § 213 medical
expense deduction for the cost of the surgeries, feminizing hormones, and other related expenses.
The IRS disallowed the deductions. In a reviewed opinion by Judge Gale the majority (8 judges)
held as follows: (1) Gender identity disorder is a "disease" within the meaning § 213(d)(1)(A)
and (9)(B); (2) the taxpayer's hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery were "for the ...
treatment ... of' and "[treated]" disease within the meaning of § 213(d)(I)(A) and (9)(B); and
(3) because they were for the treatment of disease, the procedures were not "cosmetic surgery"
that is excluded from the definition of "medical care" by § 213(d)(9)(A). However, (4) the
taxpayer's breast augmentation surgery was "directed at improving ... [her] appearance," because
the taxpayer failed to prove that the· breast augmentation surgery either "meaningfully
[promoted] the proper function of the body" or "[treated] ... disease" within the meaning of
§ 213(d)(9)(B), the breast augmentation surgery was "cosmetic surgery" that is excluded from
the definition of deductible "medical care."
Judge Halpern concurred. Judges Goeke and Holmes
•
concurred only in the result.
•
Judge Foley, joined by Judges Wells, Vasquez, Kroupa, and
Gustafson, concurred in disallowance of the deduction for the breast augmentation surgery and
dissented with respect to allowing deductions for hormone therapy and sex reassignment. He
reasoned that ''the fact that a procedure treats a disease is not sufficient to exclude the procedure
from the definition of 'cosmetic surgery,'" because § 213(d)(9)(A) provides that the term "medical
care" includes "cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures" only if the "surgery or procedure is
necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to, a disfiguring disease. "To
yield a deduction, an appearance-improving procedure must treat 'disease' (as opposed to treating a
patient or a symptom)."
•
Judge Gustafson, joined by Judges Foley, Wells, and Kroupa,
concurred in disallowance of the deduction for the breast augmentation surgery and dissented with
respect to allowing deductions for hormone therapy and sex reassignment. He reasoned as follows:
A procedure that changes the patient's healthy male body (in fact, that disables his
healthy male body) and leaves his mind unchanged (Le., with the continuing
misperception that he is female) has not treated his mental disease. On the
contrary, that procedure has given up on the mental disease, has capitulated to the
mental disease, has arguably even changed sides and joined forces with the
mental disease. In any event, the procedure did not (in the words of Havey v.
Commissioner, 12 T.e. at 412) "bear directly on the *** condition in question",
did not "deal with" the disease (per Webster's), did not "treat" the mental disease
that the therapist diagnosed. Rather, the procedure changed only petitioner's
healthy body and undertook to "mitigat[e]" the effects of the mental disease.
S.
The sun will never set on increased adoption credits, and the day gets
permanently longer, unlike mere daylight savings time. The 2010 Health Care Act amended
§ 23(b) to raise the ceiling on the adoption credit from $10,000 to $13,170 (and adjusting the
inflation adjustment rules) and to make the credit refundable for taxable years after 12/31/09.
The Act also exempted all changes in § 23 adoption credit from the EGTRRA sunset rules.
6.
Reducing health care costs by discouraging health care spending. The
2010 Health Care Act amended § 213 to increase the 7.5 of AGI threshold for deducting
unreimbursed medical expenses to 10 percent of AGI for taxable years beginning after 12/31/12.
However, the increased threshold does not apply for the years 2013 through 2016, if either the
taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse turns 65 before the end of the year. The 10 percent of AGI
threshold for deducting medical expenses under the AMT remains unchanged.
7.
How about a little consistency in tax-free drug use? The 2010 Health
Care Act amended § 220(d)(2); dealing with individual Archer MSAs, to disallow
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reimbursement from an Archer MSA for the cost of over-the-counter medicines unless the
medicine is prescribed by a physician. Reimbursement is allowed only if the medicine or drug is
a prescribed drug, without regard to whether such drug is available without a prescription, or is
insulin, which is the rule for deductibility of medicine as a medical expense under § 213. The
new rule is effective after 12/31110.
a.
Notice 2010-59 2010- 39 I.R.B. _
(9/3/10). Section 220(d)(2)
does not apply to disallow items that are not medicines or drugs, including equipment such as
crutches, supplies such as bandages, and diagnostic devices such as blood sugar test kits; such
items may qualify as medical care if they otherwise meet the definition of medical care in
§ 213(d)(I).
8.
Making it little bit more difficult to use an Archer MSA to save for
that vacation trip of a lifetime you dreamed is in your future. The 2010 Health Care Act
amended § 220(f)(4)(A), dealing with individual Archer MSAs, and § 223(f)(4)(A), dealing with
HSAs (for individuals with high deductible health plans, whether through an employer or
individually) to increase additional tax on distributions from an HSA or an Archer MSA that are
not used for qualified medical expenses from 10 percent to 20 percent of the distribution. The
new rule is effective after 12/31/10.
9.
And now for the piece de resistance - the tax Code pays for health
insurance for poor, and much of the middle c1ass, l but only as long as they are not getting
abortions. Section 36B, added by the 2010 Health Care Act provides a "premium assistance"
credit for eligible individuals and families who purchase health insurance through an American
Health Benefits Exchange established under § 1311 of the Act. (An American Health Benefits
Exchange must be established by each state (the cost of the establishment of which is subsidized
by the U.S. Treasury) to facilitate the purchase of qualified health insurance plans.) The credit is
payable in advance directly to the insurer to subsidize the purchase of health insurance through
an Exchange. The individual then pays the difference between the premium tax credit amount
and the total premium charged for the plan. (Alternatively, an individual may elect to purchase
health insurance out-of-pocket and apply to the IRS for the credit at the end of the taxable year).
The amount of the reduction in premium is required to be included with each bill sent to the
individual. For employed individuals who purchase health insurance through an Exchange, the
premiums are paid through payroll deductions. The premium assistance credit is available for
individuals (single or joint filers) with household incomes (as defined in the statute) whose
income is less than 400 percent of the Federal poverty level for the family size involved and who
do not received health insurance through an employer. The exact amount of the premium
depends on household income, based on the percentage of income the cost of premiums
represents. The baseline for the credit equals the full premium for s "second lowest cost silver
plan" - whatever that might provide - but may be used to purchase any plan, including bronze,
silver, gold and platinum level plans, through an Exchange. (We will not pretend to understand
the details of the different plans; we don't even understand our own health insurance plans.) The
credit is phased out on a sliding scale for households whose income is above the poverty level
and is completely phased out at 400 percent of the poverty level. We will not attempt to amuse
you with the details ofthe complicated phase-out formula, except to note that it is linear. Married
taxpayers must file a joint return to be eligible, and dependants are ineligible. An employee who
is offered minimum essential coverage through an employer-provided health insurance plan is
not eligible for the premium tax credit for health insurance purchased through an Exchange. But
an employee for whom offered coverage is unaffordable is eligible for the credit. An employee
also is eligible for the credit if the employer's plan benefits are less than 60 percent, and the
employee declines the employee coverage and satisfies the other conditions for receiving the
credit. (An employer will be notified if an employee is eligible for a premium assistance credit
1 Some amount of health insurance premium credit is the health insurance premium credit probably will
be available to over one-half of all households, because the credit is not fully phased out until median
household income is 400 percent of the federal poverty level, which in many states, for many different
size households, is an amount that exceeds median household income.
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because the employer does not provide minimal essential coverage, or the employer does offer
minimum essential coverage but it is not affordable; the notice will explain the employer may be
liable for an "assessable payment" - Q; Is it an excise tax, a penalty, or merely an exaction? A;
It's an excise tax - under § 4980H.) Individuals who apply for the credit must provide massive
amounts of personal information to the American Health Benefits Exchange, including copies of
their last two tax returns. If the credit received through an advance payment exceeds the amount
of credit to which the taxpayer is entitled, the excess is treated as an increased tax liability. For
individuals whose household income is below 400% of the federal poverty level, the increased
tax cannot exceed $400. If the advance payment credit is less than the amount of the credit to
which the taxpayer is entitled, the shortfall reduces tax liability. Premium assistance credits are
not available for months in which an individual has a free choice voucher. Premium assistance
credits, or any amounts that are attributable to them, cannot be used to pay for abortions for
which federal funding is prohibited. The provision is effective for taxable years ending after
12/31/13.
•
There's oh so much more that could be explained, but we ran
out of time and space and, most of all, patience to explain the mind-numbing complexity of it all.
E.
Divorce Tax Issues
F.
Education
G.
Alternative Minimum Tax
VI.
CORPORATIONS
A.
Entity and Formation
1.
To check the box 75 days is extended to 3 years and 75 days. Rev.
Proc. 2009-41, 2009-39 I.R.B. 439 (9/3/09). Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(I) provides that an election by
an unincorporated entity to be taxed as an association is effective on a date specified in the
election on Form 8832, or on the date the form is filed if no date is specified. The effective date
cannot be more than 75 days before or twelve months after the date on which the Form 8832 is
filed. Under Reg. § 301.7701-3(d)(I), an election affecting a foreign entity is relevant when its
classification affects the tax liability of any person for federal tax or information purposes. The
revenue procedure extends the provisions for relief provided in Rev. Prbc. 2002-59, 2002-2 c.B.
615, to include both an election with respect to newly electing entities and a change in an
existing election. The revenue procedure provides for an application to an IRS service center for
relief from failure to timely file the form 8832 for up to three years and 75 days after the
effective date of the election. Relief is available if the entity can establish reasonable cause for its
failure to timely file its Form 8832, the application includes a completed Form 8832, and all tax
returns affected by the election have been filed consistently with the elected status. The revenue
procedure also provides that relief may be sought by an entity not eligible for relief under the
terms of the revenue procedure by filing a request for a letter ruling that includes a statement that
all required tax and· information returns have been timely filed as if the entity classification
election had been in effect on the effective date requested.
B.
Distributions and Redemptions
1.
Section 162(k)'s bite is as loud as its bark. Ralston Purina Co. v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. 29 (9/10/08). Ralston Purina claimed a deduction under § 404(k) for
payments made to its ESOP in redemption of Ralston Purina preferred stock owned by the ESOP
to fund distributions to employees terminating participation in the ESOP.· The Commissioner
argued the redemption payments were not deductible under either § 404(k)(1) or (5), or
alternatively that the deduction was barred by §162(k). The Tax Court, in a unanimous reviewed
opinion by Judge Nims, held that because Ralston Purina's payments were "in connection with
the redemption of its own stock," § 162(k) applied to disallow the deduction. The Tax Court
refused to follow the contrary opinion on almost identical facts in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United
States, 329 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2003). In Boise Cascade the Ninth Circuit interpreted the phrase
"in connection with" to include only expenses that have their origin in a stock redemption
transaction, excluding expenses that have their origin in a "separate, although related,
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transaction." The Tax Court previously had rejected the Ninth Circuit's narrow interpretation of
the phrase "in connection with" in Fort Howard Corp. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 345 (1994),
and did so again in Ralston Purina. The court rejected Ralston Purina's argument that because
the payments were an applicable dividend under 404(k), the transaction was excepted from the
application of § 162(k) under § 162(k)(2)(A)(ii). The Tax Court reasoned that the entire
transaction potentially deductible as an applicable dividend under § 404(k) - payment from the
corporation to the ESOP and the distribution to the ESOP participants - must also pass muster
under § 162(k), and that the 'otherwise allowable' deduction was disallowed because the
payment was 'in connection with' a repurchase of stock.
a.
And the Third Circuit agrees with the Tax Court, not with the
Ninth Circuit. Conopco. Inc. v. United States, 572 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 7/13/09), aff'g 100
A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5296 (D. N.J. 7/18/07). The court held that assuming that Conopco's payments
were applicable dividends under § 404(k)(1) - an issue that it did not reach - "where a
corporation makes payment to an ESOP trust in redemption of its stock, the otherwise allowable
§ 404(k)(1) deduction for an applicable dividend inevitably involves an 'amount paid or incurred
by a corporation in connection with the reacquisition of its stock' and is therefore barred by
§ 162(k)(l)."
b.
The dog food corporation precedent wasn't the people's food
corporation's best friend. General Millsv. United States, 554 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1/26/09).
General Mills claimed a deduction under § 404(k) for payments made to its ESOP in redemption
of General Mills stock owned by the ESOP to fund distributions to employees terminating
participation in the ESOP. In a very brief opinion, the court (Judge Benton) held that § 162(k)
barred the deduction for the "applicable dividend" otherwise allowable under § 404(k). The court
followed the Tax Court's decision in Ralston Purina Co. v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 29
(9/1 0/08), and refused to follow the contrary opinion in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States,
329 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2003), because it disagreed with the reasoning of Boise Cascade.
c.
And the people food precedent comes around to bite the dog's
tail. Nestle Purina Petcare Co. v. Commissioner, 594 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2/19/10). Following its
holding in General Mills the court affirmed the tax court holding in Ralston Purina Co. v.
Commissioner, 131 T.C. No. 4 (9/1 0/08), that § 162(k)(1) barred a dividends paid deduction
under § 404(k) where payments are made to redeem stock from the distributors ESOP. In the
Eighth Circuit the taxpayer asserted, in an argument not extensively considered by the Tax
Court, that its distribution constituted a dividend under § 561 (dividends paid in determining
accumulated taxable income, undistributed personal holding company income, investment
company taxable income and REIT taxable income) that was subject to an exception from the
limitation provided in § 162(k)(2)(A)(ii), allowing deductions of dividends paid within the
meaning of § 561. The court rejected the argument pointing that § 404(k) does not reference
dividends paid under § 561 and that the plain language of the statute does not incorporate
§ 404(k) distributions within the meaning of dividends paid under § 561.
2.
Reducing E&P for nondeductible expenses. Rev. Rul. 2009-25, 2009-38
I.R.B. 365 (9/4/09). Interest paid by a corporation on a loan to purchase a life insurance policy
on an individual for which a deduction has been disallowed under § 264(a)(4) reduces earnings
and profits for the taxable year in which the interest would have been allowable as a deduction
but for its disallowance under § 264(a)(4). It does not further reduce earnings and profits when
the death benefit is received under the life insurance contract.
C.
Liquidations
D.
S Corporations
1.
Roth IRA is not an eligible S corporation shareholder. Taproot
Administrative Services. Inc. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No.9 (9/29/09) (reviewed, 12-4). The
taxpayer corporation's sole shareholder was a custodial Roth IRA account. Eligible S
corporation shareholders as defined in § 1361 include individuals, estates, certain specifically
designated trusts and certain exempt organizations. With an effective date after the year involved
in this case, § 1361(c)(2)(A)(iv) was enacted to allow a bank whose stock is held by an IRA or
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Roth IRA to elect S corporation status. Reg .. § 1.1361-1 (e)(1) provides that a person for whom S
corporation stock is held by a nominee, guardian, custodian or agent is deemed to be the S
corporation shareholder. However, in Rev. Rul. 92-73, 1992-2 C.B. 224, the IRS ruled that a
trust that qualifies as an IRA is not a permitted S corporation shareholder. Declaring the issue as
one of first impression, and indicating that under Skidmore deference to revenue rulings depends
upon their persuasiveness, the Tax Court (Judge Wherry) agreed with the IRS's rationale in the
ruling that IRAs are not eligible S corporation shareholders because the beneficiary of the IRA is
not taxed currently on the trust's share of corporate income unlike the beneficiary of a custodial
account or the grantor of a grantor trust who is subject to tax on the pass-through corporate
income. (The income of the corporation owned by a Roth IRA would never be subject to tax.)
•
Judge Holmes dissented in a beautifully-reasoned opinion
which made the point that an IRA account is owned by a custodian for the benefit of an individual,
who is to be treated as the shareholder, and any unwarranted tax benefits would not accrue because
the income of the IRA would be taxed under § 511 as UBIT. His opinion concluded:
This case is a reminder that tax law does not cascade into the real world through a
single channel. It meanders instead through a vast delta, and any general
principles tugged along by its current are just as likely to sink in the braided and
re-braided rivulets of specific Code provisions and the murk of regulations as they
are to survive and be useful in deciding real cases. Taproot thinks it found a
course through the confluence of the subchapter S and IRA rules that it could
successfully navigate. Its route would be new, but the stakes are not that great,
and the sky will remain standing if we had just read and applied the regulation as
it is.
2.
Revenge for Gitlitz? T.D. 9469, Section 108 Reduction of Tax Attributes
for S Corporations, 74 F.R. 56109 (10/30/09). The Treasury Department has promulgated final
regulations proposed in REG-l 02822-08, Section 108 Reduction of Tax Attributes for S
Corporations, 73 F.R. 45656 (8/5/08). Section 108(d)(7)(A) provides that if an S corporation
excludes COD income under § 108(a), the excluded amount reduces the S corporation's tax
attributes under § 108(b)(2); section 108(b)(4)(A) provides that the reduction occurs after the S
corporation's items of income, loss, deduction and credit for the taxable year of the discharge
pass through to its shareholders. Pursuant to § 108(d)(7)(B), Reg. § 1.108-7(d) treats any
§ 1366(d)(3) shareholder carryover losses from prior years and any passed through losses from
the current year in excess of the shareholders' bases as a "deemed NOL" of the S corporation
that would be reduced under § 108(b). Where an S corporation has more than one shareholder
during the taxable year of the discharge, a shareholder's disallowed losses or deductions equal a
pro rata share of the total losses and deductions allocated to the shareholder under § 1366(a)
during the corporation's taxable year (including losses and deductions disallowed under
§ 1366(d)(I) for prior years that are treated as current year losses and deductions with respect to
the shareholder under § 1366(d)(2». The regulations provide that the deemed NOL allocated to a
shareholder consists of a proportionate amount of each item of the shareholder's loss or
deduction that was disallowed under § 1366(d) (1 ) in the year of the debt cancellation. The
regulations were effective on 10/30/09.
3.
Disregarded QSub is still a bank subject to reduced interest
deductions for interest incurred to carry tax-exempt obligations. Vainisi v. Commissioner,
132 T.C. No. 1 (1/15/09). Sections 291 (a)(3), (e)(1)(B), and 265(b)«3) disallow interest
deductions of a financial institution incurred to carry tax-exempt obligations, but allow an 80
percent deduction for interest on tax-exempts acquired after 12/31/82, and before 8/7/86, and for
certain qualified tax exempt obligations as defined in § 265(b)(3)(B). Section 1361 allows certain
financial institutions to elect to be treated as an S corporation, and further allows an S
corporation to treat a financial institution as a qualified S corporation subsidiary (QSub). Under
§ 1361(b)(3)(A), a QSub is not treated as a separate corporation except as provided in
regulations. Reg. § 1. 1361-4(a)(3) provides that in the case of a bank that is an S corporation or a
QSub of an S corporation, any special rules applicable to banks will apply to an S corporation or
48

(

(

(

a QSub that is a banle The court (Judge Foley) held that under these provisions the limitations of
§ 291 (a)(3) are applicable to interest deductions claimed by a parent S corporation for interest
expense generated by the S corporation's QSub bank. The court also held that Reg~ § 1.13614(a)(3) is consistent with the enactment of § 1361(b)(3)(A) and its legislative history.
a.
But in the Seventh Circuit Judge Posner sees things differently, as
he often does, and S corporation banks in Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin gain a competitive
advantage over C corporation banks. Vainisi v. Commissioner, 599 F.3d 567 (7th Cir. 3/17/10).
The Tax Court's decision was reversed on appeal. Judge Posner noted that by ovirtue of
§ 1363(b)(4), § 291 applies to an S corporation only if it had been a C corporation within three
years preceding the taxable year in question. Because the taxpayer's S corporation had not been a
C corporation within the preceding three taxable years, § 291 could not apply. Nothing in Reg.
§ 1.1361-4(a)(3) could change that result. He rejected the government's argument that because
§ 291 was enacted before a bank could elect to be an S corporation or a QSub, Congress did not
intend § 1363(b)(4) to prevent the application of § 291 to a bank, and that thus the Treasury was
authorized to rescind that application by regulation. Instead, he concluded that the regulation
"merely requires that the special banking rules be applied to banks that are S corporations or
QSubs at the corporate level so that a bank's S corporation status will not emasculate the rules ....
But nothing ... suggests that section 1363(b)(4) is to be overridden with regard to banks." He
went on to reject the government's argument as follows:
Missing from the government's analysis is recognition that the only S
corporations to which section 291, the source of the special banking rule at issue
in this case (the 80 percent rule), applies are S corporations that were C
corporations in one of the three immediately preceding years. Nothing in the
regulation suggests a purpose to change that rule. ...
Of course, unless abrogated, the privilege conferred by section 1363(b)(4) will
perpetuate a competitive advantage enjoyed by S or QSub banks that have never
been C corporations or that converted from C to S earlier rather than later. Later
converters - not to mention all existing C corporation banks (the majority of all
banks) - may be gnashing their teeth in fury at the additional interest deduction
that many of their S or QSub bank competitors can take. But the difference in
treatment, and whatever consequences flow from it, are built into section
1363(b)(4).
•
Finally, Judge Posner concluded:
The regulation was promulgated a decade ago and the Treasury Department has
thus had ample time in which to decide whether the favored treatment of Sand
QSub banks is a bad idea. The Internal Revenue Service thinks it a bad idea, the
Tax Court thinks it a bad idea, but the institUtions authorized to correct the
favored treatment of these banks - Congress by statute, and the Treasury
Department (we are assuming without deciding), as Congress's delegate, by
regulation - have thus far left it intact.
•
On the reasoning, its game, set, and match, we think.
4.
A Solomon-like valuation by Judge Wells. The Ringgold Telephone
Company v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-103 (5/10/10). This case involved valuation of the
taxpayer's assets on the date it converted from C corporation status to S corporation status, for
the purpose of computing the built-in gain tax under § 1374 upon the subsequent sale of its assets
within 10 years of electing S corporation status. The only asset in question was a minority
partnership interest in a partnership that itself held a minority interest in a lower tier partnership.
The taxpayer valued the partnership interest at $2,600,000 on the effective date of its election,
but it sold the partnership interest less than a year later for $5,220,423 to Bell South, which
indirectly controlled the lower tier partnership. Judge Wells found that the taxpayer's expert
witness's testimony which valued the interest at $2,980,000, based on° averaging $3,243,000
using a "distribution yield analysis" and $2,718,000 using a business enterprise analysis with a
5% minority discount, to be more persuasive than the IRS's expert witness's valuation of
0
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$5,155,000. However, he also concluded that while Bell South had not paid a control premium
for the partnership interest, the price paid by Bell South was "probative, but not conclusive
evidence of the value if the [partnership] interest on the valuation date." Accordingly, he valued
the partnership interest at $3,727,141, by weighing equally - that means averaging - (1) the
$3,243,000 value using a "distribution yield analysis," (2) the $2,718,000 value using a business
enterprise analysis, and (3) the $5,220,423 paid by Bell South.
s.
Gitlitz by analogy? "Not," says the Tax Court. Nathel v. Commissioner,
131 T.C. 262 (12117/08). Prior to 2001, the taxpayer had claimed losses passed-though from an S
corporation in an amount that exceeded his stock basis but which were properly allowable under
§ 1366(d)(I)(B) because there were outstanding loans to the corporation from the taxpayershareholder. The taxpayer's basis in the loans to the corporation was reduced under
§ 1367(d)(2)(A) to $112,547. In 2001 the corporation paid $649,775 on the loan, which exceeded
the taxpayer's $112,547 basis in the loan by $537,228. Later in 2001, pursuant to a restructuring
of the ownership of the S corporation and two other corporations owned by the taxpayer, his
brother, and a third party (which left the taxpayer with no ownership in the corporation), the
taxpayer made a capital contribution of $537,228 to the S corporation, which equaled the amount
by which the loan repayment exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the debt. The consideration for the
contribution was the assumption by another shareholder of the taxpayer's obligation on
guarantees of loans from banks to the corporation. In calculating the gain realized upon receipt of
the loan repayment, the taxpayer treated the capital contribution as income under § 1366(a)(I) to
the S corporation, although excludable income under § 118, and therefore as restoring or
increasing under § 1367(b)(2)(B) his bases in the outstanding loans before repayment (rather
than increasing his stock basis), thus eliminating any gain. Relying on Gitlitz v. Commissioner,
531 U.S. 206, 216 (2001), the taxpayer argued that because § 118 excludes capital contributions
from the gross income of an S corporation, capital contributions are "permanently excludible"
and are thus "tax-exempt income" under Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii), and that as such it is
included as an item of the S corporation's income to for purposes of § 1366(a)(1) and the
resulting § 1367 basis adjustments. The Tax Court (Judge Swift) rejected the taxpayer's
argument and upheld the deficiency.
By attempting to treat petitioners' capital contributions to [the corporation] as
income to [the corporation], [taxpayers] in effect seek to undermine three cardinal
and longstanding principles of the tax law: First, that a shareholder's contributions
to the capital of a corporation increase the basis of the shareholder's stock in the
corporation; ... sec. 1.118-1, Income Tax Regs.; second, that equity (i.e., a
shareholder's contribution to the capital of a corporation) and debt (i.e., a
shareholder's loan to the corporation) are distinguishable and are treated
differently by both the Code and the courts ... ; and third, that contributions to the
capital of a corporation do not constitute income to the corporation; sec. 118; ...
sec. 1.118-1, Income Tax Regs.
We do not believe that the Gitlitz holding or the provisions of subchapter S,
namely sections 1366(a)(I), 1367(a)(1)(A), and 1367(b)(2)(B), should be
interpreted to override these three longstanding principles of tax law.
•
Reg. § 1.118-1 provides that "if a corporation requires
additional funds for conducting its business and obtains such funds through *** payments by its
shareholders *** such amounts do not constitute income." Thus, shareholder capital contributions
are not treated as items of income to an S corporation under § 1366(a)(I) and are not taken into
account in calculating the "net increase" under § 1367(b)(2)(B) for the purpose of restoring or
increasing a shareholder's tax basis in loans a shareholder made to an S corporation. Such capital
contributions are not "tax-exempt income" under § 1366(a)(1) nor under Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(viii)
and do not restore or increase the bases in shareholder loans under § 1367(b)(2)(B).
a.
Affirmed, after a trip down memory lane reviewing classic
Supreme Court decisions on the parameters of gross income. Nathel v. Commissioner, 105
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2699 (2d Cir. 6/2/10). After a lengthy review of the classic case law dealing
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with the parameters of gross income, ranging from Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920),
through Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628 (1925), to Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass
Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955), the Second Circuit (Judge Koeltl) held that capital contributions
traditionally are not considered to be "income" and, therefore, should not be considered "items of
income" under § 1366(a)(1)(A). Furthermore, in enacting § 118, Congress "has specifically
recognized that capital contributions are not income" in that "the legislative history of § 118
indicates that the purpose of that section was to codify pre-1954 court decisions holding that
certain payments to corporations by nonshareholders should be treated as capital contributions
and not as income to the corporations, just as shareholder contributions were not treated as
income to the corporations." Furthermore, Reg. § 118-1, which provides that "'voluntary pro rata
payments'" to a corporation from its shareholders for the purposes of providing '''additional
funds for conducting [the corporation's] business ... do not constitute income'" to the
corporation," is entitled to deference and "is fatal to the [taxpayer's] position."
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that based on the
•
reasoning of Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001), there would be no reason for § 118 to
exclude contributions to capital from gross income if they were not already included in gross
income by § 118, concluding that the taxpayer's view of § 118 was belied by its legislative history.
The court also rejected other variations of the same argument. Finally, the court rejected the
taxpayer's alternative argument that they should have been allowed to deduct their capital
contributions to the S Corporation under § 165(c)(2) as losses incurred in a transaction entered into
for profit. The Tax CQurt had found that the taxpayers had not made the contributions for the "'sole
purpose of being released from their guarantees on the bank: loans'" and, as a result, it found that the
contributions were not deductible pursuant to § 165(c)(2). The Second Circuit concluded that the
Tax Court's test was too stringent, holding instead that to be deductible as losses incurred in a
transaction entered into for profit the capital contributions needed only to have been made for the
primary purpose of obtaining the releases. Nevertheless, the Tax Court's error was harmless because
the taxpayers failed to prove that the primary purpose of the contributions was to obtain the releases
from the guarantees.
6.
The lifetime of built-in gain gets shorter every year. The Small
Business Jobs Act of2010 shortened the holding period under § 1374 for recognizing unrealized
built-in gain on conversion from a C corporation to an S corporation to five years preceding the
corporation's tax year beginning in 2011. Before the change the holding period was ten years for
sales or exchanges in tax years beginning before 2009, and seven years for tax years beginning in
2009 or 2010.
E.
Mergers, Acquisitions and Reorganizations
1_
As the old saying goes, "There's no tax free basis step-up without a
funeral." This "midco" tax shelter was rejected by the court. Enbridge Energy Co., Inc. v.
United States, 553 F. Supp. 2d 716 (S.D. Tex. 3/31/08). In a transaction substantially similar to
the transaction described in Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730, the taxpayer (Midcoast) acquired
the assets of a selling corporation (Bishop) through an intermediary (K-Pipe). Midcoast desired
to acquire the Bishop assets with a cost basis, but Bishop's shareholder (Langley) was unwilling
to engage in an asset sale, insisting on a stock sale and purchase. Midcoast's tax advisor, PWC,
arranged for the formation of an intermediary, K-Pipe ~erger, and the financing necessary for
K-Pipe Merger to purchase the Bishop stock, with the loan to K-Pipe Merger being secured by
Midcoast assets. After a downstream merger of K-Pipe Merger into Bishop, Bishop, which
changed its name to K-Pipe Group, sold the Bishop assets to Midcoast. (K-Pipe purportedly
offset the gain with built-in loss on assets contributed to it by its shareholder in a pre-§ 362(e)
year.) Thereafter, K-Pipe engaged in no business activity and was merely a shell. On cross
motions for summary judgment, the District Court (Judge Harmon) upheld the IRS's treatment of
the transaction from Midcoast's perspective as a stock sale followed by a § 332 liquidation,
which resulted in denying the step-up in basis on which Midcoast's claimed depreciation
deductions were based. After disregarding K-Pipe because it had rio substance other than as a
vehicle to allow Midcoast to claim a cost basis in the Bishop assets in a stock sale transaction
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without a § 338 election, the court addressed what was the real substance of the transaction: a
sale of stock or a sale of assets. Because Langley would not agree to a direct sale of Bishop's
assets, "the only way in which Midcoast could have obtained the Bishop Assets was to purchase
the Bishop Stock and liquidate." Assessment of the § 6662(d) substantial understatement penalty
was upheld, and because the transaction was a "tax shelter," neither the substantial authority nor
adequate disclosure exceptions applied. Alternatively, there was not substantial authority because
the weight of authority in Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases was held to have required
disregarding K-Pipe.
a.
Affirmed! Substance over form is alive and well in the Fifth
Circuit. Enbridge Energy Co. v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7289 (5th Cir. 11110/09).
In a nonprecedential per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit applied the substance over fonn
doctrine in affirming the District Dourt's decision upholding the IRS's treatment of a "midco"
transaction arranged by the buyer as a stock purchase followed by a § 332 liquidation, which
resulted in denying the step-up in basis on which the taxpayer's claimed depreciation deductions
were based. Imposition of a 20 percent § 6662 penalty also was affirmed.
2.
All cash (D) reorgs are now in the final regulations. T.D. 9475,
Corporate Reorganizations; Distributions Under Sections 368(a)(I)(D) and 354(b)(I)(B), 74 F.R.
67053 (12/18/09). In 2006, the Treasury Department promulgated Temp. Reg. § 1.368-2T,
providing that the distribution requirement under §§ 368(a)(l)(D) and 354(b)(l)(B) is deemed to
have been satisfied despite the fact that no stock andlor securities are actually issued in a
transaction otherwise described in § 368(a)(l)(D) if the same person or persons, directly or
indirectly, own all of the stock of the transferor and transferee corporations in identical
proportions. T.D. 9303, 71 F.R. 75879 (12/19/06). To a limited extent, the attribution rules in
§ 318 are invoked to determine whether the same person or persons own, directly or indirectly,
own all of the stock of the transferor and transferee. An individual and all members of his family
that have a relationship described in § 318(a)(l)are treated as one individual; and stock owned
by a corporation is attributed proportionally to the corporation's shareholder without regard to
the 50 percent limitation in § 318(a)(2)(C). Ownership in absolutely identical proportions is not
required. A de. minimis variation in shareholder identity or proportionality of ownership in the
transferor and transferee corporations is disregarded. The regulations give as an example of a de
minimis variation a situation in which A, B, and C each own, respectively, 34%, 33%, and 33%
of the transferor's stock and A, B, C, and D each own, respectively, 33%, 33%, 33% and 1% of
the transferee's stock. Stock described in § 1504(a)(4) - nonvoting limited preferred stock that is
not convertible - is disregarded for purposes of determining whether the same person or persons
own all of the stock of the transferor and transferee corporations in identical proportions. When a
transaction qualifies as a § 368(a)(l)(D) reorganization under the regulations, a nominal share of
stock of the transferee corporation will be deemed to have been issued in addition to the actual
consideration. That nominal share of stock is deemed to have been distributed by the transferor
corporation to its shareholders and, in appropriate circumstances, further transferred to the extent
necessary to reflect the actual ownership of the transferor and transferee corporations. Identical
proposed .regulations were simultaneously published. The proposed regulations have been
finalized, with certain modifications. As Reg. § 1.368-2(1). First, if no consideration is received,
or the value of the consideration received in the transaction is less than the fair market value of
the transferor corporation's assets, the transferee corporation is treated as issuing stock with a
value equal to the excess of the fair market value of the transferor corporation's assets over the
value of the consideration actually received in the transaction. If the value of the consideration
received in the transaction is equal to the fair market value of the transferor corporation's assets,
the transferee corporation will be deemed to issue a nominal share of stock to the transferor
corporation in addition to the actual consideration exchanged for the transferor corporation's
assets. In addition, Reg. § 1.358-2(a)(2)(iii) has been amended to provide that in a reorganization
in which the property received consists solely of non-qualifying property equal to the value of
the assets transferred, as well as a nominal share described in the regulations, the shareholder or
security holder may designate the share of stock of the transferee to which the basis, if any, of
the stock or securities surrendered will attach.
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If an all-cash transaction subject to these regulations occurs
between members of a consolidated group, the selling member (S) is treated as receiving the
nominal share and additional stock of the buying member (B) under § 1.1502-13(f)(3), which it
distributes to its shareholder member (M) in liquidation. Immediately after the sale, the B stock
(with the exception of the nominal share which is still held by M) received by M is treated as
redeemed in a distribution to which § 301 applies. M's basis in the B stock is reduced under Reg.
§ 1.1502-32(b)(3)(v), and under Reg. § 1.302-2(c), any remaining basis attaches to the nominal
share.
3.
Q: What does the IRS do when Temporary Regulations expire? A:
Allow taxpayers to rely on the identical proposed regulations. Notice 2010-25, 2010-14
I.R.B. 527 (3/18/10). Temp. Reg. § 1.368-1T(e)(2), T.D. 9316, Corporate Reorganizations;
Guidance on the Measurement of Continuity of Interest, 72 F.R. 12974 (3/20/07), dealing with
continuity of interest in corporate reorganizations, expired on March 19,2010, pursuant to
§ 7805(e)(2). This notice permits taxpayers to rely on Prop. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2) until new
regulations are promulgated. However, "the target corporation, the issuing corporation, the
controlling corporation of the acquiring corporation if stock thereof is provided as consideration
in the transaction, and any direct or indirect transferee of transferred basis property from any of
the foregoing, may not apply the provisions of the proposed regulations unless all such taxpayers
elect to apply the provisions of such regulations. This requirement will be satisfied if none of the
specified parties adopts treatment inconsistent with this election."
a.
REG-146247 -06, Corporate Reorganizations; Guidance on the
Measurement of Continuity of Interest, 72 F.R. 13058 (3/20/07). Prop. Reg. § 1.368-1(e)(2)
would amend Reg. § 1.368-1(e), as promulgated in 2005. (The proposed regulations are identical
to now expired Temp. Reg. § 1.368-1T.) Under the 2005 regulations, the value of consideration
received in a reorganization for purposes of determining whether shareholders received a
sufficient proprietary interest in the acquiring corporation was to be determined as of the last
business day before the contract is binding. The proposed regulations apply the signing date
value only where the contract provides for a fixed consideration. The definition of fixed
consideration is modified to provide that consideration is fixed where the contract specifies the
number of shares of the issuing corporation to be exchanged for all or each proprietary interest in
the target corporation. Definitions referring to the percentage of proprietary interests are deleted.
The regulations treat transactions that allow for shareholder elections as providing for fixed
consideration regardless of whether the agreement specifies a maximum amount of money or a
minimum amount of stock of the issuing corporation. (In any event the shareholders are subject
to the economic fortunes of the issuing corporation as of the signing date.) The rule that
modifications of the contract that increase the number of shares to be issued does not change the
signing date is broadened to also state that a modification that decreases the amount of cash or
other property to be issued also does not change the signing date. The regulations also tighten the
contingent consideration rules by providing that a contract will not be treated as providing a
fixed consideration if provisions for contingent consideration prevent the target shareholders
from being subject to the economic benefits and burdens of ownership of the issuing corporation
as of the signing date. Finally the regulations provide that the signing date value must be
adjusted to take into account the effect of any anti-dilution clause adjustments to reflect changes
in the issuing corporation capital structure.
4.
Prepaid income is not recognized built-in gain. T.D. 9487, Built-in
Gains and Losses Under Section 382(h), 75 F.R. 33990 (6/16/10). Reg. § 1.382-7 provides that
for purposes of computing § 382 limitations following an ownership change, prepaid income is
not recognized built-in gain. Prepaid income is defined as "any amount received prior to the
change date that is attributable to performance occurring on or after the change date." Examples
include, but are not limited to, income received prior to the change date that is deferred under
§ 455, Reg. § 1.451-5, or Rev. Proc. 2004-34, 2004-1 C.B. 991 (or any successor revenue
procedure). This regulation applies to corporations that have undergone an ownership change on
or after 6/11/1 0, but it merely mirrors former Temp. Reg. § 1.382-7T, which it replaced.
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5.
Measuring owner shifts of loss corporations under § 382. Notice 201050,201O-271.R.B. 12 (6/11/10). This notice provides guidance under § 382 for measuring owner
shifts of loss corporations that have more than one class of stock outstanding when the value of
one class of stock fluctuates relative to another class of stock. The IRS will accept use of the
"full value methodology," under which all shares are "marked to market" on each testing date.
Under this method, the percentage of stock owned by any person is determined with reference to
of "the relative fair market value of the stock owned by such person to the total fair market value
of the outstanding stock of the corporation.... [C]hanges in percentage ownership as a result of
fluctuations in value are taken into account if a testing date occurs, regardless of whether a
particular shareholder actively participates or is otherwise party to the transaction that causes the
testing date to occur ...." The IRS also will accept use of the "hold constant principle." Under
this methodology, "the value of a share, relative to the value of all other stock of the corporation,
is established on the date that share is acquired by a particular shareholder. On subsequent testing
dates, the percentage interest represented by that share (the "tested share") is then determined by
factoring out fluctuations in the relative values of the loss corporation's share classes that have
occurred since the acquisition date of the tested share. Thus, as applied, the HCP is
individualized for each acquisition of stock by each shareholder." The "hold constant principle"
has several variations that the notice identifies as acceptable. An acquisition is not an event upon
which the acquiring shareholder marks to fair market value other shares that it holds under any
HCP variation. To be acceptable, whichever methodology is selected must measure the increased
percentage ownership represented by a stock acquisition by dividing the fair market value of that
stock on the acquisition date by the fair market value of all of the outstanding stock of the loss
corporation on that date. Any alternative treatment of an acquisition as inconsistent with
§382(l)(3)(C) and is not acceptable. Any method selected, whether the full value methodology"
or a particular variation of the "hold constant principle" must be applied consistently to all
testing dates in a "consistency period." With respect to any testing date, the consistency period
includes all prior testing dates, beginning with the latest of: 1) the first date on which the
taxpayer had more than one class of stock; (2) the first day following an ownership change; or
(3) the date six years before that testing date.
6.
A district court decision, if followed, makes it much much more
difficult ever to have personal goodwill as an employee-shareholder. Howard v. United
States, 2010-2 U.S.T.C. ~50,542 (E.D. Wash. 7/30/10). The taxpayer was a dentist who practiced
through a solely owned (before taking into account community property law) professional
corporation until the practice was sold to a third party. He had an employment agreement with
the corporation with a noncompetition clause that survived for three years after the termination
of his stock ownership. The purchase and sale agreement allocated $47,100 to the corporation's
assets, $549,900 for the taxpayer-shareholder's personal goodwill, and $16,000 in consideration
of his covenant not to compete with the purchaser. The corporation did not "dissolve" until the
end of the year following the sale. The taxpayer reported $320,358 as long-term capital gain
income resulting from the sale Of goodwill (the opinion does not explain how the remainder of
the sales price was reported, but the IRS recharacterized the goodwill as a corporate asset and
treated the amount received by the taxpayer from the sale to the third party as a dividend from
the taxpayer's professional service corporation. Because the sale occurred in 2002, when
dividends were taxed at higher rate than capital gains, a deficiency resulted. The government's
position was based on three main reasons: (1) the goodwill was a corporate asset, because the
taxpayer was a corporate employee with a covenant not to compete for three years after he no
longer owned any stock; (2) the corporation earned the income, and correspondingly earned the
goodwill; and (3) attributing the goodwill to the taxpayer-shareholder did not comport with the
economic reality of his relationship with the corporation. After reviewing the principles of
Norwalk v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-279 and Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner,
110 T.C. 189 (1998), the court held that because the taxpayer was the corporation's employee
with a covenant not to compete with it, any goodwill generated during that time period was the
corporation's goodwill. The court also rested its holding that the goodwill was a corporate asset
on its conclusions the income associated with the practice was earned by the corporation and the
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covenant not to compete, which extended for three years after the taxpayer no longer owned
stock in the corporation rendered any personal goodwill "likely [of] little value."
F.
Corporate Divisions
G.
Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns
1.
A controlled corporation is not a controlled corporation, except when
it is controlled. REG-135005-07, Clarification of Controlled Group Qualification Rules, 74 F.R.
49~29 (9/28/09). Section 1563(a) defines groups of controlled corporations based on ownership
of voting control. and value of stock in parent-subsidiary and brother-sister controlled groups (or
a combination). Section 1563(b) excludes certain controlled corporations from being treated as
component members, including, among others, a corporation that was a member of the group for
less than half of the days of a testing period, foreign corporations that do not have effectively
connected income. Section 1561(a) limits the component members of a controlled group to one
application of certain benefits and limitations, such as one bite at the taxable income brackets of
§ 11. In addition, some provisions, such as § 41 which provides a credit for increased research
expenditures, treat the members of a controlled group as a single corporation. Controlled group
for these purposes is defined by reference to § 1563(a). Prop. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(ii) would
provide that in determining whether two or more corporations are members of a controlled group
under § 1563(a), an excluded member under § 1563(b)(2), while not a component member of a
controlled group under § 1563(b)(1), nevertheless is a member of a controlled group under
§ 1563(a). This proposed regulation is intended to clarify that for purposes of Code provisions
other than § 1561(a) that reference the definition of a controlled group under § 1563(a) for
purposes of limiting tax benefits, all corporations meeting the ownership requirements are taken
into account. The IRS indicates its belief that the provision is supported by clear statutory
language.
•
The preamble to the proposed regulation states that some
taxpayers have taken the position that the limitation of § 41 and similar provisions is applicable only
to component members of a controlled group.
2.
More controlled group guidance. T.D. 9476, Apportionment of Tax
Items Among the Members of a Controlled Group of Corporations, 74 F.R. 68530(12/28/09).
Reg. §§ 1.1561-1 through 1.1561-3 provide rules regarding the apportionment of tax benefit
items among corporations that are (1) members of a consolidated group filing a life-nonlife
income tax return (life insurance company included with a non-life insurance company) or
(2) component members of a controlled group of corporations.
3.
More help from the IRS for consolidated groups: Are they "too big to
fail"? T.D. 9458, Modification to Consolidated Return Regulation Permitting an Election To
Treat a Liquidation of a Target, Followed by a Recontribution to a New Target, as a Cross-Chain
Reorganization, 74 F.R. 45757 (9/4/09). Temp Reg. § 1.1502-13T(f)(5)(ii)(B) modifies the
election under which a consolidated group can avoid immediately taking into account an
intercompany item after the liquidation of a member corporation that previously had been sold
within the group. Under the regulations, if § 332 otherwise would apply to a target's liquidation
into its parent and the parent transfers substantially all of targets assets to a new member, and if a
direct transfer of substantially all of the target's assets to the new member corporation would
qualify as a § 368(a) reorganization, i.e., a cross-chain type (D) reorganization, then the
liquidation and transfer of substantially all of the assets be disregarded and instead, the
transaction will be treated as if target transferred substantially all of its assets to the new
corporation exchange for the new corporation's stock and the assumption of T's liabilities in a
§ 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization. The result is that target's deferred items are not triggered. The
temporary regulations generally apply to transactions that occur on or after 10/25/07. The text of
the temporary regulations also is text of the proposed regulations. REG-139068-08, 74 F.R.
45789 (9/4/09).
H.
Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
1.
Timing is everything to budget windows. Under the Corporate
Estimated Tax Shift Act of 2009, as amended by the HIRE Act and the Health Care and
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Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, for corporations with at least $1 billion in assets, in
detennining the estimated tax otherwise due after 12/31109, the percentages of estimated tax
liability of required by the Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005 for the third
quarters of2010 through 2013 do not apply. Prior to enactment of the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, payments due in July, August, or September, 2014, were increased
to 157.75 percent of the payment otherwise due, and the next required payment was to be
reduced accordingly. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 increases the
required payment of estimated tax otherwise due in July, August, or September, 2014, by 15.75
percentage points.
.
2.
They were "engineers" under the IRC, even if not under ·state law.
Kraatz & Craig Surveying, Inc. v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.8 (4/13/10). The Tax Court
(Judge Dawson) upheld the validity of Temp. Reg. § 1.448-1T(e)(4)(i), under which
"engineering" includes surveying and mapping, even though the services were not required by
state law to be perfonned by licensed engineers and were not perfonned by licensed engineers.
Whether a corporation is a qualified personal services corporation, as defined in § 448(d)(2), and
be subject to a flat 35 percent tax rate under § 11 (b)(2), is detennined under all of the facts and
circumstances and is not controlled by state licensing laws.
3.
Textron, Schmextron - the IRS is going to just require taxpayers to
rat out their uncertain positions on the return itself via Schedule "COME AUDIT ME."
This would even permit the IRS to send a statutory notice without having to perform an
audit. Announcement 2010-9, 2010-7 I.RB. 408 (1126/10). The IRS is developing a new
schedule to be filed with Fonn 1120, which would require corporations with more than $10
million in assets and one or more uncertain tax positions to disclose those positions. The
schedule would require both (a) a concise description of each uncertain position for which the
taxpayer has recorded a reserve in its financial statement [defmed broadly to include some
positions for which the taxpayer has not recorded a reserve because it expects to litigate the
position or because the taxpayer has detennined that the IRS has a general administrative
practice not to examine the position] and (b) the maximum amount of potential federal tax
liability attributable to each uncertain position if it were disallowed in its entirety.
•
The taxpayer will not be required to disclose the taxpayer's
risk assessment or tax reserve amounts, although in the Announcement the IRS states that under
United States v.Arthur Young, 465 U.S. 805 (1984), it can compel the production of that
infonnation through a summons. To be sufficient, the description must contain:
1.
The Code sections potentially implicated by the position;
2 . A description of the taxable year or years to which the position relates;
3.
A statement that the J?ositlOn involves an item of mcome, gain, loss,
deduction, or credit agamst tax;
4.
. A statement that the position involves a pennanent inclusion or exclusion
of any item, the timing of that item, or both;
5.
A statement whether the position involves a determination of the value of
any property or right; and
6.
A statement whether the position involves a computation of basis.
•
Comments and love letters should have been submitted by
3/29/10, but see immediately below.
a.
Deadline for comments extended. Announcement 2010-17, 201013 I.RB. 515 (5/5/10). That deadline was extended to 6/1110.
h.
Draft Schedule UTP is released. Announcement 2010-30,201019 I.RB. 668 (4/19/10). This announcement released draft Schedule UTP to Fonn 1120, together
with draft instructions. It requires that, beginning with returns filed for years beginning in 2010
and thereafter, the following taxpayers with both uncertain tax positions and assets equal to or
exceeding $10 million will be required to file Schedule UTP if they or a related party issued
audited financial statements: (1) Corporations who are required to file a Fonn 1120, U.S.
Corporation Income Tax Return; (2) Insurance companies who are required to file a Fonn 1120
L, U.S. Life Insurance Company Income Tax Return or Fonn 1120 PC, U.S. Property and
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Casualty Insurance Company Income Tax Return; and (3) Foreign corporations who are required
to file Form 1120 F, U.S. Income Tax Return of a Foreign Corporation.
•
For 2010 tax years, the IRS will not require a Schedule UTP
from Form 1120 series filers other than those identified above (such as real estate investment trusts
or regulated investment companies), pass-through entities, or tax-exempt organizations. The IRS
stated that it will determine the timing of the requirement to file Schedule UTP for these entities
after comments have been received and considered.
•
Query whether disclosures on Schedule UTP can serve as
substitutes for disclosures made on Forms 8275 and 8275R?
c.
Proposed regulations authorizing Schedule UTP, requiring
corporations to rat themselves out. REG-119046-10, Requirement of a Statement Disclosing
Uncertain Tax Positions, 75 F.R. 54802 (9/9/10). The Treasury has published proposed
amendments to Reg. § 1.6012-2 to require corporations to attach a Schedule UTP, Uncertain Tax
Position Statement(or any successor form) to their income tax returns in accordance with forms,
instructions, or other appropriate guidance provided by the IRS. According to the preamble,
"[t]he IRS intends to implement the authority provided in this regulation initially by issuing a
schedule and explanatory publication that require those corporations that prepare audited
financial statements to file a schedule identifying and describing the uncertain tax positions, as
described in FIN 48 and other generally accepted accounting standards, that relate to the tax
liability reported on the return." When adopted as a final regulation,· this rule will apply to
returns filed for tax years beginning after December 15, 2009, and ending after the date of
publication of these rules as final regulations.
4.
ARRA funds nonshareholder contributions? Rev. Proc. 2010-34,201014 I.R.B. _
(9/23/10). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA)
. appropriated $2.5 billion to the Rural Utilities Service of the Department of Agriculture under
the Broadband Initiatives Program (BIP) and the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration (NTIA) of the Department of Commerce under the Broadband Technology
Opportunities Program (BTOP) to expand broadband capabilities. Grants under the various
programs will be treated as nonshareholder contributions to capital under § 118(a) subject to the
basis reduction requirements of § 362(c)(2).
VII. P ARTNERSIDPS
A.
Formation and Taxable Years
B.
Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and Outside Basis
1.
If you lose it once, you can't claim it again. LeBlanc v. United States,
104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-7611 (Fed. Cl. 12/4/09). The taxpayers invested as limited partners in an
agriculture limited partnership that produced farming expense deductions in its first year of
operation. In a TEFRA audit proceeding, the partnership agreed to the disallowance of a portion
of the deductions from transactions lacking economic substance. In a separate Tax Court
proceeding, while the partnership proceeding was still pending, the taxpayers agreed to a
settlement disallowing the same deductions on the partners' return. Several years later the
taxpayers claimed a loss deduction from abandonment of the partnership interest in a refund suit.
The taxpayers claimed that as a result of the settlements with the IRS they retained a substantial
basis in their partnership interest which resulted in a loss on abandonment of the partnership
interest. First, the court rejected the IRS assertion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because disallowance of the partners' losses was determined in the partnership proceeding. The
court concluded that allowance of an abandonment loss deduction is an affected item subject to
determination in a partner's refund action. The court stated that the partnership prong, allowance
of an item, must be determined in the partnership proceeding; then the second prong, the impact
of the affected item on the partners' individual tax liabilities, may be determined in a subsequent
partner level proceeding. The court thus held that the sham transaction nature of the investment
was determined in the partnership level proceeding, and that determination was not affected by
the taxpayers' partner level settlement agreement, but that the court had jurisdiction to determine
the partners'remaining bases for purposes of claiming their § 165 abandonment losses. The·
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taxpayers asserted that their bases were reduced to zero, and no lower, by losses in the first year
of the investment, but that additions to basis in subsequent years, not offset by the first year
reductions to basis below zero, created a positive basis· in the year of abandonment. The court .
held that calculation of basis under § 705 is cumulative and reflects a partner's entire period of
ownership. Thus income and loss in the current year and prior years is summed in making the
calculation. The statutory direction that basis cannot fall below zero does not mean that the
history of profits and losses over the history of the partnership is' permanently set to zero.
Further, the basis at the end of one year set at zero does not preclude a calculation of basis at any
other time that includes all preceding distributed income and losses. The court also pointed out
that the taxpayers' claim would allow them to recover as abandonment losses the loss deductions
previously disallowed in the partnership proceeding.
2.
State rehabilitation tax credits for sale, or not. Virginia Historic Tax
Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-295 (12/21109). The Virginia Historic
Rehabilitation Credit Program contains an allocation provision that allows a. developer
partnership to allocate state rehabilitation tax credits to partners in proportion to their ownership
interests in the partnership or as the partners mutually agree. The taxpayer partnership was a state
tax credit partner in partnerships developing historic rehabilitation projects in Virginia. The
taxpayer limited partnership, as a state tax credit partner, held a small percentage ownership
interest in Virginia rehabilitation projects but was allocated most of the rehabilitation tax credits
that the developer partnership could otherwise not use. The taxpayer partnership also purchased
state tax credits under a one-time transfer provision. The taxpayer in turn received capital
contributions from 282 investor limited partners (either directly or through a lower-tier LLC or
LP). The pooled capital was invested in various developer rehabilitation partnerships. The
Virginia State Rehabilitation credits were allocated to the investor partners. In general each
investor was allocated $1 of state tax credit for each $0.74 invested. The investors were "bought
out after the partnerships accomplished their purpose."
•
The court (Judge Kroupa) rejected the IRS's alternative
assertions that the partnership derived income from the sale of state tax credits to the investors who
were not partners, or if the investors were to be recognized as partners in the tax credit partnerships,
the transactions constituted disguised sales of the state tax credits under § 707(a)(2)(B). The court
was impressed by several elements of the transactions in determining that the investors created a
community of interest in profits and losses by joining together for a business purpose: the parties
agreed to form a partnership, they acted as partners, the parties pooled resources in that the
investors' contributed capital and the general partners contributed capital and services, and that the
partners had a business purpose in terms of deriving a net economic benefit from state income tax
savings (which was not a federal tax savings). The court further held that the substance of the
transactions was the formation of a partnership rather than the sale and purchase of the state tax
credits in part because the transaction was compelled by the form of investment specified by the
Virginia program that encouraged the use of partnerships as a vehicle. for attracting capital into
historic rehabilitation. Rather than treating the investors as purchasers of state tax credits, the court
concluded that the investors' funds were pooled to facilitate investments in developer partnerships
and that the investors remained as participants in the partnerships until the developer partnerships
completed rehabilitation projects.
•
The court also found that the investors bore a risk that the
developer partnerships would fail to generate rehabilitation credits. The court rejected the IRS's
§ 707(a)(2)(B) argument for similar reasons. The court concluded that the substance of the
transactions reflects valid contributions and allocations rather than sales based upon the court's
findings that the investors made capital contributions in furtherance of the partnership's purpose to
invest in developer partnerships engaged in historic rehabilitation and to receive state tax credits,the
partnerships were able to participate because of the investors' pooled capital, the state tax credits
were allocated to the investors consistent with the allocation provisions of the Virginia program, and
that the investors were subject to the entrepreneurial risks of the partnerships operations. See Reg..
§ 1.707-3(b)(1). Finally, the court held that since the partnership did not have unreported income
from the sale of state tax credits, the three year statute of limitation barred assessment and was not
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subject to extension to six years under § 6229(c)(2) because of an omission of 25 percent of gross
income.
•
One of the taxpayer's lawyers is a fonner student of
Professor McMahon in the University of Florida College of Law Graduate Tax Program. [PAID
ADVERTISEMENT. ]
. 3.

(

Expanded anti-abuse rules look at the tax attributes of indirect
owners to test allocations of built-in gain or loss. T.D. 9485, Contributed Property, 75 F.R.
32659 (6/9/10). Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(10) provides that an allocation with respect to contributed
built-in gain or loss property under § 704(c) (or a reverse allocation in the case of a book-up) is
not reasonable if the contribution of property and the allocation is made with a view of shifting
built-in gain or loss among partners in a manner that substantially reduces the present value of
the partners' aggregate tax liability. The Treasury has finalized amendments to Reg. § 1.704-3
that adopt without substantial change the proposed regulations in REG-I00798-06, Contributed
Property, 73 F.R. 28765 (5/19/08). As amended, the regulations provide. that in testing for a
reduction in aggregate tax liability, the tax consequence to both direct and indirect partners must
be considered. Indirect partners include the owners of an entity that is a partner and is a
partnership, S corporation, estate, trust, or controlled foreign corporation that is a ten percent
partner. Indirect partners include the members of a consolidated group in which the partner is a
member. Furthennore, as amended, Reg. § 1.704-3(a)(I) provides that the use of allocation
methods with respect to built-in gain or loss property only apply to contributions to a partnership
that "are otherwise respected." Even though an allocation may comply with the literal language
of Reg. § 1.704-3(b), (c), or (d) (traditional method, curative allocations, or remedial
allocations), "the Commissioner can recast the contribution as appropriate to avoid tax results
inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K." The regulations identify remedial allocations
among related partners as one factor that may be considered.
•
Effective date. The amendments to the regulations apply to
taxable years beginning after 6/9/10, but the preamble specifically notes that "[n]o inference should
be drawn from this effective date with respect to prior law."
4.
Family farm is a partnership. Holdner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2010-175 (8/4/10). When his son Randal expressed little interest in going to college, William
Holder, an accountant, invested in developing a small family fann for his son to operate with an
agreement to divide the profits with an undefined equity interest in the property. As the fanning
operation expanding, father and son took title to property as tenants in common. On his returns
William reported one-half of the income and claimed deductions for all operating expenses. The
court held (Judge Marvel) held that the arrangement was a partnership, rejecting the taxpayer's
arguments that they each operated as independent sole-proprietors. The court noted that both
William and Randal contributed properties and labor to the venture which conducted business
activities. The court also found that the taxpayers failed to rebut a presumption that the partners
shared equal per capital interests in the partnership that applied to all items of income and
expenditure and that differing capital contributions did not justify an allocation of all
expenditures to William. The court sustained an accuracy related penalty under § 6662 finding
that William failed to make a reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of his reporting
positions.
C.
Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership and Partners
1.
Forfeitable for decades and thus not guaranteed payments as annually
accrued, but 100 percent a guaranteed payment when received. Wallis v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2009-243 (10/27/09). The taxpayer (a tax lawyer) retired as a equity partner in
Holland & Knight, and among other amounts received $240,000 in twelve $20,000 payments
over four taxable years. The $240,000 represented accumulated amounts that had been awarded
to him as an equity partner over many years, but which were neither currently distributable as
awarded nor recorded in the partner's capital account; rather, the amounts, which were
detennined annually without regard to partnership income, were payable over a period of time
after the partner reached age 68, but were forfeitable if the partner left the finn before that date.
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The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the payments were a guaranteed payment under § 707(c)
and § 736(a), taxable as ordinary income, and were not received as distributions under § 731.
a.
Affirmed. Tax lawyers have a high standard of "good faith"
and "reasonable cause." Wallis v. Commissioner, __ Fed. Appx. _ , 106 A.F.T.R.2d 20105755 (lIth Cir. 2010). The Tax Court was affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. There
was sufficient evidence to support the Tax Court's conclusion that the payments' were § 707(c)
guaranteed payments. The court also affirmed the imposition of a § 6662(a) negligence penalty,
rejecting the taxpayer's "good faith" and "reasonable cause" argument, stating as follows:
"Given that Donald Wallis has 35 years of experience as a tax lawyer, the Tax Court reasonably
could conclude that Wallis should have been aware there were inconsistencies between (l) his
not reporting the Schedule C payments at all to the IRS and (2) the income Form 1099 he
received from H&K."
.
2.
A contribution in sales clothing, in a case of first impression a
Bankruptcy Court identifies a contribution as a disguised sale, but all to no avail for the
IRS. In Re: G-I Holdings, Inc., 105 AF.T.R.2d 2010-697 (D. N.J. 12/14/09). In a set of
transactions conducted on the same date in 1990, GAF Chemicals and Alkaril Chemicals, Inc.
transferred property valued at $480 million to Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties, L.P.
("RPSSLP") in exchange for a 49 percent limited partner interest. GAF transferred its limited
partner interest to a trust, which in tum pledged the limited partnership interest to Credit Suisse
as security for a nonrecourse loan of $460 million. The trust re-distributed the loan proceeds to
GAF. RPSSLP was required to pay a priority return in an amount sufficient to pay interest on the
Credit Suisse loan, with any surplus proceeds distributable to GAF. The loan was guaranteed by
the French parent of the RPSSLP general partner. In a claim against GAF in a bankruptcy
proceeding the IRS assessed a tax deficiency claiming that the transaction was a taxable
disguised sale under § 704(a)(2)(B) rather than a contribution resulting in nonrecognition under §
721. The court first held that the transaction created a valid partnership. The court held that
§ 704(a)(2)(B) expressly authorized the court to collapse the contribution and loan transactions
into a single transaction. Looking at the history of the negotiations, the court found that GAF had
agreed to accept $30 million less cash and incur $12 million of transaction costs than a sale
transaction in order to avoid $70 million of tax. Thus GAF's "true intent in restructuring the
asset sale transaction was to sell its assets using a structure that would minimize taxation." The
court described the following factors to support its conclusion: "As to the $450M transaction, the
absence of a risk of loss, the absence of an expectation of profits that exceeded the increased
transaction costs, the historical context in which the transaction occurred, and the evidence from
the disguised sale analysis all support the conclusion that it was not a bona fide equity
contribution to the partnership." Citing substance over form, the court indicated that the
existence of a $480 million partnership capital account does not change the economic substance
of the transaction. The court found that the interest payments to GAF based on its $480 million
capital account had little real economic substance to GAF and merely represented loan payments
to Credit Suisse. The court also concluded that the fact that GAF may have a bona fide equity
interest in the partnership does not overcome the disguised sale language of § 704(a)(2)(B). After
an extensive analysis of § 704(a)(2)(B) the court agreed with the IRS characterization that,
following the principles of legislative history, the Credit Suisse loan constituted an indirect
transfer of money from the partnership to the partner and the transfers constituted a sale of
assets. With respect to whether the transaction is properly characterized as a sale under the
statutory language, looking at the factors listed in the legislative history, the court staJed:
As to the first factor, the $450M that GAF received from the 1990 Transactions
was subject to no risk whatever. It walked away from the closing on February 12,
1990 with $450M free and clear. Because this was a nonrecourse loan, GAF could
never lose anything other than the collateral for the loan, its interest in RPSSLP.
This factor weighs in favor of finding that GAF did not participate in the $450M
transactions as a partner. As to the second factor, GAF's continuing partner status
does not weigh in either direction. As to the third factor, the fact that the $450M
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transaction occurred on the same day weighs in favor of finding that GAF did not
participate in the $450M transaction as a partner. As to the fourth factor, this
Court fmds that GAF's primary motivation for participating in the $450M
transaction was to receive tax benefits. This too weighs in favor of finding that
GAF did not participate in the $450M transaction as a partner. Thus, three of four
factors weigh in favor of finding that GAF did not participate in the $450M
transaction as a partner, and none weighs in favor of finding that GAF
participated in this transaction as a partner.
•
Finally, the court indicated that its analysis is informed under
Reg. § 1.707-5, enacted after the date of the transactions and therefore not applicable, and
concluded that under the regulations the transaction would be treated as a sale. Ultimately the court
found that GAF made a $30 million equity contribution and a $450 million sale to the partnership.
At the end of the day, however, the court concluded that the omission from gross income
represented by the disguised sale did not constitute more than 25 percent of GAF's gross income so .
that the IRS was not entitled to invoke the six-year statute of limitations under § 6501 and that the
government's claims were time barred.
D.
Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers
E.
Inside Basis Adjustments
F.
Partnership Audit Rules
1.
Partner's outside basis in a tax-shelter partnership is a partner item.
Napoliello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-104 (5/18/09). The taxpayer invested in a Sonof-Boss transaction involving digital foreign currency items. The IRS issued an FPAA to the
taxpayer as a notice partner. In the uncontested partnership proceeding it was determined that the
partnership was a sham that lacked economic substance, that transactions entered into by the
partnership should be treated as transacted directly by the partners, and that purported losses
claimed on disposition of distributed property with an enhanced basis should be disallowed. The
IRS assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer based on the partnership items. The Tax Court
previously had held in Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 84 (2008), that
the determination of whether a partnership was a sham that will be disregarded for Federal tax
purposes is a partnership item. In the instant case, the court (Judge Kroupa) agreed with the IRS
that the partner's basis in distributed securities from the sham partnership is an affected item
subject to determination in the partnership proceeding, and not subject to re-determination in the
partner-level deficiency proceeding. Because the amount of any loss with respect to the partner's
disposition of securities distributed from the partnership required a factual determination at the
partner level, the court held that it had jurisdiction in the partner deficiency proceeding to
proceed under normal deficiency procedures. The court thus proceeded to determine that the
taxpayer claimed loss on the sale of the distributed securities was disallowed, that the taxpayer's
basis in the securities was their direct cost rather than an exchange basis from the partnership
interest, and that the taxpayer was not allowed to deduct transaction costs attributable to the
investment. The Tax Court also held that the FPAA gave the taxpayer fair notice of the IRS
claims.
a.
Part of the Tax Court's holding in Petaluma FX Partners retains its
vitality, but not the part the Tax Court relied upon in Napoliello. Petaluma Fx Partners, LLC v.
Commissioner, 591 F3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1112/10). The Tax Court in this Son-of-Boss tax shelter
case determined that it had jurisdiction in a TEFRA partnership proceeding to determine that the
partnership lacked economic substance and was a sham. Since the partnership was disregarded,
the Tax Court concluded that it had jurisdiction to detemiine that the partners' outside basis in
the partnership was zero. The Tax Court reasoned that a partner could not have a basis in a
partnership interest that did not exist. (131 T.C. No.9 (2008).) The Court of Appeals agreed that
the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the partnership proceeding to determine that the partnership
was a sham. Temp. Reg. § 301.6223-1T(a) expressly provides that, "[a]ny final partnership
administrative adjustment or judicial determination ... may include a determination that the entity
is not a partnership for such taxable year." The Court of Appeals held that the regulation was
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explicitly authorized by § 6233. A partnership item is defined in § 6231(a)(3) as an item required
to be taken into account in determining the partnership's income under Subtitle A of the Code
that is identified in regulations as an item more appropriately taken into account at the
partnership level. The court indicated that, "Logically, it makes perfect sense to determine
whether a partnership is a sham at the partnership level. A partnership cannot be a sham with
respect to one partner, but valid with respect to another." However, the Appeals Court concluded
that the partners' bases were affected items, not partnership items, and that the Tax Court did not
have jurisdiction to determine the partners' bases in the partnership proceeding. The court
rejected the IRS argument that the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the partnership proceeding to
determine the partners' outside basis as an affected item whose elements are mainly determined
from partnership items. The court held that resolution of the affected item requires a separate
determination at the partner level even though the affected item could easily be determined in the
partnership proceeding. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that accuracy related penalties under
§ 6662(a) could not be determined without a determination of the partners' outside basis in a
partner level proceeding and vacated and remanded the Tax Court's determination of penalty
Issues.
2.
Partnership audit rules extend the statute of limitations. Curr-Spec
Partners L.P. v. Commissioner, 579 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 8/11/09). Section 6501(a) provides a
three-year statute of limitations for assessing tax deficiencies. Section 6229(a) provides that the
period for assessing a deficiency attributable to a partnership item does not expire until three
years after the later of the date a partnership return or the due date for the partnership return. The
IRS issued an FPAA disallowing claimed partnership losses four years after the partnership
return was filed, and assessed deficiencies against the partners for years into which the losses
were carried forward. The assessment to individual losses disallowing the loss carryforwards
were within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to the partners' returns. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court holding that § 6229(a) does not establish an independent threeyear statute of limitations with respect to partnership items, but merely extends the limitations
period of § 6501(a). Thus, assessment of a deficiency against partner's whose individual return
remains open is not barred by any limitation period in § 6229(a).
a.
The Tax Court agrees. LVI Investors, LLC v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2009-254 (11/9/09). The court (Judge Nims) followed its holding in Curr-Spec
Partners as affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. Section 6501(a) provides a three year assessment
period after an individual's return is filed. Section 6229(a) provides that the period for assessing
any tax attributable to a partnership item or an affected item expires three years after the latter of
the due date of the partnership return or the date the partnership return was filed .. The court held
that § 6229 does not override § 6501 and instead sets a minimum limitations period that may
extend the § 6501(a) period.
b.
As does the Eastern District of Texas. Bemont Investments, LLC
v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R2d 2010-1256 (B.D. Tex. 3/5/10). On taxpayer's motion for partial
summary judgment on the statute of limitations, Magistrate Judge Bush held that Curr-Spec
Partners required that the motion be denied.
(1)
In another motion decided on the same day, Magistrate
Judge Bush decided that taxpayer's expert witness David Weisbach may testify as to whether the
tax opinions received complied with applicable tax opinion standards and whether they complied
with Circular 230, but not as to whether taxpayer's action were reasonable (which is a matter for
the court).
3.
Basis in a closed year is a partnership item that may be redetermined
in an FPAA for an open year. Wilmington Partners L.P. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009193 (8/26/09). The IRS issued an FPAA for the partnership'S 1993 year that was closed without
adjustment. In an FPAA issued for 1999, the IRS determined that the partnership's basis in a
reset note contributed in 1993 was zero. The court (Judge Kroupa) held that nothing in TEFRA
prevents the court from considering events in a closed year to determine the proper adjustments
for a docketed year. The court also held that the basis of the contributed note was a partnership
item in the closed year of contribution, and remained a partnership item in each subsequent year.
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The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that the fact that § 6228(a)(5) expressly empowers
the court to look back at non-docketed items as an offset to an administrative adjustment
requested by a tax matters partner under § 6227, does not bar the court from looking at the facts
of a non-docketed year in another matter.
4•
Filing a refund claim before paying the $150 million, rather than
paying first, filing second, left the taxpayer out the $150 million on procedural grounds.
Ackerman v. Commissioner, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-5830 (D. D.C. 8/18/09). Following a TEFRA
partnership proceeding, the IRS notified the taxpayers of the resulting adjustments to their tax
liability - over $150 million. Within the required sixty days of receiving the notices, the
taxpayers filed administrative refund requests to which the IRS never responded. Subsequently
they filed the refund suit. However, the taxpayers did not pay the deficiency until after the
administrative refund request was filed. The government argued that § 6230(c) requires that the
taxes be paid in full before the administrative refund request is filed, while the taxpayers argued
that under § 6230(c) - unlike under § 7422, which governs refund claims generally - it is not
necessary to pay the taxes in full before the administrative refund request is filed, but merely
before the suit is filed. The court held that, as argued by the government, for the court to have
jurisdiction, the taxes must be paid in full before the administrative refund request is filed. The
court found the long line of cases imposing the "pay first" rule under § 7422 to be controlling.
The court further held that even though accuracy related penalties resulting from the partnership
adjustments were partner-level items, § 6230(c) - and not § 6511- nevertheless controlled the
period for filing a refund claim. Thus, the taxpayer's refund claim was untimely because it was
not filed within 60 days. The suit was dismissed.
5.
Be careful what you stipulate to. LKF X Investments, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-192 (8/25/09). The IRS issued a notice of final partnership
administrative adjustment (FPAA) to the taxpayer partnership asserting that a LLC taxed as a
partnership that was used to invest in market-linked deposit transactions (another form of
abusive shelter using contingent offsetting payments to generate losses) should be disregarded
for tax purposes and that the investors had zero basis in their partnership interest. In the
partnership proceeding the parties contested the Tax Court's jurisdiction to consider disregard of
the partnership and the partners' bases as partnership items and stipulated that if the court
determined that it had jurisdiction the parties would not contest the determinations made in the
FPAA other than whether the valuation misstatement penalty imposed under § 6662 applies to
any underpayment resulting from the adjustments in the FPAA. The court· (Judge Marvel)
granted summary judgment to the IRS holding that a determination whether a partnership is a
sham, lacks economic substance, or otherwise should be· disregarded is a partnership item,
following its prior decision in Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 84 (2008).
The court also held that when a partnership is disregarded for Federal income tax purposes, the
court has jurisdiction in the TEFRA proceeding to determine that the partners have zero outside
basis. The court added that when the taxpayer stipulates that it would not contest an issue other
than on jurisdictional grounds, the court will treat the issue as conceded. Finally, the court also
held that where the partnership is disregarded and the partners' outside basis is zero the court had
jurisdiction to determine as partnership items the applicability of accuracy related and valuation
misstatement penalties under § 6662. The court rejected that taxpayer's assertion that the
valuation misstatement penalty in inapplicable because it was attributable to disregard of the
partnership rather than an erroneous valuation.
6.
In a Son-of-Boss litigation the Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine
partner level deficiencies related to affected items. Hiding the loss through additional passthroughs justifies taxpayer-level determinations. Desmet v. Commissioner, 581 F.3d 297 (6th
Cir. 9/17/09). The taxpayers formed a partnership in a Son-of-Boss transaction, then transferred
their partnership interests to an S corporation. In the TEFRA partnership proceeding, which
became final, the IRS determined that the partnership'S basis in distributed property was zero.
Rather than directly assessing tax against the taxpayers as computational adjustments resulting
from the FPPA under § 6230(a)(I), the IRS sent notices of deficiency related to affected items
that require partner level determinations under § 6230(a)(2). The taxpayers asserted that the IRS
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was required to assess the tax directly because no additional partner level determinations were
necessary and that the statute of limitations had run on the assessment of individual deficiencies.
Affirming the Tax Court, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the partnership proceeding determined
only that the partnership was required to reduce its basis on account of its contingent obligation .
to close the short sale leg of the Son-of-Boss transaction. The partnership proceeding did not
address the taxpayers' claimed losses through their S corporation. The S corporation's loss was
not addressed in the FPAA. The S corporation's loss arose from the sale of distributed stock,
which could not be determined from the FPAA. Thus, the court held that the IRS was
empowered to bring individual level proceedings to resolve issues regarding the losses passedthrough from the S corporation. The court also rejected the taxpayers' assertion that the
procedure allows duplicative proceedings contrary to the purpose of the TEFRA partnership
provisions.
7.
Go figure the deposit and come back. Russian Recovery Fund Ltd. v.
United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 698 (Fed. Cl. 12114/09). Section 6226(a) requires that in order to
petition for a readjustment of a partnership item in the Court of Federal Claims, the petitioning
partner must provide a deposit of the amount by which the tax liability of the petitioning partner
would be increased if the treatment of partnership items on the partner's return were consistent
with the FPAA. Reg. § 301.6226(e)-I(a)(l) requires that if the petitioning partners is itself a
partnership, the deposit must include the potential liability of each indirect partner. In an
arrangement with losses flowing to partners through multiple partnerships, the court holds that
the deposit must be calculated by any downstream partner to include losses flowing through the
chain of partnerships, and not just losses passing through a single filing partnership. The filing
partner's $50,000 actual deposit was increased to a required deposit of $8 million under this
interpretation. Rather than dismiss the case, however, the court allowed the taxpayer to show that
she made a good faith effort to calculate the required deposit.
a.
Krause v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1899 (W.O. Tex. 1/22/10).
Partners who didn't contest an FPAA were not permitted to raise partnership level defenses to
§ 6662(h) valuation misstatement penalties in a separate refund action. The taxpayer's claim that
a valuation misstatement penalty is not allowable with respect to a disallowed partnership
deduction is a substantive defense that must be raised in the partnership proceeding. The
assertion does not constitute a computational error or partner-level defense permitted in a refund
action under § 6230(c).
9.
The applicable statute of limitations is a partnership item, even on the
second try. Prati v. United States, 603 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 5/5/10). The taxpayers invested in
tax shelters promoted by AMCOR in the mid-1980s. In a partnership audit procedure, following
issuance of an FPAA, the Tax Court held rejected partnership assertions that the FPAA was
barred by the statute of limitations. Agri-Cal Venture Associates v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
2000-271. Some of the 43 partnerships entered into a settlement agreement with the IRS that
allowed a percentage of ordinary deductions, but provided that the IRS may assert additional tax
liability against individual partners plus interest. Subsequently the IRS assessed additional tax
plus penalties against the taxpayers, which they paid in full. Seventy-seven of 129 AMCOR
partnership tax refund cases filed in the Court of Federal Claims were identified as being
factually similar raising claims that the statute of limitations had expired and that assessments of
additional interest under § 6621(c) were improper because the transactions were not taxmotivated transactions. Prati was selected as a representative case. The trial court dismissed the
action accepting the IRS assertion that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claims that
represented partnership items that should have been challenged in the partnership level
proceeding. Ultimately 57 cases were appealed but stayed pending the court's decision in Keener
v. United States, 551 F.3d 1358, 103 AFTR 2d 2009-364 (Fed. Cir. 1/8/09), which held that the
statute of limitations is a partnership item as defined in § 6231(a), and that whether a partnership
transaction is a sham is a partnership item for purposes of the additional interest provision. In
Keener the court rejected a claim that the FPAA was untimely under § 6229 (three years after the
date a partnership return is filed or the last day for filing the partnership return), but did not
address a separate assertion that the claim was barred by the general three year limitation of §
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6501 (three years from the date an individual's return is filed). Notwithstanding representations
by the taxpayers before Keener was decided that the case would be determinative, the Federal
Circuit considered the § 6501 argument, but reached the same result. The court concluded that
the reasoning in Keener was directed to statutes of limitation in general and was not limited to
§ 6229. The court also applied the reasoning of Keener to the taxpayers' § 6621 (c) interest claim
. to hold that the characterization of partnership transactions is a partnership item. The court
rejected the assertion that the taxpayers' settlement agreements converted the items into nonpartnership items.
10.
TMP's sole shareholder doesn't get to file a separate Tax Court
petition. Devonian Program v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2010-153 (7/19/10). The taxpayer
was the sole shareholder of Basin Gas Corp. which was designated as the tax matters partner in
Devonian Program, a partnership. The Devonian subscription agreement indicated that Basin
would receive a flat fee for its services and contribute $3,000 to Devonian for a 17 percent
interest in Devonian's revenues. After the IRS issued an FPPA to Devonian, Basin filed a
petition with the Tax Court as the tax matters partner. Subsequently, the taxpayer, the sole
shareholder of Basin, filed a second petition claiming that Basin was only an agent and not a
partner in Devonian. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the second petition, finding that Basin was a partner in the partnership and the
designated tax matters partner. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that Basin held only a
contingent interest in the partnership, finding that Basin could assign the interest and that Basin's
interest in revenues was a partnership share rather than payment for services. The opinion does
not indicate why Basin's sole shareholder independently sought to file a petition with the Tax
Court.
11.
Son-of-Boss . .:. . the shelter that keeps on taking. Legal fees for creating
a Son-of-Boss transaction are affected items. Domulewicz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2010-177 (8/5/10). The taxpayers entered into a BDO Seidman / Jenkens & Gilchrist Son-ofBoss transaction by creating a subchapter S corporation that held an interest in a partnership. The
S corporation was owned by a grantor trust. The S corporation paid $1,053,400 of legal fees
related to the transaction. Under an FPAA issued to the partnership the IRS determined that the
partnership was a sham whose existence was disregarded. After the FPAA became final, the IRS
issued an affecte~ item notice of deficiency to the individual investors disallowing deduction of
the legal fees passed-through from the S corporation. The court (Judge Laro) rejected the
taxpayers' argument that the deficiency was barred by the statute of limitations because the fees,
incurred by the S corporation, were not affected partnership items. Citing Thomas v. United
States, 166 F.3d 825 (6th Cir. 1999), the court held that the fees and the S corporation deduction
were affected by the partnership item determination in· that the fees were nondeductible given the
lack of a profit or business motive flowing from the partnership level determination. The fact that
the fees were not incurred or deducted by the partnership did not remove the fees from being
treated as affected items. The court pointed out further that the relationship between the
partnership, the fees, the S corporation, and the taxpayers could not have been determined at the
partnership level but had to be determined at a partner level proceeding. Therefore, the running
of the statute of limitations was suspended under § 6229(d) until 60 days after the decision in the
partnership proceeding became final. The fees were affected items because they were related to
the transaction and were related to the partnership in that they were paid, at least in part, to form
the partnership and to effect the transaction as it related to the partnership. The fees were the type
of affected item assessable only through the deficiency procedures, because they required
partner-level determinations to ascertain the portion (if not all) of the fees related to the
partnership and to the transaction and which were thus nondeductible.
.
12.
The IRS gets a second bite at this TEFRA apple even if the in-house
rules were not followed. NPR Investments, LLC v. United States, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87398
(E.D. Tex. 8/10/10). NPR was a partnership foimed to execute a R.J. Ruble, Sidley Austin, Son
of Boss abusive tax shelter deal. The three partners were partners in a plaintiffs contingency fee
law firm, and two of them were the taxpayers in Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v.
United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 5/21109). When the partners withdrew from NPR, they
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transferred the inflated basis foreign currency from NPR to their law firm partnership. On its tax .
return, NPR indicated that it was not a partnership subject to TEFRA audit procedures, when in
fact it was a TEFRA partnership. In the initial audit of NPR's returns, the IRS applied normal
partnership audit procedures and issued a final no adjustment notice to the partnership. Rather
than proposi11g adjustments to· the NPR return, the IRS determined that it would deny loss
deductions through the issue of notices of deficiency directly to the NPR partners. In a higher
level review, the IRS determined that NPR was a TEFRA partnership and that the deficiency
action required issue of an FPAA to the NPR partners adjusting NPR partnership items. Section
6223(f) provides that if the IRS mails a final partnership administrative adjustment, it may not
mail another notice in the absence of a showing of fraud, malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a
material fact. The taxpayers argued that the second notice was invalid. The court (Judge Ward)
found that the initial notice to NPR met the statutory criteria for an FPPA, even though it was
sent through the normal audit process. The court indicated that there is nothing in statute or case
law that affects the validity of an FPPA by whether the IRS followed proper internal procedur~s
in issuing the notice. However, the court also found that the taxpayer's misrepresentation of the
TEFRA audit status on NPR's partnership return by failing to check the box indicating it was
subject to the TEFRA provisions was a "misrepresentation of a material fact" invoking the
exception in § 6223(f) that allows a second notice.
•
The court also held that the taxpayers reasonably relied on
their tax advisors and declined to impose penalties under §§ 6662(b) and 6664(c)(1).
G.
Miscellaneous
1.
Oops. No, no, I'm OK after all. Rev. Proc. 2010-32, 2010-36 LR.B. 320.
(9/7/10). This procedure provides that if a foreign entity makes a check the box election to be a
partnership, under the ·reasonable assumption that it has more than one owner, but then
determines that it only had one owner, the original check the box election will be treated as an
election to be a disregarded entity provided the requirements in the revenue procedure are
satisfied. Similarly, it also provides that if a foreign entity makes a check the box election to be
disregarded entity, under the reasonable assumption that it has only one owner, but then
determines it only had more than one owner, the original check the box election will be treated. as
an election to be a partnership provided the requirements in the revenue procedure are satisfied.
VIn. TAX SHELTERS
A.
Tax Shelter Cases and Rulings - The Saga Starts a Long, Long Time Ago,
But New Mysteries Continue to Unravel.
1.
Notice 2000-44. Baby BOSS is a fraud too! Notice 2000-44, 2000-36
LR.B. 255 (8/11100). "Artificial" capital losses generated by Baby BOSS transactions will not be
allowed. (Note that Notice 99-59, 1999-2 .B. 761, advised taxpayers that losses from "BOSS"
product transactions are not properly deductible.)
•
Scheme # 1: The taxpayer purports to borrow at a premium
interest rate. For example, a lender gives the taxpayer $3,000 and the parties treat the stated
principal amount of the loan as only $2,000, with the remaining $1,000 that must be repaid
representing interest. The taxpayer contributes the loan proceeds into a partnership, which assumes
the liability, and uses the proceeds to purchase an investment asset worth $3,000. The
taxpayer/partner takes the position under §§ 705(a)(2), 722, and 752(b) that his basis in his
partnership interest is $1,000 (the $3,000 cash contribution minus the $2,000 assumed liability),
even though the value of the partnership interest is zero. The taxpayer then sells the partnership
interest for a nominal amount, claiming a $1,000 capital loss. (Everyone apparently ignores the
$1,000 discrepancy between the cash proceeds of the loan and the $2,000 "principal amount,"
which ha,s to produce income to someone sometime.) This short sale variant is also the so-called
BLIPS strategy.
•
Scheme #2: The taxpayer simultaneously purchases a call
option and writes an offsetting call option, both of which are then contributed to a partnership. The
taxpayer takes the position that the basis of the partnership interest equals the basis of the purchased
call option, unreduced by the liability associated with the written call option, i.e., that the
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partnership did not assume a liability when it took responsibility for the written call option. The
taxpayer then uses this artificially high basis to claim a capital loss on the sale of his partnership
interest. (Compare Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131, holding that a partnership's short sale of
securities creates a liability.) This'offsetting option variant is also the so-called COBRA strategy.
•
Notice 2000-44 disallows the losses (under §§ 165(a) and (c))
produced by both of these Baby BOSS transactions as artificial, citing, in the case of individuals,
Fox v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 1001 (1984), holding that §165(c)(2) requires a primary profit motive
for a loss from a particular transaction is to be deductible. The notice also cites Reg. §1.701-2 (the
partnership anti-abuse rules). The IRS also announced that it was reexamining the partnership basis
rules.
•
Compound indicia of criminal tax fraud? The government
believes that the Baby BOSS transactions were not being individually reported on schedule D, but
instead have been buried in grantor trusts. For example, an individual taxpayer with an unrealized
capital gain contributes both the appreciated assets and the Baby BOSS partnership interest into a
.grantor trust, which sells both, and the individual reports only the net gain or loss from the grantor
trust's transactions on his return, rather than breaking out gains and losses separately, as is required
(by Reg. §1.671-2). Treasury Department officials suggest that criminal penalties might apply to
this kind of reporting, which willfully conceals the facts.
•
Changes coming to tax shelter disclosure rules. The
recently proposed corporate tax shelter disclosure rules will be changed by dropping the
requirement that a shelter be marketed to a corporation to trigger the requirement that a promoter
maintain a customer list. Under the amended regulations, a customer list would have- to be
maintained for a shelter that is exclusively peddled to individuals, provided threshold amounts of
fees and tax savings are met.
2.
Temp. Reg. § 1.7S2-6T. Fighting duplication and acceleration of losses
through partnerships before June 24, 2003. T.D. 9062, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 68
F.R. 37414 (6/24/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T provides rules, similar to the rules applicable to
corporations in § 358(h), to prevent the duplication and acceleration of loss through the
assumption by a partnership of a liability of a partner in a nonrecognition transaction. Under the
temporary regulations, if a partnership assumes a liability, as defined in § 358(h)(3), of a partner
(other than a liability to which § 752(a) and (b) apply) in a § 721 transaction, after application of
§§ 752(a) and (b), the partner's basis in the partnership is reduced (but not below the adjusted
value of such interest) by the amount of the liability. For this purpose, the term "liability"
includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make payment, without regard to whether the
obligation is otherwise taken into account for Federal tax purposes. Reduction of a partner's
basis generally is not required if: (1) the trade or business with which the liability is associated is
transferred to the partnership, or (2) substantially all of the assets with which the liability is
associated are contributed t; the partnership. However, the exception for contributions of
substantially all of the assets does not apply to a transaction described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2
C.B. 255 (or a substantially similar transaction).
•
The temporary regulations purport to be effective for
transactions occurring after 10/18/99 and before 6/24/03. The cases which held them to be
retroactively effective include: Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1882
(N.D. Ill. 2007), ajf'd, 515F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); and Maguire Partners - Master Investments,
LLC v. United States, 103 A.F.T.R2d 2009-763, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. ,-r50,215 (C.D. Calif. 2/4/09). The
cases which held them not to be retroactively effective include: Klamath Strategic Investment Fund,
LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 2006), ajf'd in part, vacated in part, and
remanded, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 5/21109); Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo.
2008); Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (Fed. Cl. 2008); and
Muifam Farms LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516 (Fed. Cl. 7/30/09).
And the Court of Federal Claims sticks by its guns.
•
Murfam Farms. LLC v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 598
(Fed. Cl. 8/16/10). The court denied a motion by the government to vacate its earlier holding that
Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T cannot be retroactively applied. The government argued that the holding
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was moot following a stipulation by the parties that the transaction lacked economic substance. The
court held that the possibility that its earlier ruling would weaken the governments litigating
position in future cases did not warrant vacating the earlier decision. The court noted that debate
among courts is helpful.
3.
District Court holds for the taxpayer on the merits in an options
transaction for which R.J. Ruble provided the tax opinion. Sala v. United States, 552 F.
Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 4/22/08). The District Court (Judge Babcock) held that taxpayer was
entitled to a $60 million ordinary loss on 24 long and short currency options entered into in
November 2000 as part of a Deerhurst Program, in which the options were contributed to a
partnership. The basis of that partnership interest was increased by the cost of the long options
but was not reduced by the contingent liability on the short options under Helmer v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-160 (l975). This was based upon Judge Babcock's finding of
fact that the long and short options were separate instruments for tax purposes. The court found
that the regulations issued in 2003, Reg. § 1.752-6, retroactive to October 1999, which contained
an "exception to the exception" for transactions described in Notice 2000-44, exceeded
Treasury's authority. Judge Babcock held that the regulations were not legislative because the
"exception to the exception" was not comparable to the rules for corporations described in
§ 358(h). Judge Babcock concluded that the corporate rules were only "to prevent acceleration or
duplication of losses," which were not involved in the transactions described in Notice 2000-44.
He refused to follow Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008).
Judge Babcock analyzed the complex transaction under the
•
step transaction doctrine and found the doctrine inapplicable.
•
He found the losses deductible under § 165(c)(2) because
they were incurred in a transaction entered into for profit, which was to be determined at the time
taxpayer entered into the transaction, and not in hindsight. In this, Judge Babcock credited Sala's
testimony that "he expected his investment in Deerhurst to be profitable above and beyond the
expected tax loss . . .."
•
He found the taxpayer was "an extremely cautious investor
who invested a great deal of time and energy carefully researching and choosing his investments"
and that he had a business purpose other than tax avoidance for structuring his investment as he did.
•
Judge Babcock further held that Sala's amended return filed
on 11118/03 was a "qualified amended return" because KPMG had not been contacted regarding
Deerhurst prior to that date, although it had been previously contacted regarding transactions similar
to Deerhurst.
a.
Government motion on 6/10/08 for new trial based upon affidavit
given in connection with decision not to prosecute investment manager. An9rew J. Krieger, a
key witness for the taxpayer, stated in an affidavit dated 5/22/08 that a portion of the testimony
he gave at deposition was false, in that there was no "test period" for an "investment program"
but merely an effort to obtain tax savings. 2008 TNT 114-15. The motion was opposed by the
taxpayer because Krieger gave his affidavit only after the government granted him immunity
from prosecution by executing a non-prosecution cooperation agreement in connection with a
criminal investigation unrelated to this case, i.e., the Coplan criminal case pending in the
SouthemDistrict of New York. 2008 TNT 130-62, 7/1108.
b.
Government motion for new trial denied. 251 F.R.D. 614, 102
A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5292 (7/18/08). Judge Babcock denied the motion, holding that the evidence
submitted by the government was not new. He stated, "Rather than implying diligence, the
timing of this 'new' evidence instead implies a deliberate attempt on the part of the Government
to further delay and derail this case for tactical gain."
c.
Tenth Circuit reverses Judge Babcock for his Sala'd days. Sala
v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5406 (lOth Cir. 7/23/10). The Tenth Circuit (Judge
Murphy) reverses Judge Babcock's ruling in favor of Sala on all issues by severing the year2000 tax loss from the post-2000 Deerhurst Program and finding that the 2000 transaction lacked
economic substance because "the economic substance doctrine requires 'disregarding, for tax
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purposes, transactions that comply with the literal terms of the tax code but lack economic
reality. '"
•
Judge Murphy observed:
Indeed, rather than suffering any actual financial loss through Deerhurst GP, Sala
actually profited from the transaction. Sala does not contest that the loss is
fictional, but rather protests that the rule from Helmer should control. This
argument does not, however, address the claimed loss's absence of economic
reality. The absence of economic reality is the hallmark of a transaction .lacking
economic substance ....
Additionally, while the district court found the long and short options had a
potential to earn profits of $550,000 over the course of one year, the expected tax
benefit was nearly $24 million. That expected tax benefit dwarfs any potential
gain from his participation in Deerhurst GP such that "the economic realities of
[the] transaction are insignificant in relation to the tax benefits of the transaction."
... The existence of some potential profit is "insufficient to impute substance into
an otherwise sham transaction" where a "common-sense examination of the
evidence as a whole" indicates the transaction lacked economic substance.
4.
Maguire Partners. Maguire Partners - Master Investments, LLC v. United
States, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-763 (C.D. Calif. 2/4/09). Two individuals, through various entities,
in late 2001 entered into call options spreads, i.e., they sold short call options to AIG via an
Arthur Andersen tax strategy and purchased offsetting long call options and promissory notes
from the same company; the options were European options, with an Asian-style feature, in that
they were to be exercised on a particular date based upon the average value of a REIT basket
over a 90-day period. The partnerships received the long options and notes and assumed the short
options. In finding for the government, the court (Judge Walter) held that the evidence
demonstrated that the transactions did not have economic substance because the individuals
received no economic benefit, other than an increase in basis, from the transactions. The court
also held that the evidence demonstrated that the individuals were motivated by the increased
basis and not by any purported hedging benefit. The court held that, under both the step
transaction doctrine and the substance-over-form doctrine, the individuals' actual cost basis was
the original amount of their investment - not the increased basis reported by the partnerships,
because they had no downside exposure, and only an extremely remote possibility of receiving a
return. Judge Thomas further held that the obligation created by the short option is a liability for
purposes of § 752, or alternatively, it had to be taken into account under Reg. § 1.752-6 which
applies retroactively. He further found that the individuals had been placed on notice by Notice
2000-44, issued in August 2000.
•
The court also held that the partnerships made a gross .
valuation misstatement under § 6662, citing in support the fact that one of the individual's
partnerships reported an increase in its capital account equal to 67 times the actual economic outlay
that the individual paid for the transaction.
.
a.
The court amended its earlier opinion to hold that the partnerships
were not liable fot the gross valuation misstatement penalties, but were liable for negligence
penalties instea4. Maguire Partners - Master Investments, LLC v. United States, ·104 A.F.T.R.2d
2009-7839 (C.D. Calif. 12/11109).' The court focused its discussion of penalties on the
"negligence or disregard of rules or regulations" under 6662(a) and (b)(1) and did not mention
the valuation misstatement issue.
S.
Murfam Farms. Retroactive application of the partnership contingent
liability regulation rejected again. Murfam Farms L.L.C. v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516
(Fed. Cl. 7/30109). The court (Judge Damich) granted the taxpayers' motion for partial summary
judgment in a COBRA tax shelter case (COBRA is a Son-of-Boss digital options shelter under
another name) declaring that Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T may not be applied retroactively. The court
held that retroactive application of the temporary regulation was barred by the prohibition of
§ 7805(b)(1) on retroactive application of regulations because it was not issued pursuant to a
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offset by a large depreciation expense, with a corresponding allocation of a large amount of taxable
income, but no corresponding allocation of depreciation deductions. This resulted in an enormous
tax savings, but the simple allocation of a large percentage of income violates no rule. The
government does not - and cannot - dispute that partners may allocate their partnership's income as
they choose. Neither does the government dispute that the taxable income allocated to the Dutch
Banks could not be offset by the allocation of non-existent depreciation deductions to the banks.
And ... the bare allocation of a large interest in income does not violate the overall tax effect rule."
•
Judge Underhill concluded:
The government is understandably concerned that the Castle Harbour transaction
deprived the public fisc of some $ 62 million in tax revenue. Moreover, it appears
likely that one of GECC's principal motivations in entering into this transaction though certainly not its only motivation - was to avoid that substantial tax burden.
Nevertheless, the Castle Harbour transaction was an economically real
transaction, undertaken, at least in part, for a non-tax business purpose; the
transaction resulted in the creation of a true partnership with all participants
holding valid partnership. interests; and the income was allocated among the
partners in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code and Treasury Regulations.
In short, the transaction, though it sheltered a great deal of income from taxes,
was legally permissible. Under such circumstances, the I.R.S. should address its
concerns to those who write the tax laws.
•
Query whether § 704(b) was properly applied. to this
transaction?
•
This appears to be a lease-stripping transaction in which the
income from the lease was assigned to foreign entities while the benefits of ownership were left
with a domestic entity.
b.
Castle Harbour IL Second Circuit reverses. 459 F.3d 220 (2d
Cir. 8/3/06). The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Leval, held that the Dutch banks were
not partners because their risks and rewards were closer to those of creditors than partners. He
used the facts-and-circumstances test of Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949), to
determine whether the banks' interest was more in the nature of debt or equity, and found that
their interest was overwhelmingly in the nature of a secured lender's interest, "which would
neither be harmed by poor performance of the partnership nor significantly enhanced by
extraordinary profits."
•
In ACM (Colgate), Judge Laro wrote a 100+ page analysis to
find that there was no economic substance to the arrangement. The next contingent payment
installment sale case in the Tax Court was ASA Investerings (Allied Signal), in which Judge Foley
wrote a much shorter opinion fmding that the Dutch bank was not a partner; the D.C. Circuit
affirmed on Judge Foley's holding that the Dutch bank was not a partner. The IRS began to pick up
this lack-of-partnership argument and began to use it on examinations. Later, the Tax Court (Judge
Nims) used the economic substance argument in Saba (Brunswick), which the DC Circuit remanded
based on ASA Investerings to give taxpayer the opportunity to argue that there was· a valid
partnership, which it could not do, as Judge Nims found on remand. Even later, the D.C. Circuit
reversed the District Court's Boca (Wyeth, or American Home Products) case based upon this lackof-partnership argument - even though Cravath planned Boca carefully so that if the Dutch bank
was knocked out, there would still be a partnership - based upon its ASA Investerings and Saba
findings on appeal that there was no partnership. Now the Second Circuit has adopted the lack-ofpartnership argument.
c.
Castle Harbour III: On remand in Castle Harbour, the District
Court found a valid partnership to have existed under § 704(e) because the heading does not alter
the clear language of a statute. A valid family partnership is found in the absence of a family ..
Additionally, in his contingent penalty findings, Judge Underhill stated that his 2004 taxpayerfavorable decision ipso facto means that the taxpayer's reporting position was based upon
substantial authority. 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6746 (D. Conn. 10/7/09), as amended, 2009 U.S.
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Dist. LEXIS 98884 (D. Conn. 10123/09). In a carefully-written opinion, Judge Underhill held
that, while the Second Circuit opinion decided that the partnership did not meet the Culbertson
totality-of-the-circumstances test ("whether ... the parties in good faith and acting with a
business purpose intended to join together in the present conduct of the enterprise"), it did not
address the § 704(e)(1) issue. He held that the Dutch banks satisfied the requirements of that
paragraph, which reads:
(e) Family partnerships.
(1) Recognition of interest created by purchase or gift. - A person shall be
recognized as a partner for purposes of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in
a partnership in which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether or
not such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any other person.
•
In so holding, he relied upon well-settled law that the title of
a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text, and that the title is of use only when it sheds
light on some ambiguous word or phrase. See also, LR.C. § 7806(b).
•
Some of the authors observe that it is worth noting that
although Evans v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971), aff'g 54 T.C. 40 (1970), which
Judge Underhill relied upon extensively to reach his conclusion, held that the application of
§ 704(e)( 1) was not limited to the context of family partnerships, Evans involved the question who,
between two different persons - the original partner or an assignee of the original partner's
economic interest - was the partner who should be taxed on a distributive share of the partnership's
income. Although in the family context § 704(e) frequently has been applied to determine whether a
partnership exists in the first place, Judge Underhill's decision in Castle Harbour III is the very first
case to discover that § 704(e)(I) applies to determine whether an arrangement between two (or
more) otherwise unrelated business entities or unrelated individuals constituted a partnership.
•
It has sometimes been adduced that the fact that a court of
applicable jurisdiction subsequently upholds the tax treatment of a transaction should be a strong
argument for the proposition that such tax treatment was based upon substantial authority. With
respect to the applicability of penalties should he be reversed on appeal, Judge Underhill stated:
To a large extent, my holding in Castle Harbour I in favor of the taxpayer
demonstrates the substantial authority for the partnership's tax treatment of the
Dutch Banks, as does my discussion above of the Dutch Banks' interest in Castle
Harbour under section 704(e)(1). In addition, the government's arguments against
the substantial authority defense are unavailing. (emphasis supplied)
•
Judge Underhill also sought to place the application of the
penalty provisions in a temporal context when he stated:
The government argues that Culbertson and Second Circuit cases like Slifka and
Dyer that interpreted Culbertson cannot provide substantial authority for the
partnership'S tax position because the Second Circuit held in Castle Harbour II
that the Dutch Banks were not partners under Culbertson. The government,
however, has not pointed to any Second Circuit case or other authority, prior to
1997 and 1998 when the Castle Harbour partners took the tax positions at issue,
where the parties' good faith intention or valid business purpose in forming a
partnership was not sufficient to support a conclusion of partnership status for tax
purposes.
•
In the context of the previous two bullet points, it is worth
noting that Judge Underhill's observations in the immediately preceding 'bullet point appear to be
consistent with Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv)(C), which provides that whether a position is supported by
substantial authority must be determined with reference to authorities in existence at the time. But,
Judge Underhill's observations in the second preceding bullet point appear to be inconsistent with
One of us thinks the opinion is "carefully-written." Dan and Marty, the only two of us who teach and
regularly write about partnership taxation, do not so think. Ira, who has never taught a course in
partnership taxation, appreciates the innovative logic underlying the opinion.
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both Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii), and observations in the immediately preceding bullet point.
However, we are not all in agreement with what Judge Underhill intended the observations in the
second preceding bullet point to mean.
.
Stay tuned for further proceedings on appeal to the Second
•
Circuit, where the same panel that heard Castle Harbour II will hear Castle Harbour IV.
7.
Consolidated Edison. Taxpayer victory in the Court of Federal Claims
in a lease-in, lease-out (LILO) transaction with a Dutch utility. On appeal, the taxpayer is
likely to hit a Dutch wall, i.e., a [Timothy] Dyk. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v.
United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (10/21109). The Court of Federal Claims (Judge Hom), in a long
and careful opinion held that, under the particular facts of this case, the LILO transaction
taxpayer entered into with a Dutch utility had economic substance, i.e., that no decision as to
whether particular options would be exercised was "pre-ordained" and that taxpayer "bore the
burdens and benefits of ownership." In finding that taxpayer had shown that the transaction was
a true lease and should be respected, she distinguished factually other LILO cases decided for the
government, such as BB & T Corporation v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008), and
AWG Leasing Trustv. United States, 592 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Ohio 2008).
A large portion of the opinion consists of Judge Hom's
•
analysis of the expert evidence, with pointed criticism of one expert who "failed to conduct in-depth
studies of the ... [t]ransaction and gave almost automatic and generalized conclusions on the flaws
ofLILO and SILO transactions for tax purposes."
. ' Alleged "spoliation of evidence" in 2000 by reason of a
switch in e-mail systems without preserving all of the then-existing e-mails, and the desire to protect
1997 memoranda as work product, come into conflict with bad result for the credibility of an in-_
house lawyer. ("He was considered by the court an unreliable witness, perhaps willing to write or
say whatever he thOUght would assist his then current assignment.") The court found that litigation
was not reasonably anticipated until 2002 at the earliest because negotiations in connection with the
IRS audit were ongoing until at least that year. The 1997 memoranda were ordered disclosed.
8.
Palm Canyon X Another Son-of-Boss-type shelter bites the dust in the
Tax Court and not even the Thighmaster can trim the tax bill. Palm Canyon X Investments,
LLC, et al. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-288 (12115/09). In a lengthy opinion the court
(Judge Marvel) held that a Son-of-Boss investment in offsetting digital option contracts was to
be disregarded under the economic substance doctrine. Taxpayers Alan and Suzanne Hamel ran a
retail business that included the extremely successful "Thighmaster," which featured Suzanne
Hamel, a/kIa the actress Suzanne Somers, in its advertising. They incorporated Alan Hamel
Investments (AHI), which in tum was the sole member of Palm Canyon, an LLC. Palm Canyon
entered into a long digital option contact for a premium of $5 million an offsetting short option
for which the counterparty paid a premium of $4.945 million, resulting in a net premium outlay
of $55,000. An investment company formed by one of the promoters acquired a membership
interest in the LLC, thereby allowing the LLC to be treated as a partnership. AHI claimed a basis
in the LLC in the amount of the premium paid for the long position without reduction for the
contingent liability represented by the short position assumed by the partnership. On the
subsequent liquidation of the partnership, AHI claimed a high basis in a Canadian dollars
position that was sold for a loss. The contracts were entered into through John Ivsan, a tax
attorney with Cantl~y & Sedacca, LLP, who directed them to the Dallas branch of Deutsche
Bank to implement the strategy, which created a $5 million ordinary loss. The court avoided the
technical issues, and assumed that the transaction satisfied the literal language of § 752 and that
under Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-160, AHI's partnership basis was not reduced
by the contingent short option liability. The court also avoided the issue of retroacti,ve
application of Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6, which would have required AHI to reduce its basis by the
LLC's potential payment on the short option. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the
transaction failed to satisfy the subjective prong of the economic substance test because the
Hamels entered into the transaction for the sole purpose of avoiding federal income tax, and
failed the objective prong because the taxpayers' failed to demonstrate that the transactions had
any reasonable prospect of earning a profit. The court noted that because of the marketing
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agent's ability to determine the spot market exchange rate on the option date, the marketing
agent could assure that the option contracts would not hit the "sweet spot" that would make the
transaction profitable. The court imposed accuracy related penalties concluding that the
transaction qualified as a tax shelter and that the Hamels could not reasonably rely on the tax
opinion of Pryor, Cashman, Sherman & Flynn, LLP, which was part of the promoter team and
therefore had a conflict of interest in issuing the opinion.
9.
Wells Fargo. "The SILO transactions here are offensive to the Court
on many levels." Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (1/8/10). Wells Fargo
engaged' in 26 SILO transactions, five of which were tried in this refund case in the Court of
Federal Claims. Seventeen of the SILOs involved domestic transit agencies and nine involving
qualified technological equipment. The trial dealt with four SILOs involving public transit
agencies, and one involving cellular telecommunications equipment. The parties agreed that the
court's ruling with respect to the five transactions would guide the' resolution of the remainder.
The court's fact [mdings are synopsized in the following passage from the opinion by Judge
Wheeler:
In each transaction, the parties employed equity and debt "defeasance accounts,"
which are types of escrow accounts intended to minimize the risks of nonpayment. During the lease-back period, a return is generated from the equity
defeasance account investments. The value of the equity defeasance account is
expected to grow so that the tax-exempt entity can exercise the buy-out option at
the end of the lease-back period without using any of its own funds. However, the
equity defeasance account return is more than offset by the other costs of the
transaction, including Wells Fargo's cost of funds to engage in the transaction.
The end result is that the trial transactions produce an overall loss without the tax
benefits, and no rational person would engage in these transactions absent the tax
benefits. This conclusion is borne out by Wells Fargo's cessation of SILO
transactions after the IRS began disallowing SILO tax deductions. Moreover, the
profitable portion of the transactions could be realized simply by investing in the
same portfolio as the equity defeasance account. The only reason to create the
elaborate array of agreements comprising a SILO transaction is for Wells Fargo to
obtain the tax benefits at minimal risk, and with complete assurance of the desired
long-term outcome.
'
•
The essence the court's ultimate holding is captured in the
following passages from the opinion:
The Court finds that Wells Fargo is not entitled to the claimed tax deductions on
the five trial transactions. The SILO transactions did not grant to Wells Fargo the
burdens and benefits of property ownership. The transactions lack economic
substance, and were intended only to reduce Wells Fargo's federal taxes by
millions of dollars. Although well disguised in a sea of paper and complexity, the
SILO transactions essentially amount to Wells Fargo's purchase of tax benefits
for a fee from a tax-exempt entity that cannot use the deductions. The transactions
are designed to minimize risk and assure a desired outcome to Wells Fargo,
regardless of how the value of the property may fluctuate during the term of the
transactions. Indeed, nothing of any substance changes in the tax-exempt entity's
operation and ownership of the assets. The only money that changes hands is
Wells Fargo's up-front fee to the tax-exempt entity, and Wells Fargo's payments
to those who have participated in or created the intricate agreements. The equity
and debt "loop" transactions simply are offsetting accounting entries not
involving actual payments, or pools of money eventually returned to the original
holder. If the Court were to approve of these SILO schemes, the big losers would
be the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), deprived of millions in taxes rightfully
due from a financial giant, and the taxpaying public, forced to bear the burden of
the taxes avoided by Wells Fargo.
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... The heart of these transactions is that Wells Fargo paid a fee to tax-exempt
entities to acquire valuable tax deductions that the tax-exempt entities could not
use. Wells Fargo also invested an amount with an equity undertaker that it could
have done directly, without involving any tax-exempt entities or their equipment.
Aside from these two elements, the circular flow of funds adds nothing to the
transaction, except to eliminate any risk to Wells Fargo and to produce more
claimed tax deductions. The involvement of lenders like AIG, appraisers like
Ernst & Young, and law firms like King & Spalding is "window dressing" serving
only to generate fees and lengthy documents to give the SILOs an appearance of
validity. The Indiana district court hit the mark when it described the SILO as a
"blatantly abusive tax shelter" that is "rotten to the core." Hoosier Energy Rural
Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 588 F.Supp.2d 919, 921, 928
(S.D. Ind. 2008), affd 582 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2009).
After first holding that Wells Fargo was not entitled to
•
depreciation deductions because it never obtained the benefits and burdens of ownership, and was
not entitled to interest deductions, because the "loop nonrecourse debt was not genuine indebtedness
- "the lenders did not relinquish the use of the money except for the brief one-day loop ... [and
neither] Wells Fargo nor the tax-exempt entity ever had the use of the funds" - the court held
alternatively that the transactions lacked economic substance under the standards of Coltec
Industries v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (F3d. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007). The
. transactions lacked objective economic substance because the source of the non-tax economic
benefit to Wells Fargo, when the SILOs terminated was merely the return of its investment, plus the
interest earned.
... Wells Fargo could have realized this same return simply by investing in the
portfolio of the equity defeasance arrangement, without involving the [counterparties] ... in any way....
... Though the mountains of paper defy comprehension without careful study, the
bottom line is that the SILOs provide no reasonable possibility of profit at all,
absent a claim for the tax deductions.
Wells Fargo's cost of funds alone turns the SILOs into a losing proposition. Wells
Fargo's witness ... agreed that the cash-on-cash, non-tax return calculated is less
than Wells Fargo's cost of funds for its leasing business ....
... [W]hen all transactional and funding costs are considered, the non-tax return is
negative. Thus, if not for the tax deductions, no rational business entity would
seriously contemplate a SILO transaction.
•
The transactions failed the subjective branch of the economic
substance test because they had no non-tax business purpose .
... Without the claimed tax benefits, and without the company's tax capacity to
use the claimed tax benefits, Wells Fargo would not have entered into the SILO
transactions .... The motivating reason for the Wells Fargo SILOs was the desire
to reduce the company's taxes as much as possible. There were no non-tax
reasons that would justify Wells Fargo's entering into these transactions.
The lack of any arms' length negotiations of many substantive terms is a further
indication of a questionable transaction. The key terms of the SILOs were
determined by tax considerations, and Wells Fargo'S constraints to eliminate risk.
The transaction terms were more the product of a software model, than any
negotiations or commercial realities.
•
The court distinguished Consolidated Edison Co. of New
York v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6966 (2009), as a "distinctly unique"
case, and found the transactions in Wells Fargo to be like those in AWG Leasing Trust v. United
States, 592.F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ohio 2008), and BB&T Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir.
2008), aff'g 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-376 (M.D. N.C. 2007), in which deductions from LILO
transactions were disallowed.
75

10.
Confining the Frank Lyon Co. Result to its facts as understood by the
Supreme Court. "The Court [in Frank Lyon CO.] also emphasized, in contrast to this case
the transaction did not create any tax deductions, because Lyon and Worthen paid taxes at
the same rate." Altria Group, Inc. v. United States, 694 F.3d 259 (S.D. N.Y. 3/16/10). In a
refund suit involving several SILO and LILO tax shelters with respect to infrastructure originally
owned by tax indifferent parties, a jury rendered a verdict for the government, fmding that the
transactions lacked economic substance. On the taxpayer's motion for judgment as a matter of
law and, alternatively, for a new trial, Judge Holwell ruled in favor of the government. He
generically described the four transactions as follows:
In each transaction, Altria immediately leased the asset back to its original owner
using agreements with a number of unusual features, including complete
defeasance (prepayment, in essence) of the lessee's rent and an owner's option to
repurchase the asset. Altria then claimed depreciation, amortization, interest
expense, and transaction expense deductions on its 1996 and 1997 corporate tax
return based on its newly acquired assets, even though (i) its purchase money
immediately was invested in securities that the nominal lessees could not access
without providing substitute collateral, and (ii) the lessees could reacquire the
assets without incurring any out-of-pocket costs.
•
In the course of extensive discussion of the import of Frank
Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), Judge Holwell deftly confmed that case to its facts
as understood by the Supreme Court, stating, "The Court also emphasized, in contrast to this case
the transaction did not create any tax deductions, because Lyon and Worthen paid taxes at the same
rate." Referring again to the Supreme Court's Frank Lyon decision, he observed: "The Supreme
Court, however, has expressly indicated that a transaction's effect on the U.S. Treasury must inform
a federal court's analysis of whether a transactional form chosen selected by a taxpayer should be
respected for federal tax purposes." Judge Holwell went on to discuss of the application of a flexible
economic substance doctrine test under Second Circuit precedent, but he described it all as "dicta"
in light of the jury's verdict. He described Second Circuit law as requiring "an analysis under which
the fact fmder must consider both aspects of the economic substance inquiry, and may (but need not)
fmd against the taxpayer if a transaction lacks either a legitimate business purpose or an economic
effect." On this basis, the court rejected Altria's argument that because the facts established that it
that it expected to receive a non-taxbased return of 2.5% to 3.8% from the transactions it was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law "[T]he jury's fmding that Altria lacked a legitimate business
purpose for entering the transactions, even if at the limits of what present doctrine allows, was
sufficient to support its economic substance verdict."
Note that under new § 7701(0), if a court applies the
•
economic substance doctrine to transactions entered into after 3/30/1 0, it must apply a conjunctive
test under which the claimed tax benefits must be disallowed unless (1) the transaction changes the
taxpayer's economic position in a meaningful way apart from Federal income tax effects and (2) the
taxpayer has a substantial business purpose, apart from Federal income tax effects, for entering into
such transaction.
11.
Partnership anti-abuse rules are applied to eliminate losses in a
transaction that lacked economic substance. Did this court initiate the use of Reg. § 1.7012? NY Partners Fund, LLC v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-830 (S.D. Miss. 4/30/10). The
District Court upheld the IRS recharacterization of a tax shelter strategy involving KPMG, called
the Family Office Customized Strategy (FOCus) in eleven separate actions challenging final
partnership administrative adjustments (FPAAs). The court agreed with the IRS that the
transactions were subject to recharacterization under the anti abuse rules of Reg. § 1.701-2. The
tax matters partner in all of the proceedings was James Kelly Williams who had substantial gains
in tax years 2001 and 2002. The ·transaction developed by KPMG utilized a multiple tier
structure, the creation of a fund of funds LLC, an alternative investment fund LLC and a third
tier LLC that invested in collared long and short currency futures with Credit Suisse First
Boston. Gains on long positions were invested in CDs with Credit Suisse, suspended losses on
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short positions remained in the investment funds. The tax shelter investor then purchased the
funds to acquire the suspended losses with a capital contribution, in the form of debt guarantees
with Credit Suisse, to establish basis. The transaction was blessed with opinions from the Arnold
Porter firm. The court recognized these transactions as artificial high basis transactions described
in Notice 2000-44,2000-36 I.R.B. 255 (BOSS and Son of Boss type transactions). While noting
that the BOSS type transactions had been challenged by the IRS, the court also indicated that
KPMG hoped that the FOCus strategy was structured in a way that would avoid IRS scrutiny and
did not register the deal as an abusive tax shelter. The court found that "the central point in 2001
of following the strategy being promoted by KPMG was to ameliorate Williams' tax situation,
regardless of Williams' investment activity," After a lengthy analysis of economic substance
cases, the court stated that "the FOCus steps were a series of transactions lacking economic
substance and comprising an abusive tax shelter designed to permit an investor such as James
Kelley Williams to purchase losses embedded in a tiered partnership structure and to reduce
substantially, if not entirely, his federal tax liability for the 2001 tax year in a manner
inconsistent with the intent of subchapter K." The court also refused to conflate the FOCus
generated losses with subsequent successful investments with the hedge fund, the NCR
Bricolage companies, that managed the investments. Thus, the court held that the IRS
appropriately recast the transaction under Reg. § 1.701-2 to deny the losses. With regard to the
IRS assertion of penalties, the court held that James Kelly Williams was required to raise any
reasonable cause and good faith defenses in a separate partner level refund action. The court
sustained imposition of 20 percent understatement of income and 20 percent negligence penalties
(which are not stacked) on the partnerships and rejected the partnerships' assertions that the
FOCus positions were supported by substantial authority and that the partnerships could have
reasonably relied on the advice of professionals.
a.
Different District Court, same result. Fidelity International
Currency Advisor A Fund LLC v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2403, 2010-1 U.S.T.C.
~50,418 (D. Mass. 5/17/10). Richard Egan (a former ambassador to Ireland) was one of the
founders of EMC Corporation, a large publically traded entity that developed computer storage
devices. In order to avoid tax on $200 million capital gain resulting from sales of EMC stock,
Egan entered into paired options arrangements through partnership investments devised by
KPMG, with opinions from Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, with Fidelity International Currency
Advisors and Fidelity High Tech Advisor A Fund as general partners (Son-of Boss type
transactions), and a separate transaction designed to offset ordinary gains described as a financial
derivatives strategy designed to generate U.S. losses offset with offshore gains attributed to a
non-US taxpayer. In an opinion in excess of 350 pages, finding that the transactions were shams
lacking economic substance the court (Judge Saylor) described the transactions as "entirely
irrational; they were unnecessarily and extravagantly expensive, and did not hedge the purported·
risks effectively (or at all) .... the transactions were designed and intended to lose money, and in
fact did so." With respect to the taxpayer's argument that § 752 allowed a basis increase for the
long option positions while not treating the short positions as liabilities, the court stated that, "If
the tax system depended entirely on form over substance, the argument might well pass muster.
[par.] But tax liabilities are not so easy to dodge. It would be absurd to consider offsetting
options - purchased and sold at the same time, and with the same counterparties - as separate
items, and to act as if the one item existed and the other did not. That is particularly true where
(as here) the individual option positions were gigantic, and might bankrupt the taxpayer or the
options dealer if no offset were in place." Rejecting the taxpayers' claim of reasonable reliance
on tax opinions, the court described the opinions as "fraudulent" and indicated that "[t]he Egans
knew that the opinion letters were simply part of the tax shelter scheme, and did not for a
moment believe that they were receiving independent legal advice after a full disclosure of all
underlying facts." The court ultimately held, among other things, that neither transaction had
business purpose and both lacked economic substance, that the intermediate steps of the
transactions should be disregarded under the step transaction doctrines and that the transaction
should be treated as a single integrated transaction, and that the partnerships would be
disregarded under the anti-abuse regulation § 1.701-2. Although the court found that there were
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no grounds to assert reasonable reliance defenses to penalties, the court indicated that it lacked
jurisdiction to determine whether specific penalties, determined in individual partners'
proceedings, should be assessed against members or partners.
.
12 .
The Court of Federal Claims denied retroactive application of the
regulations, but slammed the door on the digital options strategy on economic substance
grounds and upholds penalties. Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl.
636 (Fed. Cl. 7/31/08). The Welles family recognized substantial capital gain on disposition of
50 percent of the family residential entry door business for $455 million. Prior to sale the family
transferred their stock holdings in the family corporation, Therma-Tru, to a family investment
partnership, Stobie Creek. The partnership, through single rnember LLCs, participated in the
Jenkens & Gilchrist digital options strategy, to no avail according to the Court of Federal Claims.
In an extraordinarily detailed and lengthy opinion, the court held:
•
Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975-160, establishes
that the contingent nature of the short sold position in foreign currency prevents a reduction in basis
for a reduction in partnership liabilities on distribution of property from the partnership. Thus the
potential liability on the open currency option did not reduce the taxpayers' basis in distributed
Therma-Tru stock, whose basis was increased by the purchase price of the short options.
•
Retroactive application of Reg. § 1.752-6 is not justified by
§ 309 of the Community. Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 309, 114 Stat.
2763A-587, -638. That provision was aimed at corporate transactions and is focused on the use of
contingent liabilities to accelerate or duplicate losses. The court opined that, "The transfers of the
contingent liabilities in the cases at bar resulted in increasing each partner's outside basis, but did
not cause any acceleration or duplication of losses."
Judge Miller held that the long and short digital options were
•
two options, not one as contended by the government.
•
Judge Miller dismissed Notice 2000-44, which was issued in
August 2000, after the transactions occurred but before they were reported by taxpayers in 2001, as
follows:
[The government's] argument misunderstands the import of IRS notices. As a
general proposition, IRS notices are press releases stating the IRS's position on a
particular issue and informing the public of its intentions; such notices do not
constitute legal authority. . ... Whether [taxpayers] had "notice" that their
transactions would be subject to scrutiny has no bearing on whether a Treasury
regulation, seeking retroactively to effect a change in the law, can serve to
disallow [taxpayers'] reporting position.
•
Nonetheless, under Coltee Industries, Ine. v. United States,
454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), the partnership transaction in options lacked economic substance.
The court indicated that in· Coltee, "The Federal Circuit thus adopted a disjunctive test for
determining whether a transaction should be disregarded as an economic sham: the doctrine should
apply and a transaction should be disregarded either if the transaction lacks objective economic
substance or if it is subjectively shaped solely by tax avoidance motivations." After an exhaustive
analysis of conflicting expert. opinions, the court found that, "the weight of the evidence
overwhelms plaintiffs' claim that the transactions were investments motivated by a business
purpose to return a profit." The court also interpreted Coltee as holding that, "if a transaction was
shaped solely by a tax-avoidance purpose, the fact that the transaction may have some objective
economic reality cannot save it from being disregarded as an economic sham." As to the taxpayers'
subjective purpose, the court found that, "Plaintiffs' limited evidence of non-tax avoidance
subjective motivation does not imbue the transactions with economic substance."
The court also applied the step transaction doctrine to deny
•
the claimed tax benefits. The court stated, "Trial established that, under either the interdependence
test or the end result test, the step transaction doctrine applies to plaintiffs' transactions.
Accordingly, the tax consequences must tum on the substance of the transaction and not on the form
by which plaintiffs engaged in it. In disregarding the predetermined steps of the J&G strategy,
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Stobie Creek is unable to claim a basis increase in the Therma-Tru stock, and the capital gains must
be taxed according to the reality of the transaction."
•
The court upheld accuracy and negligence penalties and
rejected the taxpayers' claims that they reasonably relied on the advice of counsel. The court
concluded that because of the built-in conflict of interest of the lawyers promoting the transaction
that was known to the taxpayers, reliance on the legal opinions was not reasonable.
a.
Affirmed, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2848 (Fed. Cir. 6/11/10). The
Federal Circuit (Judge Prost) affirmed the Court of Federal Claims on both the merits and on the
penalty issue. The court found that the offsetting options, while separate transactions for tax
purposes (under "a literal application of the tax code at that time"), were to be "properly treated
as a single, unified transaction" for economic substance ("economic reality") purposes. This led
to the conclusion that "they similarly should not be separate for the purpose of calculating the
taxpayers' basis in Stobie Cr~ek," and the taxpayers' claimed basis of $204,575,000 was
disregarded "as lacking economic reality."
•
The key paragraphs of the opinion relating to penalties are:
Similarly, the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Jeffrey Welles
knew or should have known that SLK was an agent of J & G, and thus could not
reasonably rely on SLK's advice. SLK's agency relation-ship was apparent from
the beginning. Waterman referred the Welleses to J & G, presented the strategy at
the Vero Beach meeting, and recommended the strategy. As was true for J & G,
SLK's fee agreement made clear that SLK had a financial stake in the outcome,
again tying compensation to the sheltered gain. SLK also helped implement the
strategy by drafting and backdating documents for the different corporate entities.
In-deed, SLK openly acknowledged its role in a letter to the Welleses. The letter
stated that the lower taxable gain that would be reported on Stobie Creek's return
was "produced by the tax strategy that was developed by [J & G] and implemented
with our [SLK's] help earlier this year." The trial court found that Jeffrey Welles
received this letter. Based on that and other evidence presented at trial; it was
reasonable for the trial court to infer that Jeffrey Welles (and thus Stobie Creek) knew
or should have known about the conflicts of interest for J & G and SLK. It was not
objectively reasonable for Jeffrey Welles to ignore evidence of these conflicts and
continue to rely on the advice, regardless of the Welleses' longstanding relationship
with SLK or the reputations of both firms.
Even if Jeffrey Welles had not known about the conflicts of interest, his reliance
on the advice ofSLK and J & G was still unreasonable. Based on Jeffrey Welles's
education and experience, as well as the reason the. Welleses pursued the J & G
strategy, the trial court found that Jeffrey Welles should have known that the J &
G strategy was "too good to be true." Cj Neonatology, 299 F.3d at 234. This
determination is not clearly erroneous. Jeffrey Welles was a highly educated
professional with extensive experience in finance, having worked as an
investment banker and as the manager of his family'S complex finances. Stobie
Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at 715. In that managerial role, he had helped implement a
number of sophisticated tax-planning strategies, giving hini sufficient knowledge
and experience to know when a tax-planning strategy was likely "too good to be
true.;' Jeffrey Welles knew that the J & G strategy was marketed as a "Basis
Enhancing Derivatives Structure" and that the purpose of the strategy was to
boost the basis in capital assets, "generating a reduced gain for tax purposes."
Moreover, Jeffrey Welles sought out and selected the ~ & G strategy because of a
desire to avoid taxes that would otherwise be owed on the Therma-Tru deal, not
because he wanted to structure the deal itself to minimize taxes.
13.
Even this Tax Court Judge's gullibility has limits. A "should" opinion
by PWC that the transaction was not a disguised sale isn't worth the paper it was printed
on, which resulted in a penalty of $36,691,796. Reliance on an opinion issued by an advisor
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who was actively involved in developing and structuring a transaction was unreasonable
because the advisor faced an inherent conflict of interest. Canal Corp. v. Commissioner, 135
T.C. No.9 (8/5/10). In 1999, a member ofthe taxpayer's consolidated group that manufactured
tissues, WISCO, contributed substantially all of its assets to an LLC in exchange for a 5-percent
interest in the LLC, which assumed most of WISCO's liabilities and which simultaneously
distributed $755 million of cash to WISCO. The remaining 95 percent interest in the LLC was
owned by Georgia Pacific. The $755 million was obtained through a bank loan to the LLC
guaranteed by Georgia Pacific, for which WISCO provided a circumscribed indemnity regarding
the principal, but not the interest (which required Georgia Pacific first to look to the LLC's assets
and which also provided WISCO an increased interest in the LLC if it paid the indemnity).
WISCO used the cash to pay a $151 million dividend to Canal and repay intercompany loans.
WISCO's only assets thereafter were a $151 note from Canal and a $6 million corporate jet.
Subsequently, the LLC borrowed funds from a subsidiary of Georgia Pacific to retire the bank
loan. The taxpayer received a "should" opinion from PWC that the 1999 transaction would not
be treated as an asset sale and gain would be deferred, for which it paid flat fee of $800,000. The
fee was due only if the opinion was a "should" opinion, and only upon the closing of the joint
venture transaction. In 2001, WISCO sold its LLC interest to Georgia Pacific for $1 million, and
Georgia Pacific then sold the entire interest in the LLC to an unrelated party. The taxpayer
treated the 1999 transacti0n as a contribution to the LLC and the receipt of a "debt-financed
transfer of consideration," for which Reg. § 1.707-5(b) provides an exception to the disguised
sale rules to the extent the distribution does not exceed the distributee partner's share of the
partnership liabilities under § 752. (However, for financial accounting purposes taxpayer
reported the transaction as a sale.) The IRS asserted that the 1999 transaction was a disguised
sale under § 707(a)(2)(B), because WISCO did not have any allocable share of the liability. The
taxpayer argued that WISCO's indemnity of Georgia Pacific's guaranty imposed the economic
risk of loss for the LLC debt on WISCO, and thus WISCO's share of the debt equaled the
distribution. The IRS asserted that WISCO's indemnity agreement should be disregarded under
the anti-abuse rule for allocation of partnership debt: Reg. § 1.752-20)(1) and (3) provides that a
partner's obligation to make a payment may be disregarded if (1) the facts and circumstances
indicate that a principal purpose of the arrangement between the parties is to eliminate the
partner's risk of loss or to create a facade of the partner's bearing the economiC risk of loss with
respect to the obligation, or (2) the facts and circumstances of the transaction evidence a plan to
circumvent or avoid the obligation. The Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) agreed with the IRS that the
transactions had to be viewed together and they constituted a disguised sale under § 707(a)(2)(B)
rather than a tax-free contribution to a partnership under § 721. Taking into account all of the
facts, including the facts that (1) Georgia Pacific did not require the indemnity, but it was
included because the taxpayer's tax advisor concluded that it was necessary in order to avoid the
disguised sale rules, (2) the indemnity's provisions minimized the likelihood that it would ever
be invoked, and (3) the taxpayer's representations to Moody's and Standard & Poor's that the
only risk associated with the transaction was the tax risk, Judge Kroupa found that the indemnity
agreement was crafted to limit any potential liability to WISCO's assets, which were insufficient
to cover more than a small fraction of the indemnity.'Accordingly, the indemnity agreement was
disregarded, and the distribution of cash to WISCO was not protected by the debt-financed
transfer exception to the disguised sale rules. The 1999 transaction was a sale of WISCO's
assets. The court said, "Chesapeake [taxpayer's predecessor] used the indemnity to create the
appearance that WISCO bore the economic risk of loss for the LLC debt when in substance the
risk was borne by GP." Among the circumstances considered by the court was that Chesapeake
represented that its only risk on the transaction was the tax risk.
•
Judge Kroupa also upheld the imposition a substantial
understatement penalty under § 6662(a) in the amount of $36,691,796. Even though the taxpayer
received a "should" opinion from PWC that the 1999 transaction would not be treated as an asset
sale and gain would be deferred, the "reasonable cause exception of § 6664(c)(1) did not apply,
because (1) "the opinion was riddled with questionable conclusions and unreasonable assumptions,"
and (2) PWC was actively involved in planning the transaction and its opinion was tainted by a
80

(

('

(

(

conflict of interest, which caused it have "crossed over the line from trusted adviser for prior
accounting purposes to advocate for a position with no authority that was based on an opinion with
a high price tag-$800,000." She described the opinion as "littered with typographical errors,
disorganized and incomplete." Judge Kroupa concluded that PWC's opinion was based on the size
of its fee, rather than on legal reasoning, stating as follows:
We are also nonplused by Mr. Miller's failure to give an understandable response
when asked at trial how PWC could issue a "should" opinion if no authority on
point existed. He demurred that it was what Chesapeake requested. The only
explanation that makes sense to the Court is that no lesser level of comfort would
have commanded the $800,000 fixed fee that Chesapeake paid for the opinion.
•
Judge Kroupa found that the taxpayer "essentially bought an
insurance policy as to the taxability of the transaction," and continued to conclude as follows:
PWC's opinion looks more like a quid pro quo arrangement than a true tax
advisory opinion. If we were to bless the closeness of the relationship, we would
be providing carte blanche to promoters to provide a tax opinion as part and
parcel of a promotion. Independence of advisers is sacrosanct to good faith
reliance. We fmd that PWC lacked the independence necessary for Chesapeake to
establish good faith reliance. We further find that Chesapeake did not act with
reasonable cause or in good faith in relying on PWC's opinion.
Identified "tax avoidance transactions."
B.
1.
Now let me get this straight. I followed the Code and Regs
meticulously, claimed my loss deduction, but it was disallowed because I really had no
possibility of actually making money on the deal and all I was looking for was a nice tax
loss, and even though I've got this letter from my lawyer saying the deduction is 100%
legal, I'm still looking at a 40 percent penalty on the deficiency. But my neighbor who
deducted the cost of his kid's college education as a business expense, which every
kindergartner knows you can't do, doesn't have to pay any penalty because he's dumb and
his dumb, but probably honest, CPA said it was OK. Say What!? Well, we don't have to
"know it when we see it" because Congress has defined it for us. The 2010 Health Care
Reconciliation Act added new Code § 7701 (0), codifying the economic substance doctrine,
which has been applied by the courts for several decades as a judicial interpretive doctrine to
disallow tax benefits otherwise available under a literal reading of the Code and regulations.
•
Background - Codification of the economic substance
doctrine has been on the legislative agenda many times since early in the first decade of this century,
or for the past ten years (for those of us still hung up on Y2K). The move for codification was
motivated in part by the insistence of not a few tax practitioners that the economic substance
doctrine simply was not actually a legitimate element of the tax doctrine, notwithstanding its
application by the courts in many cases over several decades. This argument was based on the
assertion that the Supreme Court had never actually applied the economic substance doctrine to
deny a taxpayer any tax benefits, ignoring the Supreme Court's decision in Knetsch v. United States,
364 U.S. 361 (1960), and instead focusing on the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Cottage
Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991), and Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 561 (1978), in which a transaction that on the facts showed the total lack of "economic
substance" was upheld. Congressional concern was intensified by the decision of the Court of
Federal Claims in Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004), vacated and
remanded, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007), which questioned
the continuing viability of the doctrine, stating that "the use of the 'economic substance' doctrine to
trump 'mere compliance with the Code' would violate the separation of powers." See STAFF OF TIlE
JOINT COMMITIEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF TIlE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF TIlE
"RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WIlli TIlE "PATIENT PROTECTION
AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," 144 (JCX-18-10 3/21110); However, in that case the trial court found
that the particular transaction at issue in the case did not lack economic substance, and thus the trial
court did not actually rule on its validity, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
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vacated the Court of Federal Claims decision and, reiterating the validity of the economic substance
doctrine and, in the opinion of some, expanding it greatly, held that transaction in question lacked
economic substance. Although the economic substance doctrine has been articulated in a number of
different manners by different courts over the years, its purpose is aptly described by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Coltec Industries v. United States, supra.
The economic substance doctrine· represents a judicial effort to enforce the
statutory purpose of the tax code. From its inception, the economic substance
doctrine has been used to prevent taxpayers from subverting the legislative
purpose of the tax code by engaging in transactions that are fictitious or lack
economic reality simply to reap a tax benefit. In this regard, the economic
substance doctrine is not unlike other canons of construction that are employed in
circumstances where the literal terms of a statute can undermine the ultimate
purpose of the statute.
•
. The modem articulation of the doctrine traces its roots back
to Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), where the Court upheld the taxpayer's
treatment of an early version of a SILO, stating as follows:
[W]here, as here, there is a genuine multiple-party transaction with economic
substance which is compelled or encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is
imbued with tax-independent considerations, and is not shaped solely by tax
avoidance features that have meaningless labels attached, the Government should
honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by the parties.
•
This passage - which sets forth a statement as to what was
sufficient for economic substance, but which was subsequently interpreted to be a statement as to
what was necessary for economic substance3 - has led courts to two different formulations of the
economic substance doctrine. One, the so-called "conjunctive test" requires that a transaction have
both (1) economic substance and (2) a non-tax business purpose in order to be respected for tax
purposes. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Investment Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir.
2009); Pasternak v. Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 898 (6th Cir. 1993); James v. Commissioner, 899
F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1990); New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.9 (2009);
Coltec, supra. Under the other formulation, the so called "disjunctive test," represented principally
by IES Industries v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 358 (8th Cir. 2001), and Rice's Toyota World, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985), a transaction would be respected for tax purposes if it
had either (1) economic substance and (2) a non-tax business purpose. Yet a third articulation
appeared inACM Partnership v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1017 (1999), where the court concluded that, that "these distinct aspects of the economic sham
inquiry do not constitute discrete prongs of a 'rigid two-step analysis,' but rather represent related
factors both of which inform the analysis of whether the transaction had sufficient substance, apart
from its tax consequences, to be respected for tax purposes." The courts also have differed with
respect to the nature of the non-tax economic benefit a taxpayer is required to establish to
demonstrate that a transaction has economic substance. Some courts required a potential economic
profit. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 364
F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967). Other courts have applied the
economic substance doctrine to disallow tax benefits where - even though the taxpayer was exposed
to risk and the transaction had a profit potential - compared to the tax benefits, the economic risks
and profit potential were insignificant. Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738 (1990); Goldstein,
supra. Yet other courts have asked whether a stated business benefit - for example, cost reduction,
as opposed to profit-seeking - of a particular transaction was actually obtained through the
transaction in question. See Coltec Industries, Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007). Finally, notwithstanding that several courts have rejected the
3
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"necessary" for economic substance. Marty and Dan do not so believe, or think that the alleged error is
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bootstrap argument that an improved fmancial accounting result - derived from tax benefits
increasing· after-tax profitability - served the valid business purpose requirement, see, e.g.,
American Electric Power, Inc. v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 2d 762, a.!f'd, 326 F.3d.737 (6th Cir.
2003); Wells Fargo & Company v. United States, 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (2010), taxpayers continued to
press such claims.
•
The Codified Economic Substance Doctrine - The
codification of the economic substance doctrine in new § 7701 (0) clarifies and standardizes some
applications of the economic substance doctrine when it is applied, but does not establish any rules
for determining when the doctrine should be applied. According to the legislative history, "the
provision [I.R.C. § 7701(0){5)(C)] does not change present law standards in determining when to
utilize an economic substance analysis." See STAFF OF TIlE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION,
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF TIlE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF TIlE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,"
AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH TIlE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,"
152 (JCX-18-10 3/21110). Thus, "the fact that a transaction meets the requirements for specific
treatment under any provision of the Code is not determinative of whether a transaction or series of
transactions of which it is a part has economic substance." Id., at 153. Codification of the economic
substance doctrine was not intended to alter or supplant any other judicial interpretive doctrines,
such as the business purpose, substance over form, and step transaction doctrines, any similar rule in
the Code, regulations, or guidance thereunder; § 7701(0) is intended merely (merely?) to
supplement all the other rules. Id., at 155.

•

Conjunctive analysis of objective and subjective prongs -

One of the most important aspects of new § 7701(0) is that it requires a conjunctive analysis under
which a transaction has economic substance only if (1) the transaction changes the taxpayer's
economic position in a meaningful way apart from Federal income tax effects and (2) the taxpayer
has a substantial business purpose, apart from Federal income tax effects, for entering into such
transaction. (The second prong of most versions of the codified economic substance doctrine
introduced in earlier Congresses added "and the transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing
such purpose." See, e.g., H.R. 2345, 110th Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th Cong., 1st Sess.
(2003). It is not clear what difference in application was intended by adoption of the different final
statutory language.) This conjunctive test resolves the split between the Circuits (and between the
Tax Court and certain Circuits) by rejecting the view of those courts that find the economic
substance doctrine to have been satisfied if there is either (1) a change in taxpayer's economic
position or (2) a nontax business purpose, see, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d
89 (4th Cir. 1985); IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350,353 (8th Cir.2001). Section
7701(0)(5)(D) allows the economic substance doctrine to be applied to a single transaction or to a
series of transactions. The Staff of the Joint Committee Report indicates that the provision "does not
alter the court's ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise recharacterize a transaction when
applying the doctrine," and gives as an example the courts' ability ''to bifurcate a transaction in
which independent activities with non-tax objectives are combined with an unrelated item having
only tax-avoidance objectives in order to disallow those tax-motivated benefits."
•
Claim of Profit Potential - Section 7701(0)(2) does not
require that the taxpayer establish profit potential in order to prove that a transaction results in a
meaningful change in the taxpayer's economic position or that the taxpayer has a substantial nonFederal-income-tax purpose. Nor does it specify a threshold required return ifthe taxpayer relies on
the profit potential to try to establish economic substance. (In this respect the enacted version differs
from earlier proposals that would have required the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the
transaction to exceed a risk-free rate of return. See, e.g., H.R. 2345, l10th Cong, 1st Sess. (2007);
H.R. 2, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).) But if the taxpayer does rely on a profit potential claim, then
the profit potential requires a present value analysis:
The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken into account in determining
whether the requirements of [the § 7701(0) test for economic substance] are met
with respect to the transaction only if the present value of the reasonably expected
pre-tax profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of
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the expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were
respected.
•
Thus the analysis of profit potential by the Court of Federal
Claims in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. United States, 90 Fed. Cl. 228 (2009), which·
appears not to have thoroughly taken into account present value analysis, would not stand muster
under the new provision. In all events, transaction costs must be taken into account in detennining
pre-tax profits, and the statute authorizes regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as
expenses in detennining pre-tax profit in appropriate cases. Any State or local income tax effect that
is related to a Federal income tax effect is treated in the same manner as a Federal income tax effect.
Thus, state tax savings that piggy-back on Federal income tax savings cannot provide either a profit
potential or a business purpose. Similarly, a fmancial accounting benefit cannot satisfy the business
purpose requirement if the financial accounting benefit originates in a reduction of Federal income
tax.
•
Don't worry; be happy! /?] - Section 7701(0)(5)(B)
specifically provides that the statutory modifications and clarifications apply to an individual only
with respect to "transactions entered into in connection with a trade or business or an activity
engaged in for the production of income." (We wonder what else anybody would have thought they
might apply to? The home mortgage interest deduction? Charitable contributions of appreciated
property? How about a Son of Boss transaction where there is no possibility for profit?) More
importantly, according to STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED, IN
COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," 152-153 (JCX-1810 3/21110), "[t]he provision is not intended to alter the tax treatment of certain basic business
transactions that, under longstanding judicial and administrative practice are respected, merely
because the choice between meaningful economic alternatives is largely or entirely based on
comparative tax advantages." The list of transactions and decisions intended to be immunized for
the application of the economic substance doctrine includes:
(1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise with debt or equity; (2) a
U.S. person's choice between utilizing a foreign corporation or a domestic
corporation to make a foreign investment; (3) the choice to enter a transaction or
series of transactions that constitute a corporate organization or reorganization
under subchapter C; and (4) the choice to utilize a related-party entity in a
transaction, provided that the ann's length standard of section 482 and other
applicable concepts are satisfied.
•
Leasing transactions will continue to be scrutinized based on
all of the facts and circumstances.
•
Jettisoned along the way - Many earlier versions of the
codification of economic substance doctrine, some of which were adopted by the House, also
provided special rules for applying what was essentially a per se lack of economic substance in
transactions with tax indifferent parties that involved fmancing, and artificial income and basis
shifting. See, e.g., H.R. 2345, 11 Oth Cong, 1st Sess. (2007); H.R. 2, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).
These rules did not make it into the enacted version. Special statutory rules for detennining the
profitability of leasing transactions also did not fmd their way into the final statutory enactment.
•
Penalties, oh what penaltiesl - New §§ 6662(b)(6), in
conjunction with new § 6664(c)(2), imposes a strict liability 20 percent penalty for an
underpayment attributable to any disallowance of claimed tax benefits by reason of a transaction
lacking economic substance, within the meaning of new § 7701(0), "or failing to meet the
requirements of any similar rule of law." (Does that extend to substance versus fonn in a SILO?
How about business purpose in a purported tax-free reorganization?) The penalty is increased to 40
percent if the taxpayer does not adequately disclose the relevant facts on the original return or an
amended return filed before the taxpayer has been contacted for audit - an amended return filed
after the initial contact cannot cure original sin. I.R.C. § 6664(i). Because the § 6664(c) "reasonable
cause" exception is unavailable, outside (or in-house) analysis and opinions of counselor other tax
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advisors will not insulate a taxpayer from the penalty if a transaction is found to lack economic
substance. Likewise, new § 6664(d)(2) precludes a reasonable cause defense to imposition of the
§ 6662A reportable transaction understatement penalty for a transaction that lacks economic
substance. (Section 6662A(e)(2) has been amended to provide that the § 6662A penalty with respect
to a reportable transaction understatement does not apply to a transaction that lacks economic
substance if a 40 percent penalty is imposed under § 6662(i)). A similar no-fault penalty regime
applies to excessive erroneous refund claims that are denied on the ground that the transaction on
which the refund claim was based lacked economic substance. I.R.C. § 6676(c). However, under the
"every dark cloud has a silver lining" maxim, the §§ 6662(b)(6) and 6664(c)(2) penalty regime does
not apply to any portion of an underpayment on which the § 6663 fraud penalty is imposed.
•
Effective date - Section 7701 (0) and the revised penalty
rules applies to transactions entered into after the date of enactment and to underpayments,
understatements, and refunds and credits attributable to transactions entered into after 3/30/10.
a.
Better than a sharp stick in the eye, but not much better. The
IRS is catching conjunctivitis, weighing in on the conjunctive test. Notice 2010-62, 2010-40
I.R.B. _ (9/13/2010). The IRS indicates ,that it will rely on relevant case law in applying the
two-pronged conjunctive test for economic substance. Thus, both in determining whether a
transactions meets both of the requirements of the conjunctive test, the IRS will apply cases
under the common law economic substance doctrine to determine whether tax benefits are
allowable because a transaction satisfies the economic substance prong of the economic
substance doctrine and to determine whether a transaction has a sufficient nontax purpose to
satisfy the requirement that the tax benefits of a transaction are not allowable because the
taxpayer lacks a business purpose. The IRS adds that it will challenge taxpayers who seek to rely
on case law that a transaction will be treated as having economic substance merely because it
satisfies either of the tests. The IRS also indicates that it anticipates that the law of economic
substance will continue to evolve and that it "does not intend to issue general administrative
guidance regarding the types of transactions to which the economic substance doctrine either
applies or does not apply."
.
•
The Notice also indicates that, except for reportable
transactions, disclosure for purposes of the additional penalty of § 6621 (i) will be adequate if the'
taxpayer adequately discloses on a timely filed original return, or a qualified amended return the
relevant facts affecting the tax treatment of the transaction. A disclosure that would be deemed
adequate under § 6662(d)(2)(B) will be treated as adequate for purposes of § 6662(i).
C.
Disclosure and Settlement
D.
Tax Shelter Penalties, Etc.
1.
"Everyone's doing it" is not a legal principle. 3K Investment Partners
v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No.6 (9/3/09). In a partnership proceeding to determine whether the
partnership reasonably relied on tax opinions in a Son-of-Boss tax shelter investment in order to
avoid § 6662 accuracy related penalties, the partnership sought discovery of all of the Son-ofBoss tax shelter opinions and a list of firms providing opinions in order to bolster its argument
that reliance on opinions of Jenkens & Gilchrist was reasonable. In denying the discovery
motion, the court (Judge Thornton) observed that, "Petitioner's argument appears to be a variant
of the refrain, familiar to parents of teenagers, that 'Everyone's doing it.' For the same reason
that this does not constitute reasonable cause for teenagers, it would not constitute reasonable
cause for petitioner." The court held that the partnership must establish reasonableness based on
the facts of its own case. The court also rejected the partnership's argument that the undisclosed
opinions, which the court described as involving only a small subset of tax advisors, disclosed a
general consensus of tax advisors supported good faith reliance. The court also ruled that the
undisclosed tax opinions in the possession of the IRS represented confidential taxpayer
information protected from disclosure under § 6103(a).
.
2.
The Seventh Circuit jumps ship on penalties as partnership items. It
affirmed a District Court holding that no accuracy-related penalties applied in a Son-ofBoss case because taxpayers were entit~ed to rely on tax opinions. American Boat Company,
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LLC v. United States, 583 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 10/1/09). David Jump transferred Mississippi river
towboats to American Boat L.L.C. after an accident in which barges broke loose from a tow boat
and nearly caused a disaster by floating into a casino moored in St. Louis. In a series of Son-ofBoss transactions, American Boat used Treasury note short sales to increase the basis of its tow
boats and claim higher depreciation deductions. In a District Court proceeding brought by the
partnership the trial court held that the Son-of-Boss transactions were shams, but upheld the
partnership's assertion of a reasonable cause defense under § 6664(c) to accuracy related
penalties as a partnership item. The government appealed the penalty issue.
•
The court stated that the vast majority of courts have held that
a partnership may assert a reasonable cause defense as a partnership item on its own behalf based on
the conduct of its managing or general partner. The court also noted that a partner may not raise the
partner's own reasonable cause defense in a partnership proceeding, but rejected the IRS argument
that a reasonable cause defense is limited. The court concluded that a partnership may raise a
reasonable cause defense on facts and circumstances common to all partners and which relies on
neither an individual partner's tax return nor his unique conduct. The court further concluded that,
while it was a close case, the Seventh Circuit was not able to conclude that the District Court
committed clear error in finding that American Boat, through David Jump, reasonably relied on the
tax opinion of Erwin Mayer and Jenkens & Gilchrist in reporting the Son-of-Boss transaction.
, 3.
Magistrate Judge Bush decided that valuation misstatement penalties
are inapplicable in a Son of Boss tax shelter case in which the IRS determined that the
transaction were shams that lacked economic substance. Bemont Investments LLC v. United
States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1338 (B.D. Tex. 3/9/10). Magistrate Judge Bush based his decision
on Weiner v. United States, 389 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 2004), which cited with approval a line of
cases that held that valuation penalties are not applicable if the IRS's disallowance of tax
benefits is not "attributable to" a valuation misstatement.
4•
The IRS states that it will suspend the collection of penalties under
§ 6707A from small businesses that "inadvertently" invested in listed tax shelters. 2009
TNT 128-15 (7/6/09). Letter from Commissioner Shulman, which reads in part, "Given your
indication of a commitment to enact legislation to address this issue, and to provide the Congress"
that opportunity, we will not undertake any collection enforcement action through September 30,
2009, on cases where the annual tax benefit from the transaction is less than $100,000 for
,
individuals or $200,000 for other taxpayers per year."
a.
The IRS agrees to extend the moratorium through the end of 2009.
Letter from Commissioner Shulman. 2009 TNT 184-23 (8/24/09.
b.
And again, to extend the moratorium through 41111 O. 2009 TNT
245-1 (12/23/09).
c.
Yet another extension to 6/1/10.2010 TNT 42-2 (4/3/10).
•
With Congress focused "laser-like" on job creation, no
legislation on this penalty issue had been enacted as of 8/5/10, although H.R. 5297, the Small
Business Jobs and Credit Bill of2010 is pending in the Senate.
d.
Relief from tax shelter penalties under § 6707A for small
businesses. The § 6707A penalty is limited to 75 percent of the decrease in tax shown for
any reportable transaction. Under § 2041 of the Small Business Jobs Act of2010, the § 6707A
penalty is limited to 75 percent of the decrease in tax shown for any listed or reportable
transaction. Formerly, penalty imposed for failure to include informa,tion on a listed transaction
by a taxpayer other than a natural person was $200,000 regardless of how small the claimed
benefits from the transaction happened to be. The limitation applies to penalties assessed after
12/31/06. '
5.
If the tax advisor's fee is big enough, it's not a reliable opinion!
Murfam Farms. Inc. v. United States, _ Fed. Cl. _,2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 598 (8/16/10).
The taxpayers conceded that their Son-of-Boss tax shelters lacked economic substance, and the
only issue was whether the 40 percent accuracy related penalty was properly assessable. The
court held that the taxpayers had not established that acted with reasonable cause or in good
faith, and that the penalty waOs properly assessed. Reliance on the advice of E&Y was not
86

(

(,'

(

/

reasonable: "Because E& Y had a financial interest in having the Murphys participate in
COBRA, the firm had an inherent conflict of interest in advising on the legitimacy of that
transaction." Furthermore, "[t]hat conflict of interest was exacerbated by the fee structure,"
under which E&Y's fee would be a percentage of the taxpayer's desired tax loss. "The Murphys
knew that E&Y stood to earn millions by advising them to participate in COBRA, and they
therefore knew or should have known that E& Y' s advice lacked the trustworthiness of an
impartial opinion." Judge Damich also had a host of other reasons for finding that the taxpayers'
reliance was not reasonable or in good faith.
IX.
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A.
Exempt Organizations
1.
The IRS gives small exempt organizations until 10/15/10 to comply
with filing requirements. IR-2010-87 (7/26/10). The IRS has granted relief to small exempt
organizations that failed to file required returns for 2007, 2008 and 2009 by extending to
10/15/10 the deadline for complying with filing requirements in order to keep tax exempt status.
The information release provides for late electronic filing of the Form 990-N, Electronic Notice
(e-Postcard) and for a voluntary compliance program to file the Form 990-EZ.
2.
Tax Blues for Bluetooth. Bluetooth SIG, Inc. v. United States, 106
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5163 (9th Cir. 7/8/10). The taxpayer sought tax exempt status under
§ 501(c)(6) as a "business league." The corporation (1) develops, refines, and adapts the
Bluetooth speCification, (2) engages in marketing, public relations, and other promotional
activities designed to influence the acceptance, understanding, and use of Bluetooth enabled
products, (3) enforces its trademark both by ensuring that its members conform to the "Bluetooth
Brand Book" and by detecting unauthorized use of the Bluetooth trademark, and (4) operates a
certification and listing program. The taxpayer had 4,148 members, all of which independent
businesses. It had three membership classes: Adopters, Associates, and Promoters. Adopters pay
no annual fee, but pay a listing fee of $10,000 per product. Associates pay an annual fee of either
$7,500 or $35,000 depending on the size of the manufacturer. They pay a reduced listing fee of
$5,000 per product and have the right to participate in the continuing development of the
Bluetooth specification. They receive certain marketing and promotional opportunities that may
not be available to Adopters. Promoters pay no annual fee but enjoy the same benefits as
Associates, plus a seat on the board of directors. Each of the original five companies involved
with the technology has Promoter status. The court affirmed the district court's summary
judgment that the taxpayer did not qualify for tax exempt status, because it activities were
activities ordinarily conducted for profit, which is not permitted under Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1.
Further, the taxpayer's activities were not directed to the improvement of business conditions of
one or more lines of business as distinguished from the performance of particular services for
individual persons. A benefit to nonmembers is a key characteristic of business leagues, but the
taxpayer did not benefit nonmembers. Rather, the taxpayer engaged in particular services for
particular member-manufacturers.
3.
The exclusivity of a gated parking lot for the neighborhood beach club
has a tax price. Ocean Pines Association v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No. 13 (8/30/10). The
taxpayer was a homeowners association that was tax-exempt under § 501(c)(4) as a not-for-profit
organized to promote community welfare. In addition to enforcing zoning and providing roads
and recreational facilities within Ocean Pines, funded by members' dues (but which were open to
both members and nonmembers), it operated a beach club and parking lots eight miles from the
area (Ocean Pines) in which its members lived. The primary beach club facilities (e.g., pool,
locker room, etc.) and parking lots were accessible only to the association's members and their
guests, but the snack bar, restaurant, and beach itself were open to the public. The taxpayer
charged its members a separate fee for parking permits, and maintained a parking permit system
and guards. It also leased the parking lots to third-party businesses at night and in the off season.
The taxpayer did not report any of the income as subject to the unrelated business income tax
(UBIT). The IRS issued a deficiency notice determining that the net income from the parking
lots and beach club facilities was subject to UBIT, because their operation was not substantially
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related to the promotion of community welfare. The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) upheld the
deficiency. The court concluded that the operation ofthe beach club and the parking lots did not
promote community welfare because they were not accessible to nonmembers, i.e., the general
public. Therefore, unless an exception applied, the income was subject to UBIT. Finally, the
court held that the § 512(b)(3)(A)(i) exception for rents from real property did not apply, because
Reg. § 1.512(b)-1 (c)(5) provides that income from the operation of a parking lot is not rent from
real property.
Charitable Giving
B.
1.
The easement has to have some real effect to give rise to a charitable
contribution deduction. Herman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-205 (9/14/09). Judge
Gustafson held that a contribution to a charitable organization of an easement burdening
developable air rights over a certified historic structure owned by another person did not qualify
for a charitable contribution deduction under § 170(h). The easement did not preclude the
taxpayer, the structure's owner, or any subsequent purchaser of the property from altering or
demolishing the structure. Thus, the conservation easement did not preserve an "historically
important land area" or a "certified historic structure" within the meaning of § 170(h)(4)(A){iv).
2.
A possibly faulty conservation easement deduction saved by local
preservation laws. Simmons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-208 (9/15/09). Judge Wherry
held that facade conservation easements validly supported a charitable contribution deduction,
even though they allowed easement holder to consent to changes to the properties, because any
rehabilitative work or new construction on the facades was required to comply with the
requirements of all applicable Federal, State, and local government laws and regulations. Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(d)(5) allows a donation to satisfy the conservation purposes test even if future
development is allowed, as long as that future development is subject to local, State, and Federal
laws and regulations. That the properties were already subject to local preservation laws did not
prevent any charitable contribution deductions, because even though the easements were
duplicative in some respects, the easements subjected taxpayer to a higher level of enforcement
than that provided by local law.
3.
A "gotcha" for the IRS! The Tax Court just says "no" to deductions
for contributions of conservation easements on mortgaged properties. Kaufman v.
Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.9 (4/26/10). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that as a matter of
law no charitable contribution deduction is allowable for the conveyance of an otherwise
qualifying conveyance of a facade conservation easement if the property is subject to a mortgage
and the mortgagee has a prior claim to condemnation and insurance proceeds. Because the
mortgage has priority over the easement, the easement is not protected in perpetuity - which is
required by § 170(h)(5)(A). The deduction cannot be salvaged by proof that the taxpayer likely
would satisfy the debt secured by the mortgage.
4.
A personal sperm bank can't qualify as a tax exempt organization.
Was this foundation founder thinking he could get a tax deduction for producing sperm?
Free Fertilitv Foundation v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.2 (7/7/10). A not-for-profit corporation
established for the sole purpose of providing the founder's sperm free of charge to women
seeking to become pregnant through artificial insemination or in vitro fertilization was held not
to promote health for the benefit of the community, and thus did not operate for exempt purposes
and did not qualify for an exemption under § 501(c)(3). The founder and his father were the only
board members and decided in their sole discretion who would receive the founder's sperm.
S.
Both their house and their claimed charitable contribution deduction
went up in smoke. District Court denies deduction for about-to-be-demolished house to
local fire department on "qualified appraisal" and "contemporaneous written
acknowledgment" grounds, but ducks the issue of whether taxpayers could claim a
deduction for this type of donation. Hendrix v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5373 (S.D.
Ohio 7/21110). When the taxpayers found it would cost $10,000 to demolish their house so they
could build a new house on the land, in 2004 they entered into a transaction under which the
local fire department could use their house for training and return the cleared land to the
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taxpayers. They claimed a charitable contribution deduction of $287,400 - based upon an
appraisal of $S20,000 for the property. The District Court (Judge Frost) denied the deduction on
failure to obtain a "qualified appraisal" as required by § 170(f)(11 )(A) and failure to obtain a
"contemporaneous written acknowledgment" as required by § 170(f)(8). While Judge Frost. did
not answer the question of whether "taxpayers may be able to Claim a deduction for the type of
donation involved in this case" if a qualified appraisal and written acknowledgment had been
obtained, he did include in his opinion that Deloitte & Touche had advised the taxpayers that
"[d]onation of property to a fire department is aggressive and not explicitly sanctioned by the
Internal Revenue Code."
6.
Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 112
(l0/30/08). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that, as a precondition to using the replacement
cost approach to valuing real estate, the taxpayer must show that the property is unusual in nature
and other methods of valuation, such as comparable sales or income capitalization, are not
applicable. The income approach to valuation is favored only where comparable market sales are
absent. On the facts, the value of the contribution of a conservation facade easement for an
historic structure on the edge of the French Quarter in New Orleans was overstated. The
accuracy-related penalty for gross overvaluation was proper because there was no good faith
investigation into the value.
a.
Regardless of which valuation method is used, it still must
relate to the property's "highest and best use." Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v.
Commissioner, 2010-2 U.S.T.C. ~SO,S64 (Sth Cir. 8/10/10). In an opinion by Judge Barksdale,
the Fifth Circuit vacated the Tax Court's decision and remanded the case for a determination of
the easement's value, although it rejected the taxpayer's arguments that the IRS's expert was
unqualified and that his report was unreliable and should not have been admitted. But the Court
of Appeals agreed with the taxpayers' argument that the Tax Court "miscomprehended the
highest and best use" of the building subjected to the conservation easement, and thereby
undervalued the easement.
In sum, the tax court erred in declining to consider the Maison Blanche and Kress
buildings' highest and best use in the light of both the reasonable and probable
condominium regime and the reasonable and probable combination. of those
buildings into a single functional unit, both of which foreclosed the realistic
possibility, for valuation purposes, that the Kress and Maison Blanche buildings
could come under separate ownership. This combination affected the buildings'
fair market value.
•
As result the court did not reach the Tax Court's holding that
the income and replacement-cost methods of valuation were inapplicable and directed the tax court
to consider those methods, in addition to comparable sales method on remand. Because the holding
on the valuation was vacated, the Tax Court's holding that the gross overvaluation penalty also was
vacated.
7.
"Praise the Lord, [but] pass the ammunition." Or, is it that the judge
was hypertechnical? Lord v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-196 (9/8/10). Charitable
contribution deduction for a conservation easement was denied because the appraisal in the
amount of $242,000 submitted to comply with Reg. 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i)(A) was not a "qualified
appraisal." The Tax Court (Jude Foley) held that this was because the appraisal itself did not
include: (1) the easement contribution date); (2) the date the appraisal was performed; or (3) the
appraised fair market value of the easement contribution on the contribution date. Judge Foley
further held that the doctrine of substantial compliance was not applicable because significant
information was omitted from the appraisal.
•
The background facts were that taxpayer granted a deed of
. conservation easement to the Land Preservation Trust on 12/30/99; that the Paige Appraisal
Company produced an appraisal report [stating the fair market value of the easement] with an
effective date of 12/31/99; and that the report date was 114/00.
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x.

TAXPROCEDURE
A.
Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions
1.
Increased penalty for failure to file on time. For returns required to be
filed after December 31, 2008, the Heroes Earnings Assistance and Relief Tax ACt of 2008
increases the minimum penalty failure to file a return on time to the lesser of$135 or 100 percent·
of the tax required to be shown on the return.
a.
Increased penalties for failing to timely file partnership and S
corporation returns. Section 16 of the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Act of 2009
(WHABA) amends §§ 6698 and 6699 to increase the penalty for failing to file a partnership or S
corporation tax return from $89 to $195.
2.
No free trade agreement for SSNs. T.D. 9437, Amendments to the
Section 7216 Regulations - Disclosure or Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 73 F.R.
76216 (12/16/08). This Treasury Decision amends Reg. § 301.7216-3(b)(4) to permit disclosure
by a tax return preparer of a taxpayer's SSN to another tax return preparer located outside the
United States only with the taxpayer's consent. The amended regulation applies to disclosures of
tax return information occurring on or after 1/1/09.
a.
But there is some freedom for preparers to use taxpayer return
information to increase their own profitability. T.D. 9478, Amendments to the Section 7216
Regulations - Disclosure or Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 75 F.R. 48 (12/29/09).
Temp. Reg, § 301.7216-2T(n) allows preparers to compile, maintain, and use a list containing
solely the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, phone numbers, taxpayer entity classification, and
income tax return form numbers of taxpayers whose tax returns the tax return preparer has
prepared, if the list is used only to contact the taxpayers on the list either (1) to provide tax,
general business, or economic information for educational purposes, or (2) for soliciting
.additional tax return preparation services. Temp. Reg. § 301.7216-2T(p) allows return preparers
to disclose return information without penalty for the purpose of a quality or peer review, but
only to the extent necessary to accomplish the review. The information also may be used to
perform a conflict of interest check. Identical proposed regulations were published
simultaneously. REG-131028-09, Amendments to the Section 7216 Regulations - Disclosure or
Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 75 F.R. 94 (12/29/09).
(1)
Rev. Rul. 2010-5, 2010-4 I.R.B. 312 (12/30/09). This
revenue ruling provides further guidance and allows disclosure of return information to a return
preparer's malpractice 'carrier to the extent necessary to obtain insurance or to defend against
claims; to defend claims, the tax return itself may be disclosed and it may be disclosed to
attorneys engaged to defend against the claim.
(2)
Rev. RuI.201O-4, 2010-4 I.R.B. 309 (12/30/09). This
revenue ruling provides further guidance and details circumstances that justify use of lists to
contact clients and allowing disclosure of information to a third-party provider who prepares the
mailings.
3.
IRS gets addicted to announcing amnesty for offshore tax cheats. IRS
News Release IR-2003-05, 2003 TNT 10-11 (1/14/03). An Offshore Voluntary Compliance
Initiative provided that "eligible taxpayers," who used offshore payment cards or other offshore
financial arrangements' to hide their income, may avoid civil fraud and information return
penalties (but not failure to pay tax or accuracy-related penalties) if they come forward and pay
up by 4/15/03 and provide full details on those who promoted or solicited the offshore scheme.
Promoters and solicitors are not eligible. The information release contains the following
example:
For example, a taxpayer who understated his income to avoid $100,000 in taxes in
1999 would wind up paying $149,319 to the government. This includes the tax
liability plus $29,319 in interest and an additional accuracy-related penalty of
$20,000.
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a.
Rev. Proc. 2003-11, 2003-1 C.B. 311 (1/14/03). This revenue
procedure contained detailed procedures for the Offshore Voluntary Compliance Initiative,
including as an exhibit the "specific matters closing agreement" to be executed.by the taxpayer.
b.
Liechtenstein! IR-2008-26 (2/26/08). The IRS announced that it
was initiating enforcement action involving more than 100 U.S. taxpayers in connection with
accounts in Liechtenstein. According to a story in the 2/19/08 Wall Street Journal, (a) Heinrich
Kieber, a former employee of Liechtenstein's largest bank, LGT Group, has offered confidential
client data to tax authorities on several continents over the past 18 months, and (b) the German
government paid roughly €4.2 million ($6.4 million) to an unnamed individual for the same type
of information.
c.
UBS settles with the Justice Department for $780 million. On
2/18/09, the Swiss bank UBS agreed to pay $780 million under a deferred prosecution agreement
over the bank's offshore services to U.S. taxpayers. It also agreed to hand over the names and
account information of some of these taxpayers; however, there were indications that only 250
client names out of 19,000 account holders were being disclosed. 2009 TNT 31-1.
d.
The 2009 version is much less of an amnesty than the 2003
version. On 3126/09, the IRS announced several programs relating to penalties on voluntarily
disclosed offshore accounts. They have a 3/23/09 effective date, and are good for six months.
Several internal memoranda explain how the IRS intends to process voluntary disclosure claims
made regarding offshore accounts. 2009 TNT 57-2.
•
These memoranda include one on examinations of offshore
transactions, 2009 TNT 57-32; one on the routing ofvoluntary disclosure cases, 2009 TNT 57-33;
and one authorizing a new penalty structure for voluntary disclosures, 2009 TNT 57-34.
e.
IR-2009-84 (9/21109). The filing deadline for the voluntary
disclosure was extended to 10/15/09, and the IRS announced there would be no further
extensions.
f.
The instructions for the new FBAR are FUBAR. IR-2009-58
and Announcement 2009-51, 2009-25 I.R.B. 1105 (6/5/09). The IRS announced that for the
Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBARs) due on 6/30/09, filers of Form TD F
90-22.1 (Rev. 10-2008) need not comply with the new instruction relating to the definition of a
United States Person, i.e.:
United States Person. The term "United States person" means a citizen or
resident of the United States, or a person in and doing business in the United
States. See 31 C.F.R. 103.11(z) for a complete definition of 'person.' The United
States includes the states, territories and possessions of the United States. See the
definition of United States at 31 C.F.R. 103.11(nn) for a complete definition of
United States. A foreign subsidiary of a United States person is not required to
file this report, although its United States parent corporation may be required to
do so. A branch of a foreign entity that is doing business in the United States is
required to file this report even if not separately incorporated under U.S. law.
•
Instead, for this year, taxpayers and others can rely on the
definition of a United States person included in the instruction to the prior fonn (7-2000):
United States Person. The term "United States person" means: (1) a citizen or
resident of the United States; (2) a domestic partnership; (3) a domestic
corporation; or (4) a domestic estate or trust.
q.
Notice 2009-62, 2009-35 I.R.B. 260 (8/7/09). By this notice, the
IRS extended the filing deadline unti16/30/10 to report foreign financial accounts on Form TD F
90-22.1 for persons with signature authority over (but no financial interest in) a foreign financial
account and persons with signature authority over, or financial interests in, a foreign commingled
fund.
h.
Still clear as mud: New definitions and instructions. R1N 1506AB08, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network; Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act
Regulations - Reports of Foreign Financial Accounts, 75 F.R. 8844 (2126/10). This proposed
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rule would include a definition of "United States person" and definitions of "bank account,"
"securities account," and "other financial account," as well as of "foreign country." It also
includes draft instructions to Form TD F 90-22.1 (FBAR).
(1)
Notice 2010-23, 2010-11 I.R.B. 441 (2/26/10). Provided
administrative relief to certain person who may be required to file and FBAR for the 2009 and
earlier calendar years by extending the filing deadline until 6/30/11 for persons with signature
authority, but no financial interest in, a foreign financial account for which an FBAR would have
otherwise been due on 6/30/10. It also provides relief with respect to mutual funds.
(2)
Announcement 2010-16,2010-11 I.R.B. 450 (2/26/10). The
IRS suspended, for person who are not U.S. citizens, U.S. residents, or domestic entities, the
requirement to file an FBAR for the 2009 and earlier calendar years.
4.
Tax Court jurisdiction to review an otherwise unreviewable assessable
penalty can't piggyback on a related deficiency proceeding. Smith v. Commissioner, 133
T.C. No. 18 (12/21/09). Section 6707A, added to the Code by the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, imposes a penalty for a taxpayer's failure to include with his return required information
with respect to a reportable transaction. The IRS assessed a § 6707A penalty against the taxpayer
and issued a deficiency notice to his wholly owned corporation with respect to the transaction to
which the § 6707A penalty applied. The taxpayer filed a timely petition with the Tax Court, but
Judge Kroupa held that a penalty imposed under § 6707A is not reviewable by the Tax Court,
even in a deficiency proceeding. Although the IRS issued a deficiency notice, the notice did not
determine the § 6707A penalty. The § 6707A penalty was properly independently assessed
without the IRS issuing a deficiency notice, and the penalty was thus not within the Tax Court's
deficiency jurisdiction. The taxpayer's only redress is though a refund proceeding.
S.
There's no prepayment judicial review for the failure to pay penalty.
Burke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-282 (12/8/09). The § 6651(a)(3) addition to tax for
failure to pay is not subject to deficiency procedures, but may be collected administratively if it
not paid upon notice and demand.
,6 •
Meeting five out of six criteria for being a "responsible person" buys a
100% penalty. Erwin v. United States, 591 F3d 313 (4th Cir. 1/13/10). The Fourth Circuit, in a
majority opinion by Judge Motz, upheld the District Court's finding on summary judgment that
the taxpayer was liable for the § 6672 failure to withhold and pay-over penalty. To determine
whether a particular individual is a "responsible person" liable for the § 6672 failure to withhold
and pay-over penalty, the Fourth Circuit will examine whether he: (1) served as an officer or
direGtor of the company; (2) controlled the company's payroll; (3) determined which creditors to
pay and when to pay them; (4) participated in the corporation's day-to-day management; (5) had
the ability to hire and fire employees; and (6) possessed the power to write checks. Undisputed
facts established that taxpayer met the first five criteria, even though he delegated some
responsibilities to others. Considering "the totality of the circumstances", he was a responsible
person even though he did not have check-writing authority.
•
Judge Hamilton dissented, concluding that a "reasonable
fact-finder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Erwin and drawing all reasonable
inferences from such evidence in his favor, could find that he was not a responsible person ... ",
even though he did not believe that as a matter of law Erwin could not be a responsible person.
Judge Hamilton thought that only the first factor cut in favor of the government, and he would have
vacated and remanded for a trial, because it was a "close case."
7.
The District Court needs to justify home imprisonment in lieu of time
in the big house for criminal tax evasion. United States v. Engle, 592 F.3d 495 (14th Cir.
1/13/1 0). The defendant pled guilty to tax evasion for 2004. Although he was charged with tax
evasion only for 2004, the information alleged that he had evaded taxes for 16 years between
1984 and 2002 and owned taxes on more than $600,000 - when interest and penalties were
tacked on the amount exceeded $2 million. The District Court sentenced Engle to four years
probation, conditioned on 18 months of home detention, with work release and international
travel privileges. The district judge reasoned that it was more important that the back taxes be
paid than that Engle be imprisoned and that if Engel were imprisoned he would be deprived of
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his livelihood and hence be unable to pay the taxes that he had evaded. The Fourth Circuit (Judge
Traxler) vacated the sentence because the district court did not adequately explain its decision tQ
vary significantly from the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' recommendations
in imposing the len~ent sentence that did not include prison time. Judge Traxler noted, after
requiring that further proceedings be in front of a different judge:
The district judge in this case [Judge Mullin] also presided over the tax
evasion trials and sentencings in [other] cases that, though not formally
consolidated with this case, were argued before this court seriatim with this
appeal. In the sentencing hearing for [another criminal defendant], the district
judge, who has taken senior status, stated that he no longer intended to handle
. criminal matters.
8.
Yip[e]! United States v. Yip, 592 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1113/10). The Ninth
Circuit held that under U .S.S.G. § 3C 1.1, "[0]bstruction during an IRS audit justifies enhancing a
defendant's sentence for obstruction 'during the course of the investi,ation. '"
9.
The defendant was a little bit too "Cheeky" for his own good; instead,
he should have turned the other cheek(s). United States v. Phipps, 595 F.3d 243 (5th Cir.
1125110). The defendant's conviction for tax evasion was upheld. His claim of good faith belief
that he was not required to pay taxes on proceeds from a pyramid marketed tax evasion scheme
was belied by his receipt of prior notice from the IRS regarding his tax liability coupled with his
advice to participants in the scheme to plan a "reliance defense" based "on the advice of income
tax professionals and other credible sources that could be used to convince a jury that the
participant sincerely believed he or she was not liable for federal or state income tax." Because
he was advising others to employ calculated tactics to avoid paying income taxes ... a rational
jury reasonably could have found that [he] ... willfully evaded paying income tax."
,
10.
"Abatement" is all or nothing. "Reduction" is not a lesser included
option. It couldn't have happened to a nicer union. Service Employees International Union v.
United States, 598 F.3d 111 0 (9th Cir. 3/1711 0). SEIU filed its information return late and the
IRS assessed a $50,000 penalty under § 6652(c)(l)(A). On appeal from an adverse CDP
determination, the district court (which at the time had jurisdiction) concluded that there was no
"reasonable cause" for the late filing, but nevertheless held that in its discretion the IRS should
have reduced the penalty and entered judgment in favor of the IRS for only 25% of the $50,000
penalty. The Court of Appeals reversed. The penalty under § 6652(c)(I)(A) is "'either fully
enforceable or fully unenforceable,'" citing In re Sanford, 979 F.2d 1511, 1513 (11th Cir. 1992).
Section 6652(c)(4), providing for abatement of the penalty if there was "reasonable cause" for
the late filing, is mandatory, not discretionary. "If a nonprofit fails to file the informational return
on time for reasonable cause, the IRS has no discretion whether to impose or reduce the penalty;
it is flatly prohibited from imposing any penalty at all." Neither the IRS nor any reviewing court
has discretion to reduce, rather than to abate for "reasonable cause," a § 6652(c)(1 )(A) penalty
for late filing of an informational Teturn.
11.
The "TurboTax got it wrong for me just like Wikipedia says it did for
Timothy Geithner" defense doesn't cut the mustard. Lam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2010-82 (4119/10). Based on a stipulation, the Tax Court (Judge Wherry) upheld a deficiency
determined by the IRS based on the application of § 280A to disallow claimed rental real estate
losses and recharacterization of claimed ordinary losses as capital losses. The court also upheld
accuracy related penalties, finding that there was no substantial authority for the taxpayer's
positions and that the reasonable cause exception did not apply. The taxpayers argued that they
consistently filled out their tax returns using TurboTax and that they confused capital gains and
losses with ordinary income and expenses. Even though Judge Wherry believed that the errors
were made in good faith, he held that they did not behave in a manner consistent with that of a
prudent person. They did not consult a tax professional or visit the IRS's web site for instructions·
on filing the Schedule C. He did not accept their misuse of TurboTax, even if unintentional or
Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), held that Court held that a good-faith belief as to the law
need not be objectively reasonable to be a defense to criminal tax fraud.
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accidental, as a defense to the penalties, because they did not attempt to show a reasonable cause
for their underpayment of taxes. Rather, they analogized their situation to that of the Secretary of
the Treasury, Timothy Geithner.
Citing a Wikipedia article, Ms. Lam essentially argues that, like Secretary
Geithner, she used TurboTax, resulting in mistakes on her taxes. In short, it was
not a flaw in the TurboTax software which caused petitioners' tax deficiencies.
"Tax preparation software is only as good as the information one inputs into it."
[citation omitted]. Because petitioners have not "shown that any of the conceded
issues were anything but the result of [their] own negligence or disregard of
regulations," they are liable for the section 6662(a) penalties.
a.
Another case on TurboTax. The case does not reflect whether the
IRS was ashamed, but it was undeterred in seeking penalties for conduct unpenalized with
respect to the Secretary of Treasury. Parker v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2010-78
(6/21110). The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) held that taxpayer's compensation from the
International Monetary Fund was subject to self-employment taxes. Accuracy-related penalties
were imposed despite taxpayer's argument that he relied on his tax return preparation software.
12.
T.D. 9488, Interest and Penalty Suspension Provisions Under Section
6404(g) of the Internal Revenue Code, 75 F.R. 33992 (6/16/10). Final Reg. § 1.6404-4(b)(5),
replacing Temp. Reg. § 1.6404-4T(b)(5), provides guidance regarding the exception for any
listed transaction as defined in § 6707A(c) or any undisclosed reportable transaction from the
general rule of suspension of any interest under § 6404(g)(I) if the IRS does not contact the
taxpayer regarding adjustments within the requisite period of time, generally 36 months after the
later of the due date or the return filing date.
13.
He might have played a DC cop in "Murder at 1600," but now he'll be
a convict for real at an FCI thanks to 1111 Constitution Ave. United States v. Snipes, 106
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5256 (11th Cir. 7/16/10). Snipes earned more than $27 million dollars in gross
income from 1999 to 2004, but he did not file individual federal income tax returns for any of
those years. Snipes was involved with co-defendant Eddie Ray Kahn's organization, American
Rights Litigators (ARL), which purported to assist customers in resisting the IRS. ARL
employees, including co-defendant Douglas Rosile, and ARL members, including Snipes, sent
voluminous letters to the IRS, challenging the IRS's authority to collect taxes. The centerpiece of
this resistance was the "861 argument" that the domestic earnings of individual Americans are
not income subject to tax. Snipes personal arguments to the IRS over the curse of several years
were described by the court, in part, as follows:
Snipes's correspondence with the IRS advanced several arguments justifying his
failure to file his personal tax returns, including that he was a "non-resident alien
to the United States," that earned income must come from "sources wholly
outside the United States," that "a taxpayer is defined by law as one who operates
a distilled spirit Plant," and that the Internal Revenue Code's taxing authority "is
limited to the District of Columbia and insular possessions of the United States,
exclusive of the 50 States of the Union." Snipes also claimed that as a "fiduciary
of God, who is a'nontaxpayer,'" he was a "foreign diplomat" who was not
obliged to pay taxes. When Snipes consulted his long-time tax _attorneys about his
resistance to paying federal income taxes, they advised him that his position was
contrary to the law and that he was required to file tax returns. The firm
terminated Snipes as a client when Snipes refused to file his tax returns.
•
Snipes also integrated the ALR tax "teachings" into the
accounting methodology of his film production companies. After June 2000, his companies stopped
deducting payroll and income taxes from employees' salary checks. Snipes began to proselytize this
theory of tax resistance. Not surprisingly, The Eleventh Circuit upheld Wesley Snipes's conviction
of willful failure to file tax returns and the imposition of a 36-month prison sentence.
14.
Cheatin' tax advisor blinded by his own brilliance. United States v.
Jewell, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5483 (8th Cir. 7/30/10). The defendant was a tax attorney who
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concocted a scheme to assist his clients in underreporting several million dollars of income and
was convicted of aiding and abetting tax evasion. Among the many issues he raised on appeal.
was that his clients ultimately had settled the tax deficiency with the IRS. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction. The court held that the fact that the taxpayer whose taxes were evaded
eventually paid those taxes is not a defense to aiding and abetting tax evasion if the advisor had
the intent to assist the taxpayer with evading taxes in the taxable year in question and at the time
taxes were due for the year in question there was a deficiency.
B.
Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1.
District Court finds tax accrual workpapers protected by the "work
product privilege" and denies the IRS petition for summons enforcement. United States v.
Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. R.1. 8/28/07). Textron engaged in six SILO transactions in
2001 before SILOs became listed transactions in 2005. Under IRS procedures, engaging in more
than one listed transaction means that the IRS will request the entire tax accrual workpapers file.
Textron produced all requested documents with respect to the SILO transactions but refused to
tum over its entire workpaper file. Judge Torres held that the tax accrual workpapers were
prepared "because of' anticipated litigation with the IRS. He refused to follow contrary authority
from the Fifth Circuit in United States v. El Paso Company, 682 F.2d 530 (1982), which used the
more stringent primary purpose test for determining whether documents were prepared "in
anticipation of litigation." He also held that work product protection was not lost when the tax
accrual workpapers were provided to Ernst & Young for its audit of the company because the
AICPA Code § 301 on confidential client information made it very unlikely thatthe accounting
firm would provide them to the lRS.
.
a.
This split decision has been taken to the bane. United States v.
Textron Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. R.I. 8/28/07), affirmed in part, vacated in part and
remanded, 553 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1121109) (2-1), taxpayer's petition for rehearing denied,
(3/24/09), government's petition for en banc rehearing granted, (3/25/09). The majority opinion
(Judge Torruella) affirmed the holding that Textron's tax accrual workpapers were protected by
the work product doctrine on the ground that the First Circuit law is that "dual purpose"
documents created because of the prospect of litigation are protected even though they were also
prepared for a business purpose, i.e., E&Y's audit of Textron. It distinguished United States v. El
Paso Company, 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982), as being part of an existing split between the
circuits in the definition of "the anticipation of litigation."
•
The majority remanded the case for the District Court to
consider the questions of whether Textron waived work-product protection by showing its tax
accrual workpapers to E&Y and whether E&Y's workpapers were within the "control" of Textron.
•
Judge Boudin dissented on the ground that the proper test
should be whether the tax accrual workpapers were prepared "in the ordinary course of business" or
were otherwise independently required, and their preparation would not be chilled by lack of
protection because they are required by "the financial statement obligations and accounting rules."
He based his opinion on the need for such documents "[i]n the wake of Enron and other corporate
scandals ...." He later stated,
And, while it may seem one-sided to give the government Textron's blue print to
weaknesses in Textron's tax returns, the return is massive - constituting more
than 4000 pages; the government has an important interest in collecting taxes that
are owed; and its inquiries into work papers were focused on a specific type of
transaction that had been shown to be open to abuse. So context should be kept in
mind before shedding too many tears for Textron.
•
The government's petition for rehearing en banc was granted.
b .
Reversed by a divided First Circuit in an en bane rehearing.
The First follows the Fifth to El Paso. United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir.
8/13/09) (3-2), cert. denied (5/24/10). The majority (Judge Boudin) held that the work product
privilege protects only work done for litigation purposes (the "prepared for" test or the "primary
purpose" test), and abandoned the prior First Circuit "because of' test, encompassing work done
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in preparing fmancial statements that also is prepared in contemplation of litigation. The majority
followed United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982),
Judge Boudin concluded:
Textron apparently thinks it is "unfair" for the government to have access
to its spreadsheets, but tax collection is not a game. Underpaying taxes threatens
the essential public interest in revenue collection. If a blueprint to Textron's
possible improper deductions can be found in Textron's files, it is properly
available to the government unless privileged. Virtually all discovery against a
party aims at securing information that may assist an opponent hi uncovering the
truth. Unprivileged IRS information is equally subject to discovery.
The practical problems confronting the IRS in discovering under-reporting
of corporate taxes, which is likely endemic, are serious. Textron's return is
massive - constituting more than 4,000 pages - and the IRS requested the work
papers only after finding a specific type of transaction that had been shown to be
abused by taxpayers. It is because the collection of revenues is essential to
government that administrative discovery, along with many other comparatively
unusual tools, are furnished to the IRS.
As Bentham explained, all privileges limit access to the truth in aid of
other objectives, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2291 (McNaughton Rev. 1961), but
virtually all privileges are restricted - either (as here) by definition or (in many
cases) through explicit exceptions - by countervailing limitations. The Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is qualified, among other
doctrines, by the required records exception, and the attorney client privilege,
along with other limitations, by the crime-fraud exception.
To sum up, the work product privilege is aimed at protecting work done
for litigation, not in preparing financial statements. Textron's work papers were
prepared to support financial filings and gain auditor approval; the compulsion of
the -securities laws and auditing requirements assure that they will be carefully
prepared, in their present form, even though not protected; and IRS access serves
the legitimate, and important, function of detecting and disallowing abusive tax
shelters. (footnote and internal citations omitted)
c.
Even after Textron, the government is still not home free when it
wants to run barefoot through tax audit workpapers and tax opinions, and to run roughshod over
work product protections. The D.C. Circuit accepted that dual-purpose documents could be
covered by the work product doctrine, and it refused to find that disclosure to the auditing CPA
firm constituted waiver of work product protection. United States v. Deloitte LLP, 106
A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5053 (D.C. Cir. 6/29/10). The government sought discovery of three
documents in the possession ofDeloitte, Dow Chemical's independent auditor, that the taxpayer,
claimed were attorney work product. One document was a draft memorandum prepared by
Deloitte that summarized a meeting between Dow employees, Dow's outside counsel, and
Deloitte employees about the possibility of litigation over a partnership in which Dow was a
member and the necessity of accounting for such a possibility in an ongoing audit. The district
court had concluded that, although the document was created by Deloitte, it was nonetheless
Dow's work product because "its contents record the thoughts of Dow's counsel regarding the
prospect of litigation." The second document was a memorandum and flow chart prepared by
two Dow employees, an accountant and an in-house attorney. The third was a tax opinion
prepared by Dow's outside counsel. The district court held that all three documents were
protected under the work-product doctrine. On appeal, the government contends that the Deloitte
memorandum was not work product because it was prepared by Deloitte during the audit
process. It conceded that the other two documents were work product, but argued that Dow
waived work-product protection when it disclosed them to Deloitte.
•
The Court of Appeals (Judge Sentell e) vacated the district
court's decision that the memorandum prepared by Deloitte was work product and remand for in
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camera review to determine whether it is entirely work product. It affirmed the district court's
holding that Dow did not waive work-praduct pratectian when it disclosed the other two do.cuments
to. Deloitte. In analyzing whether the Deloitte memarandum cauld be work praduct, the Court of .
Appeals applied the "'because of' test, asking 'whether, in light of the nature af the dacument and
the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be said to have been prepared or
obtained because of the prospect of litigatian.'" It rejected the government's argument that the
memarandum was not protected work product under United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F .22· 530
(1982), reasoning that El Paso was decided under the "primary mativating purpose test," which is a
different test than the "because of' test, as well as the government's argument that United States v.
Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009), supported its position, reasaning that the halding in
Textron was fact specific. In rejecting the gavernment's argument that the Deloitte memorandum
cauld nat be work product because it was prepared in the course of a financial audit, the Court of
Appeals held that a dacument can contain protected work-praduct material even though it serves
multiple purposes, so long as the protected material was prepared because of the prospect of
litigatian.
•
Hawever, having determined that the Deloitte memarandum
could be work product, when it turned to whether it was work product, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the District Court lacked a sufficient evidentiary foundation for its holding that the
memorandum was purely work praduct and remanded for further consideration. Turning to waiver
issue with respect to the other two documents, the Court of Appeals held that there was no waiver.
Deloitte was neither a potential adversary in the matter with respect to which the documents had
been prepared nor a conduit to other adversaries - the only relevant adversary was the IRS. "Daw
had a reasanable expectation of canfidentiality because Deloitte, as an independent auditor, has an
obligation to. refrain fram disclosing confidential client informatian."
We nate that ane left caast tax professor vented on this case
•
so. vehemently that a casual observer might fear that he would burst a ventricle. 2010 lNT 125-1.
2.
A stern warning against unwarranted blanket claims of privilege.
Eulich v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6337 (N.D. Tex. 9/4/09). In cannection with an
audit, the IRS summansed certain documents relating to. a Bahamian trust, and the taxpayer
asserted attarney client privilege and wark praduct dactrine protection for 'voluminous
dacuments" that were submitted for in camera review. The court (Judge Lindsay) determined
that hundreds - we last count at over 400 - af dacuments were privileged in whale or in part,
and that hundreds - we again last caunt at aver 400 - af dacuments were not privileged in
whale or in part. The Judge Lindsay cancluded as fallaws:
This review has placed an undue, and in many instances unjustified, burden on the
caurt and its staff. It has stretched scarce judicial resources in a way never
cantemplated by the court. In many instances, the court does not believe that the
claim af privilege was met seq.ade in good faith. Petitioner is put on notice that
the court will not tolerate such blanket claims of privilege and will impose
sanctions as appropriate if such conduct recurs. (Emphasis in original.)
C.
Litigation Costs
1.
Clarifying guidance on collecting attorney's fees from tbe IRS. REG111833-99, Regulatians Under I.R.C. Section 7430 Relating to. Awards of Administrative Casts
and Attorneys Fees, 74 F.R. 61589 (11/25/09). The Treasury Department has published prapased
regulatians relating to awards of administrative costs and attorneys fees under § 7430 to canfarm
to. the amendments made in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and the IRS Restructuring and
Reform Act af 1998. Among the changes reflected in the proposed regulations are the follawing.
(1) A taxpayer has ninety days after the date the IRS mails to the taxpayer a final decision
determining tax, interest ar penalty, to file an applicatian with the IRS to recaver administrative
costs. (2) A taxpayer has ninety days after the date the IRS mails to the taxpayer, by certified ar
registered mail, a final adverse decision regarding an award af administrative costs, to. file a
petition with the Tax Court. (3) Individuals filing joint.returns should be treated as separate
taxpayers far purposes of determining net worth. (4) Trusts are subject to the net worth
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requirements. (5) Clarifying changes address the calculation of net worth. (6) Several
amendments to § 7430 in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 are reflected in the
proposed regulations: (a) the hourly rate limitation is increased to $125; (b) difficulty of the
issues presented and local availability of tax experts may be considered to increase an attorney's
hourly rate; (c) a court should consider whether the IRS has lost cases with substantially similar
issues in other circuit courts of appeal in deciding whether the IRS's position was substantially
justified; (d) if an individual who is authorized to practice before the Tax Court or the IRS is
representing the taxpayer on a pro bono basis, the taxpayer may petition for an award of
reasonable attorneys fees in excess of the amounts that the taxpayer paid or incurred, as long as
the fee award is ultimately paid to the individual or the individual's employer; (e) the period for
recovery of reasonable administrative costs is extended to include costs incurred after the date on
which the first letter of proposed deficiency ("30-day letter") is mailed to the taxpayer, but the
taxpayer may be eligible to recover reasonable administrative costs from the date of the 30-day
letter only if at least one issue (other than recovery of administrative costs) remains in dispute as
of the date that the IRS takes a position in the administrative proceeding.
Statutory Notice of Deficiency
D.
1.
If you pay without a statutory notice, you can't get a refund. Bush v.
United States, 599 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 3/31/10). During the pendency of a partnership level
proceeding, the taxpayers entered into closing agreements with the IRS with respect to their
§ 465 at-risk amounts in the partnership. The closing agreements did not waive the right to a
deficiency notice. Subsequently, the IRS issued Notices of Adjustment, without issuing any
deficiency notices, based on the application of the agreed upon at-risk amount in the closing
agreements. The taxpayers paid the assessed taxes and sought a refund. A deficiency notice is
not required if a tax liability issue has been resolved in a partnership-level proceeding. In that
case any additional tax due is assessed as a computational adjustment, § 6230(a)(1), which
§ 6231(a)(6) defines for this purpose as the "change in the tax liability of a partrier which
properly reflects the treatment under this subchapter of a partnership item." But a deficiency
notice is required if the additional tax asserted by the IRS to be due does not involve such a
"computational adjustment." Thus, a deficiency notice is required if the deficiency is attributable
to "affected items which require partner level determinations." § 6230(a)(2)(A)(i). The court
(Judge Dyk), held for the government, concluding that on the facts of the case, the IRS's failure
to issue a deficiency notice was harmless error. After first concluding that § 6213(a) "does not
broadly provide for a refund of amounts paid by the taxpayer after assessment or provide for a
refund where the taxpayer voluntarily pays the assessment before collection proceedings are
initiated," the court continued as follows:
The IRS did not issue a demand for payment (which is a predicate to collection,
see I.R.C. § 6303) or initiate collection proceedings. The taxpayers do not ... seek
repayment of funds improperly collected. Rather, the taxpayers paid the
assessments and then sued for a refund, alleging that they are entitled to a refund
simply because the IRS failed to issue the requisite notice, without regard to
whether the tax was in fact owed, and without any showing that the taxpayers
were prejudiced by litigating the tax issue in the refund proceedings rather than in
the Tax Court. Nothing in the language of the statute confers such a refund right
on the taxpayer, and the failure in the statute to provide for a refund under such
circumstances strongly suggests that no such automatic refund was intended.
•
Finally, the court explained that despite the taxpayers not
having received a deficiency notice, had they not voluntarily paid the tax, they could have had their
day in Tax Court simply by not paying and seeking collection due process relief under § 6330 when
the IRS subsequently took actions to collect the assessed taxes.
2.
The Tax Court loves its jurisdiction. Winter v. Commissioner, 135 T.C.
No. 12 (8/25/10). The taxpayer reported passed-through losses from an S corporation in which he
was a shareholder in excess of the amount reported on his Schedule K -1. Rather that treat the
adjustment resulting from the inconsistency as correction of a mathematical error, as provided by
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§ 6037, subject to summary assessment under § 6213(b), the IRS issued a deficiency notice with
respect to both the adjustment resulting from disallowing the excess loss and the inclusion of
unreported interest, dividends, and gambling income. The IRS issued a summary assessment
based on the mathematical error only after the taxpayer had filed the Tax Court petition. The
principal issue was whether the Tax Court had jurisdiction over the adjustment to the taxpayer's
distributive share of S corporation income or whether the IRS was required to assess the tax
related to the adjustment as a math error under § 6213(b), precluding the inclusion in the notice
of deficiency of the increase in tax relating to that adjustment. Both the taxpayer and IRS argued
that the court had jurisdiction, but the court nevertheless addressed the question, and in a
reviewed opinion (10-1-1) by Judge Goeke, the Tax Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider
the taxpayer's claim that his income from the S Corporation was less than the amount reported
on the Schedule K-l he received from it. The decision was based on two alternative grounds;
first, the taxpayer assigned error to the entire deficiency and the alleged unreported income was
one of the IRS's adjustments contributing to that deficiency; second, pursuant to the Tax Court's
overpayment jurisdiction (which the taxpayer had invoked), the Tax Court has "authority to
decide all the issues necessary to determine the correct amount of income tax for the taxable year
in issue," which even includes amounts that cannot be assessed because the statute of limitations
on assessment and collection has expired.
•
Judge Holmes, in a long 1 and lonely dissent, argued that the
Tax Court lacked jurisdiction to review the deficiency attributable to the inconsistency between the
taxpayer's return and the S corporation's Schedule K-l with respect to the taxpayer. He reasoned
that even though the IRS did issue a deficiency notice, it had no power to do so because § 6037
required that the IRS treat the inconsistency solely as a mathematical error. That treatment would
leave the taxpayer in the position of being required to pay the assessed amount and seek a refund.
E.
Statute of Limitations
1.
The courts hold that overstating basis is not the same as understating
gross income, but- the Treasury Department ultimately plays its trump card by
promulgating regulations. Section 6501(e)(I) extends the normal three-year period of
limitations to six years if the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount in excess of 25
percent of the gross income stated in the return. Section 6229(c)(2) provides a similar extension
of the statute of limitations under § 6229(a) for assessments arising out of TEFRA partnership
proceedings. A critical question is whether the six year statute of limitations applies if the
taxpayer overstates basis and as a consequence understates gross income.
a.
The Tax Court says overstating basis is not the same as
understating gross income. Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207
(6/14/07), Overstated basis resulted in an understatement of § 1231 gain. Looking to Supreme
Court precedent under the statutory predecessor of § 6501(e) in the 1939 Code (Colony, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958)), from which the six-year statute of limitations in
§ 6229(c)(2) is derived and to which it is analogous, the Tax Court concluded that this
understated gain was not an omission of "gross income" that would invoke the six year statute of
limitations under § 6229(c)(2) applicable to partnership audits.
.
b.
The Ninth Circuit likes the way the Tax Court thinks:
Bakersfield Energy Partners is affirmed. Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Commissioner,
568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 6/17/09). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court on the grounds that
the language at issue in the instant case was the same as the statutory language interpreted in
Colony. The court noted, however, that "The IRS's interpretation of § 6501(e)(1)(A) is
reasonable."
c.
And a judge of the Court of Federal Claims agrees. Grapevine
Imports, Ltd v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505 (7/17/07). In a TEFRA partnership tax shelter
case, the Court of Federal Claims (Judge Allegra) held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of
limitations does not apply to basis overstatements, citing Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S.
IThe dissent was 43 typewritten pages, while the majority opinion was only 14 pages long.
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28 (1958). Section 6501(e), rather than § 6229(c)(2) as in Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP,
applied because in earlier proceedings in the instant case (71 Fed. Cl. 324 (2006)), the court had
held that § 6229 did not create an independent statute of limitations, but instead only provides a
minimum period for assessment for partnership items that could extend the § 6501 statute of
limitations, and because the FPAA was sent within this six-year statute of limitations under
§ 6229(d) the statute of limitations with respect to the partners was suspended.
d.
But a District Court in Florida disagrees. Brandon Ridge
Partners v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5347 (M.D. Fla. 7/30/07). The court refused to
follow Bakersfield Energy Partners and Grapevine Imports and held that the § 6501(e) 6-year
statute of limitations does apply to basis overstatements. The court reasoned that as a result of
subsequent amendments to the relevant Code sections, the application of Colony, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958) is limited to situations described in § 6501(e)(I)(A)(i), which
applies to trade or business sales of goods or services. ["In the case of a trade or business, the
term "gross income" means the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods
or services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to diminution by the
cost of such sales or services."] The court reasoned that to conclude otherwise would render
§ 6501(e)(I)(A)(i) superfluous. Because the transaction at issue was the partnership's sale of
stock, which was not a business sale of goods or services, the gross receipts test did not apply.
On the facts, the partners and partnership returns (and statements attached thereto), taken
together "failed to adequately apprise the IRS of the true amount of gain on the sale of the ...
stock." Thus, the partnership did not show that the extended limitations period was inapplicable.
e.
And a different judge of the Court of Federal Claims agrees with
the District Court in Florida and disagrees with the prior Court of Federal Claims opinion by a
different judge in Grapevine Imports. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189
(1119/07). The court (Judge Miller) refused to follow Bakersfield Energy Partners and
Grapevine Imports and held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of .imitations does apply to basis
overstatements. Judge Miller reasoned that an understatement of "gain" is an omission of gross
income, and that omission can result from a basis overstatement as well as from an
understatement of the amount realized. Like the Brandon Ridge Partners court, Judge Miller
concluded that the application of Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), is limited to
situations described in § 6501(e)(l)(A)(i), which applies to trade or business sales of goods or
services. ("In the case of a trade or business, the term 'gross income' means the total of the
amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or services (if such amounts are required to
be shown on the return) prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services.") Because the
transaction at issue was the partnership's sale of a ranch, which was not a business sale of goods
or services, the gross receipts test did not apply. On the facts, the partners' and partnership
returns failed to adequately apprise the IRS of the amount of gain in a variant of the Son-of-Boss
tax shelter. Accordingly, the partnership did not show that the extended limitations period was
inapplicable. The amended order certified an interlocutory appeal and stayed the case pending
further court order, because of the split of opinion between Salman Ranch, on the one hand, and
Bakersfield Energy Partners and Brandon Ridge Partners, on the other hand.
f.
And the pro-government opinion by Judge Miller is slapped
down by the Federal Circuit. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed.·Cir.
7/30/09). Following Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), the Federal Circuit
(Judge Schall, 2-1) held that "omits from gross income an amount properly includable therein" in
§ 6501(e)(l)(A) does not include an overstatement of basis. Accordingly, the six-year statute of
limitations on assessment did not apply - the normal three-year period of limitations applied.
Judge Newman dissented.
q.
But a second District Court sees it the government's way.
Home Concrete & Supply LLC v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. N.C. 10/21108). The
court held that §6501(e) extends the statute of limitations for deficiencies attributable to basis
overstatements that result in omitted gross income exceeding 25 percent of the gross income
reported on the return. The court refused to follow the Tax Court's decisions in Bakersfield
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Energy Partners and Grapevine Imports, because it concluded that those cases were erroneously
decided.
h.
A hiccup from Judge Goeke in the Tax Court: overstated basis in
an abusive tax shelter is a substantial omission from gross income that extends the statute of
limitations. Highwood Partners v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. I (8/13/09). The taxpayers
invested through partnerships in foreign currency digital options contracts designed to increase
partnership basis and generate losses marketed by Jenkens & Gilchrist (Son of Boss and
miscellaneous other names). After expiration of the three-year statute of limitations, the IRS
issued an FPAA to the partnership based on the six-year statute of §6501(e)(1) applicable if there
was a greater than 25 percent omission of gross income on each partner's or the partnership's
return. The court.(Judge Goeke) held that the digital options contracts produced § 988 exchange
gain on foreign currency transactions, which, under the regulations, are required to be separately
stated. The long and short positions of the options contracts were treated as separate transactions.
Thus, failure to report the gain on the short position, not offset by losses on the accompanying
stock sale, represented an omission of gross income. The court also rejected the taxpayer's
argument that because the IRS asserted that the options transactions should be disregarded in
full, there can be no omission of gross income from the disregarded short position. Finally, the
court refused to apply the adequate disclosure safe harbor of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) because the
taxpayer's netting of the gain and loss from the long and short positions was intended to mislead
and hide the existence of the gain and did not apprise the IRS of the existence of the gain.
i.
But Judge Haines follows the Tax Court orthodoxy. Beard v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-184 (8/11/09). In a basis offset deal involving contributions of
long and short positions in Treasury notes contributed to S corporations, the court (Judge Haines)
granted summary judgment to the taxpayer holding that the basis overstatement attributable to
the short sale was not an a substantial omission of gross income. Because the transaction
involved Treasury notes, there were no § 988 issues involved. This holding is consistent with
Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 6117/09), and Salman
Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 7/30/09).
j .
And the IRS loses again in the Tax Court. Intermountain
Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-195 (9/1/09). The court (Judge
Wherry), again following Bakersfield Energy Partners LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207
(2007), granted summary judgment to the taxpayer holding that a basis overstatement is not a
substantial omission from gross income that triggers the six year extended statute of limitations
under § 6229.
k.
Finally, the IRS gets the upper hand with temporary
regulations. T.D. 9466, Definition of Omission from Gross Income, 74 F.R. 49321 (9/24/09).
Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-lT and 301.6501(e)-lT both provide that for purposes of
determining whether there is a substantial omission of gross income, gross income as it relates to
a trade or busi~ess includes the total amount received from the sale of goods or services, without
reduction for the cost of goods sold, gross income otherwise has the same meaning as under
§ 61(a). The regulations add that, "[i]n the case of amounts received or accrued that relate to the
disposition of property, and except as provided in paragraph (a)(l)(ii) of this section, gross
income means the excess of the amount realized from the disposition of the property over the
unrecovered cost or other basis of the property. Consequently, except as provided in paragraph
(a)(l)(ii) of this section, an understated amount of gross income resulting from an overstatement
of unrecovered cost or other basis constitutes an omission from gross income for purposes of
section 6229(c)(2)."
1.
But the IRS still suffers from a hangover in cases on which the
extended statute had run before the effective date of the regulations. UTAM. Ltd v.
Commissioner. T.C. Memo. 2009-253 (11/9/09). Judge Kroupa followed Bakersfield Energy
Partners to hold that the statute of limitations is not extended to six years pursuant to
§ 6229(c)(2) or § 6501(e)(l)(A) as a result of a basis overstatement that causes gross income to
be understated by more than 25 percent.
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•
Although the date of the decision was after the effective date
of Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-IT and 301.6501(e)-IT, the result was dictated by prior law
effective when the FPAA was issued in 1999.
m.
Judge Wherry shoves it up the Commissioner all the way to his
"Colon(-y)" in a reviewed Tax Court decision that holds the Temporary Regulations invalid.
Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 11 (5/6/10) (reviewed,
7-0-6), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2009-195 (9/1/09) (granting summary judgment to the
taxpayer, holding that a basis overstatement is not a substantial omission from gross income that
triggers the six year extended statute of limitations under § 6229). On IRS motions to reconsider
and vacate in light of Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-IT and 301.6501(e)-IT, the Tax Court
(Judge Wherry) held that the Supreme Court's opinion in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357
U.S. 28 (1958), '''unambiguously forecloses the [IRS] interpretation' ... and displaces [the]
temporary regulations." The first ground was that the temporary regulations were specifically
limited their application to "taxable years with respect to which the applicable period for
assessing tax did not expire before September 24, 2009," and in this case that period was not
open as of that date. The second ground was that the Supreme Court had held in Colony that the
statute was unambiguous in light of its legislative history, and foreclosed temporary regulations
to the contrary.
•
Judges Halpern and Holmes concurred in the result. They
stated that they were not persuaded by either of the majority's analyses, but that the temporary
regulations should be invalidated on procedural grounds for failure to comply with the
Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment requirement.
2.
Proposed Regulations provide an instruction manual on how to start
running the otherwise endless statute of limitations on previously unreported listed
transactions. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Period of Limitations on Assessment for Listed
Transactions Not Disclosed Under Section 6011, REG-160871-04, 74 F.R. 55127 (10/7/09). The
Treasury has published proposed regulations § 301.6501(c)-I(g) under § 6501(c)(10), which
extends the statute of limitations when a taxpayer fails to disclose a listed transaction; the statute
of limitations does not expire until one year after the earlier of (1) the date on which the taxpayer
furnishes the required information, or (2) the date a material advisor (as defined in § 6111)
satisfies the list maintenance requirements of § 6112 with respect to a request by the IRS. The
proposed regulations specify the methods for subsequent disclosure of listed transaction that was
not properly disclosed under § 6011. The extended statute of limitations applies only to the tax
relating to the listed transaction, but the proposed regulations provide that tax with respect to the
listed transaction includes, but is not limited to, adjustments made to' the tax consequences
claimed on the return plus interest, additions to tax, additional amounts, and penalties that are
related to the listed transaction or adjustments made to the tax consequences, as well as any item
to the extent the item is affected by the listed transaction even if it is unrelated to the listed
transaction.
3~
A listed transaction is a listed transaction, is a listed transaction,
period. A partner's statute of limitations can be determined in a TEFRA partnership level
proceeding. Blak Investments v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 19 (12/23/09) (reviewed, 12-3).
The taxpayers engaged in a Son of Boss type transaction in December 2001 and January 2002
that first became a reportable transaction on 2/28/03, when Reg. § 1.6011-4 was promulgated. As
of that date, they had already filed their 2001 return, but they had not yet filed their 2002 return.
Reg. § 1.6011-4(e)(2) required them to attach a statement to their 2002 return disclosing the
listed transaction, but when they filed their 2002 return on October 15, 2003, they failed to
include the required statement. The IRS issued an FPAA on October 13, 2006, challenging the
transactions as shams. Section 6501(c)(IO) was added by the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004 applicable to tax years "with respect to which the period for assessing a deficiency did not
expire before" 10/22/04, and the statute of limitations with respect to the taxpayers' transactions
was open on that date. Section 6707A, including the definition of listed transactions in
§ 6707A(c), imposes penalties on failure to provide required information on reportable
transactions on returns due after 10/22/04. Temp. Reg. §1.6011-4T (and Prop. Reg. § 1.6011-4),
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requiring disclosure of defined listed transactions were first published in 2000. In a reviewed
opinion by Judge Haines, the majority first held that although the Tax Court's jurisdiction in a
partnership proceeding generally is limited to determining "partnership items," an exception
extends jurisdiction over whether the period of limitations has expired as to individual partners
presents, because the expiration of the period of limitations can depend on facts that are peculiar
to the individual partners, citing Poulenc Surfactants & Specialties, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114
T.C. 533 (2000), appeal dismissed and remanded, 249 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2001), and Curr-Spec
Partners, LP v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007- 289, affd. 579 F.3d 391(5th Cir. 2009). The
majority rejected the taxpayers' argument that there are two types of listed transactions, those
entered into before and those entered into after 10122/04, and that extension of the period for
assessment under § 6501 (c)(1O) only applied to transactions for which a return was due after that
date. The court concluded that the extension of the statute of limitations under § 6501 (c) (1 0) is
effective for tax years for which the period of limitations had not expired on 10122/04, and that
the enactment of the penalty provisions in § 6707A has no bearing on the application of
§ 6501(c)(10). "[I]t is of no consequence that the transaction in question became a reportable
transaction after the transaction had already occurred. The legislative history expressly
contemplated such a result." The court also held that Temp. Reg. § 1.6011-4T was valid and
required disclosure of the taxpayers' transactions on their 2001 and 2002 returns. The court
rejected the taxpayers' arguments that the temporary regulation violated Executive Order 12866,
which requires Office of Management and Budget review of proposed significant regulatory
actions, or that the temporary regulation violated the notice and comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act. Thus, the statute of limitations remained open on the taxpayers'
transactions under § 6501 (c)(1 0) until one year after the required disclosure was provided.
•
Judge Halpern Goined by Judges Foley and Holmes)
dissented on the grounds that the Tax Court does not have the authority in a partnership-level
proceeding to decide whether the statute of limitations bars the assessment of a resulting
computational adjustment. The dissenters assert that the application of the statute of limitations to
the subsequent assessment against the partners is neither a partnership item nor an affirmative
defense to the FPAA.
4.
The" statute of limitations remains open for any tax return in
connection with which required information about foreign transfers is not reported to the
IRS. Section 513 of the 2010 HIRE Act amended I.R.C. § 6501(c)(8) by providing that the
statute of limitations remains open for any tax return relating to which information about foreign
transfers is not furnished to the IRS and Treasury. The statute of limitations remains open until
three years after the required information is furnished. Section 511 and 512 of the 2010 HIRE
Act also provide for extended limitations for tax returns that are not fully compliant with respect
to foreign assets.
F.
Liens and Collections
1.
In this much-discussed case, taxpayer's poverty trumps a proposed
levy. Vinatieri v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 16 (12/21109). The taxpayer submitted a
settlement offer for delinquent taxes, but the IRS determined to levy on the taxpayer's wages and
car. Even though the IRS concluded that the levy would create an economic hardship, the
settlement officer determined collection alternatives to the levy, including an installment
agreement, an offer-in-compromise, &nd reporting the account as currently not collectible, were
not available because the taxpayer had not filed returns for several years. In a review of a § 6330
CDP hearing, Judge Dawson held that it was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion for the IRS
to proceed to levy on the taxpayer's wages and car, because a levy would have left the taxpayer
impoverished. Section 6343(a)(I) requires that the IRS must release a levy upon all, or part of, a
taxpayer's property if it determines that the levy creates an economic hardship due to the
taxpayer's financial condition. Reg. § 301.6343-1(b)(4) provides that a levy creates an economic
hardship due to the financial condition of an individual taxpayer and must be released "if
satisfaction of the levy in whole or in part will cause an individual taxpayer to be unable to pay
his or her reasonable basic living expenses." Because the taxpayer had demonstrated that a levy
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would render her unable to pay her reasonable basic living expenses, the IRS was barred from
levying. Judge Dawson rejected the IRS's argument that because the taxpayer was not in
compliance with the filing requirements for all required tax returns, its determination to levy was
not unreasonable.
•
The requirement that taxpayer be currently in compliance
with his or her obligations to the IRS under its "currently not collectible" ("CNC") program does
not apply to relief under § 6343.
2 . " 1 would gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today." T.D. 9473,
Agreements for Payment of Tax Liabilities in Installments, 74 F.R. 61525 (11125/09). The
Treasury Department has promulgated final Reg. § 301.6159-1, dealing with rules governing the
acceptance and rejection by the IRS of proposed installment agreements, the terms of installment
agreements, modification or termination by the IRS, and appeal procedures when the IRS rejects
or terminates an installment agreement. Among the provisions is a requirement that the IRS
review partial payment installment agreements every two years to determine whether the
financial condition of the taxpayer changed enough to warrant an increase in the payments. The
IRS may terminate an installment agreement if the taxpayer provides materially inaccurate or
incomplete information in connection with a requested financial update. The IRS will generally
notify the taxpayer in writing at least 30 days prior to terminating an installment agreement and
describe the reason for the termination, after which the taxpayer may provide information
showing that the IRS's reason is incorrect. Appeals procedures are provided. The IRS cannot
levy during the time an installment agreement is pending, unless an installment agreement
request was made solely to delay collection. The statute of limitations on collection under § 6502
of the Code is suspended for the period that a proposed installment agreement is pending, plus 30
days following a rejection, and during any appeal.
3.
Nuanced differences in the statutory subsections result in different
.periods for suspending the statute of limitations on collections. Severo v. Commissioner, 586
F.3d 1213 (5th Cir. 11120/09), aff'g 129 T.C. 160 (11115/07). Section 6503(h) suspends the
running of the period of limitations on collection from the date of the taxpayer's bankruptcy'
petition was filed to the date six months after the bankruptcy court issues a discharge order. The
more limited suspension of the period of limitations in § 6503(b), which applies to judicial
proceedings generally when the taxpayer's assets are under control of a court, does not apply in
bankruptcy situations.
4.
Ever-expanding Tax Court jurisdiction over CDP appeals. Michael v.
Commissioner, 133 T.C. No. 10 (10/8/09). Judge Goeke held that a settlement of the
government's counterclaim in a prior refund suit for § 6694 penalties' does not preclude Tax
Court jurisdiction to review a § 6330 CDP determination with respect to collection of the
settlement amount. The District Court's dismissal of the refund action with prejudice on the basis
of the settlement agreement does not render the administrative statutory collection remedies
unavailable. Nor does the District Court's retention of jurisdiction for a 60-day enforcement
period preclude the IRS from pursuing statutory collection remedies, such as a levy. Thus, the
Tax Court had jurisdiction to review the IRS's determination to sustain the levy and to determine
whether respondent may collect the unpaid penalties by levy.
5.
You only imagined that a discharge in bankruptcy from personal
liability for back income taxes really got you off the hook. Wadleigh v. Commissioner, 134
T.C. No. 14 (6/15/10). This case involved a review of the IRS's determination in a § 6330 CDP
hearing not to release a levy on the taxpayer's pension. The tax lien had not been perfected by
filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, and prior to the IRS issuing its Notice oflntent to Levy, the
taxpayer's personal liability for the income taxes in question had been discharged in bankruptcy.
The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) held that because the taxpayer's pension was an excluded asset
under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) that was never part of the bankruptcy estate - in contrast to an
exempt asset, which initially is part of the bankruptcy estate but which is unavailable to satisfy
creditor's claims - the § 6231 unperfected tax lien on the taxpayer's pension survived his
bankruptcy and could be enforced notwithstanding his personal discharge. However, the lien was
not enforceable until the pension entered payout status. Nevertheless, Judge Marvel remanded
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the case to the Appeals Division, but retained jurisdiction, because the record was inadequate to
determine whether the IRS abused its discretion in levying on the taxpayer's retirement income,
in the face of the taxpayer's claim that the levy would result in economic hardship by leaving
him destitute.
6.
Just because the IRS thinks it's not worth trying to levy on it doesn't
necessarily mean it's not a fraudulent conveyance if you give it away. Rubenstein v.
Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 13 (6/7/10). The taxpayer's father, who was insolvent and had
substantial unpaid income tax liabilities of which the taxpayer was aware, transferred to the
taxpayer for little or no consideration the condominium in which they both resided, which was
worth approximately $44,000. In the course of evaluating an offer in compromise previously
submitted by the father, but which was rejected, the IRS had determined that the net realizable
equity value in the condominium was zero. After the transfer, the IRS asserted transferee liability
equal to the condominium's fair market value on the date of the transfer on the ground that the
transfer was constructively fraudulent under Florida's Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
(FUFTA). Under Florida law the condominium was the father's homestead, and thus was
generally exempt from creditor's claims under nonbankruptcy law. However, the FUFTA
excludes from the definition of "assets" property that is "generally exempt under nonbankruptcy
law." On this basis the taxpayer argued that the condominium was not an "asset" for purposes of
the FUFTA and its transfer to him thus was not avoidable. The Tax Court (Judge Thornton) held
that because a homestead property is reachable by the United States through judicial process to
enforce collection of unpaid income tax liabilities, even if it is exempt from the claims of other
creditors under state law, the homestead condominium was not "generally exempt under
nonbankruptcy law" within the meaning of the FUFTA. Thus, the condominium was an "asset"
for purposes of the IRS's claim under the FUFTA. Furthermore, because the care that the
taxpayer had provided for his father was not bargained for, but was provided out of love and
respect, it did not constitute "reasonably equivalent value" for the condominium within the
meaning of the FUFTA. Accordingly, the transfer was fraudulent. Finally, the IRS was not
equitably estopped from asserting transferee liability by virtue of having previously determined
that the condominium had zero net equity value.
.
7.
Here's a case in which a partner's draw is "salary or wages," much to
his dismay. United States v. Moskowitz, Passman & Edleman, 603 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 4/29/10).
The Second Circuit held that a continuing levy on "salary" under § 6331(e) reached a partner's
"near-weekly" draw against the law firm's profits. Reg. § 301.6331-1(b)(1) defines "salary or
wages" to '" include[] compensation for services paid in the form of fees, commissions, bonuses,
and similar items.'" (emphasis supplied by the court). Because the partner's draw was
"compensation for services," the court concluded that it was within the sweep of the Regulation,
and thus § 6331(e). The court rejected the law firm's argument that payments of partnership
draw to the partner were not "salary or wages" under § 6331 (e) at the time of the levy because
'''a partner only realizes income on the last day of the partnership's taxable year.'"
8.
No need for actuarial values to decide how much of the entirety the
tax-deadbeat hubby owned. United States v. Barr, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-5590 (6thCir. 8/4/10).
In an opinion by Judge Rogers, the Sixth Circuit held that to satisfy a husband's separate tax
liability, the government could levy on his one-half interest in a house owned with his wife in
tenancy by the entirety under Michigan law. The taxpayer's wife was entitled to only one-half of
the sales proceeds, despite her longer life expectancy.
Innocent Spouse
G.
1.
That regulation ain't got no equity and it ain't got no empathy, so it's
invalid. The Tax Court majority responds to "the sound of [congressional] silence." Lantz v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.8 (4/7/09) (reviewed, 12-4). The taxpayer sought equitable relief
from joint income tax liability under § 6015(f), but the IRS denied relief on the ground that she
had not requested relief within two years from the IRS's first collection action, as required by
Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(I). Consequently, the IRS did not reach the substantive issues of the claim. In
a reviewed opinion by Judge Goeke, joined by eleven judges, with four dissents, the Tax Court
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held Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(I) to be invalid as applied to § 6015(t) relief. (Following the Golsen
rule, the Tax Court applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), because the Seventh Circuit held in Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States,142
F.3d 973,979 (7th Cir. 1998), that regulations issued under general or specific authority of the
. IRS to promulgate necessary rules are entitled to Chevron deference; Reg. § 1.6015-5 was issued
under both a general grant of authority under § 7805 and a specific grant of authority in
§ 6015(h).) The court focused on the explicit inclusion of a two-year deadline in both § 6015(b)
and § 6015(c}, in contrast to the absence of any deadline in § 6015(t), to find that the regulation
was not a reasonable interpretation of the statute under the Chevron standard.
'''It is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely' when it
'includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another''' .
... We find that by explicitly creating a 2-year limitation in subsections (b) and (c)
but not subsection (t), Congress has "spoken" by its audible silence. Because the
regulation imposes a limitation that Congress explicitly incorporated .into
subsections (b) and (c) but omitted from subsection (t), it fails the first prong of
Chevron . ...
Had Congress intended a 2-year period of limitations for equitable relief, then of
course it could have easily included in subsection (t) what it included in
subsections (b) and (c). However, Congress imposed no deadline, yet the
Secretary prescribed a period of limitations identical to the limitations Congress
imposed under section 6015(b) and (c).
•
As a result, the IRS abused its discretion in failing to consider
all facts and circumstances in the taxpayer's case. Further proceedings are required to fully
determine the taxpayer's liability.
.
a.
You don't have to actually know the IRS denied § 6015(b) relief
for the statute of limitations on seeking review to have expired, but you can always turn to
§ 6015(f), which for now appears to have an open-ended period for review. Mannella v.
Commissioner, 132 T.C. No. 10 (4/13/09). The IRS sent the taxpayer a notice of intent to levy
and notice of the right to a § 6330 CDP hearing on 6/4/04. On 1111/06, more than two years later,
the taxpayer requested § 6015 relief from joint and several liability, which the IRS denied on the
grounds that the request was untimely. The taxpayer claimed that she did not receive her notice
of intent to levy because her former husband received the notices, signed the certified mail
receipts, and failed to deliver of inform her of the notices. Judge Haines held that actual receipt
of the notice of intent to levy or of the notice of the right to request relief from joint and several
liability is not required for the 2-year period in which to request relief under §§ 6015(b) and (c)
to begin. The taxpayer's request for relief under §§ 6015(b) and (c) was not timely. However, the
taxpayer's claim. for relief under § 6015(t), was timely because Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C.
No.8 (4/7/09), held that Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(I), requiring a request for relief within two years
from the IRS's first collection action, is invalid as applied to § 6015(t) relief.
.
b.
But the ms will fight this one to the bitter end! CC-201O-005,
Designation for Litigation: Validity of Two-Year Deadline for Section 6015(t) Claims Under
Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(I) (3/12/10). This Chief Counsel Notice states that because the issue
of the validity of the two-year deadline in Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(l) for filing a claim for § 6015(t)
relief, which was held to be an invalid regulation in Lantz v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.8
(2009), has been was designated for litigation by the Office of Chief Counsel, the IRS will
continue to deny claims for relief under § 6015(t) as untimely and will not settle or concede this
issue. However, depending on the facts of the case, the merits of the § 6015(t) claim might be
conceded.
c.
And the IRS's bitter-end fight to validate the regulation ended up
in the Seventh Circuit, where Judge Posner denied the existence of "audible silence." Lantz v.
Commissioner, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 6/8/10). The taxpayer was described as "a financially
unsophisticated woman whose husband, a dentist, was arrested for Medicare fraud in' 2000,
convicted and imprisoned. They had been married for only six years when he was arrested and
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there is no suggestion that she was aware of, let alone complicit in, his fraud." She received a
packet that included a notice of a proposed levy on her in 2003, but did not respond because her
estranged husband told her "he'd deal with the matter." He asked the IRS to be sent the
application form for seeking innocent-spouse relief, explaining that his wife was an "innocent
spouse," but he died before filing it. In 2006, the IRS applied taxpayer's $3,230 income tax
refund for 2005 to her joint and several liability for 1999 of more than $1.3 million.
"Unemployed and impecunious, she applied for innocent-spouse relief but the IRS turned her
down because she'd missed the two year-deadline .... " The Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner),
sustained the regulation and agreed with the IRS's denial of relief, stating, " ... any statute of
limitations will cut off some, and often a great many, meritorious claims."
•
Judge Posner denied the existence of "audible silence" in the
following words:
But even if our review of statutory interpretations by the Tax Court were
deferential, we would not accept "audible silence" as a reliable guide to
congressional meaning. "Audible silence," like Milton's "darkness visible" or the
Zen koan "the sound of one hand clapping," requires rather than guides
interpretation. Lantz's brief translates "audible silence" as "plain language," and
adds (mysticism must be catching) that "Congress intended the plain language of
the language used in the statute."
•
In sustaining the regulation Judge Posner reasoned as
follows;
Agencies .:. are not bashful about making up their own deadlines[,] ... and because
it is as likely that Congress knows this as that it knows that courts like to borrow a
statute of limitations when Congress doesn't specify one, ·the fact that Congress
designated a deadline in two provisions of the same statute and not in a third is
not a compelling argument that Congress meant to preclude .the Treasury
Department from imposing a deadline applicable to cases governed by that third
provision"; if there is no deadline in subsection (t), the two-year deadlines in
subsections (b) and (c) will be set largely at naught because the substantive
criteria of those sections are virtually the same as those of (t) ....
We must also not overlook the introductory phrase in subsection (f)---"under
procedures prescribed by the [Treasury Department]"-or the further delegation
in 26 U.S.C § 6015(h) to the Treasury to "prescribe such regulations as are
necessary to carry out the provisions of' section 6015. In related contexts such a
delegation has been held to authorize an agency to establish deadlines for
applications for discretionary relief.
•
The opinion concludes with the hope that the IRS would
grant taxpayer relief under § 6343 from its levy on taxpayer by declaring the taxes "currently not
collectible" as follows"
Ironically, the Service declared the taxes owed by Lantz's husband - the crooked
dentist - "currently not collectible." She is entitled a fortiori to such relief, and
there is no deadline for seeking it. We can at least hope that the IRS knows better
than to try to squeeze' water out of a stone. 5
2.
See no evil, hear no evil, but speak evil of ex-spouse - a perfect
formula for § 6015 relief. Phemister v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-201 (9/2/09). The
taxpayer was entitled to relief from liability on a tax deficiency attributable to her ex-husband's
medical practice under § 6015(b) where she had no meaningful involvement with the business
and the adjustments resulted from his failure to substantiate claimed expenses. Although his
business income supported the taxpayer, it was more than sufficient to have provided support
without regard to the disallowed expenses. Thus, the disallowed expenses did not result in any
meaningful financial benefit to the taxpayer. The taxpayer also was entitled to § 6015(t)
5

But cf, Exodus 17:1-7 and Numbers 20:1-13.
107

equitable relief. She was divorced from her ex-husband, she had no meaningful involvement
with the business, his adjustments resulted from his failure to substantiate claimed expenses; she
did not know who kept her husband's books and records, and there was no evidence she
reviewed any of his claimed deductions.
3.
One spouse pays and other spouse doesn't and no one is innocent. One
is just more cooperative with the IRS. Jordan v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No. 1 (1111110). The
Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that spouses may separately agree to a waiver of the lO-year
period of limitations on collections for a year with respect to which they filed a joint return. The
waiver may be effective with respect to one spouse, but not with respect to the other spouse if the
other spouse did not also execute the waiver or has the right to repudiate it.
4•
The statute might not have correctly articulated the statutory cross
reference, but the Tax Court got the drift of congressional intent anyway. Adkison v.
Commissioner, 129 T.C. 97 (10/16/07). The Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to review a
claim for apportioned liability relief under § 6015(c) when the tax liability in question relates to
partnership income and the deficiency notice on which the jurisdiction was asserted to be based
is invalid because the partnership items are subject to determination in a TEFRA partnership
level proceeding that has not yet been resolved. Section 6230(a)(3)(A), which still refers to
former § 6013(e), the statutory predecessor of § 6015, evidences congressional intent that the
spouse of a partner can initiate a claim for innocent spouse relief with respect to a deficiency
attributable to an adjustment of a partnership item only after the IRS issues a notice of
computational adjustment following the completion of the partnership-level proceeding. Judge
Cohen concluded that Congress simply overlooked the need to correct the cross references in
§ 6230 when it replaced § 6013(e) with § 6015.
a.
Affirmed on other grounds: The Tax Court had jurisdiction,
but cannot grant any relief until the TEFRA proceeding is. concluded~ Adkison v.
Commissioner, 592 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1121/10). Judge Bybee's opinion for the Ninth Circuit
described the Tax Court's holding as "dismiss[ing] for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that
because a separate partnership proceeding involving the transaction from which the deficiency
arose was already pending, the Commissioner did not "assert" a deficiency against Adkison
within the meaning of [§ 6015(e)(I)(A)." However, Judge Bybee concluded that the Tax Court
did have jurisdiction, because nothing in § 6320 divests the Tax Court of jurisdiction under §
6015. He found that "the Commissioner, joined by the Tax Court, has confused the availability
of a remedy with the question of the Tax Court's jurisdiction." However, he continued to
conclude that:
Although ... the Tax Court has jurisdiction over Adkison's § 6015 petition, the
Tax Court's instincts were correct: in light of the ... TEFRA proceeding ... , there is
no "appropriate relief available" to Adkison." TEFRA plainly contemplates that
when a partnership proceeding is pending, the Commissioner will not assert a
deficiency against a taxpayer-partner until the partnership proceeding determines
the liability of the partnership, and consequently, the partners. ... Once the
.TEFRA proceeding is concluded, the partners are entitled to a "final partnership
administrative adjustment," id. § 6223(a)(2), their tax deficiency is determined,
and at that point, the spouse of a partner may file a petition for relief under §
6015.
Thus, the judgment was affirmed on the grounds that no
•
remedy was available, even though there was jurisdiction.
•
We think Judge Bybee was confused by the phrase "in the
case of an individual against whom a deficiency has been asserted" in § 6015(e) and concluded that
the Tax Court has jurisdiction even though the deficiency notice is invalid. A long line of case law
holds that the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction in every case in which a "deficiency is asserted,"
to use Judge Bybee's phrase, but only in those cases in which a valid deficien:cy notice has been
issued. If the deficiency notice was issued prematurely, it was not valid, and if the deficiency notice
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is not valid, although the Tax Court has no jurisdiction to "redetermine" the asserted deficiency, the
IRS nevertheless is barred from assessing the tax.
5.
The widow inherits the ability to make a standalone § 601S(c) election,
even though § 601S(b) and § 601S(f) relief were foreclosed by the pleadings in the prior
deficiency case. Deihl v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.7 (2/23/10). The taxpayer and her late
husband had contested deficiencies for 1996, 1997, and 1998 in Tax Court proceedings in 2004.
The petition in that proceeding had raised the issue of § 6105 relief for 1996, but not for 1997 or
1998; however, in the stipulation of facts for the consolidated cases, the claim for relief from
joint and several liability was withdrawn. Only the taxpayer's husband signed the petition in the
deficiency proceeding. The taxpayer did not (1) sign any court documents in the case, (2) review
the petitions or the stipulations of facts, or (3) agree to any of the stipulations. Her husband and
their (his) lawyer did not discuss the documents with the taxpayer, and she saw them for the first
time at trial in the instant case. The taxpayer'did not meet with any IRS personnel, participate in
any settlement negotiations with the IRS, or sit in on any such meetings between her attorneys
and the IRS during the litigation in the earlier case, although she was called as a witness and
testified briefly. The taxpayer's husband died after the trial but before a final order was entered.
After the decision was entered, the taxpayer filed an administrative claim for relief from joint
and several liability for all three years, which the IRS denied on the ground that the claim was
barred by res judicata under § 6015(g)(2). The Tax Court (Judge Vasquez) held that § 6015(g)(2)
applied because the Tax Court entered final decisions for 1996 through 1998. However, because
§ 6015 relief was raised only in the pleadings for 1996, § 6015 relief for 1997 and 1998 was not
an issue in the prior proceeding, and because the taxpayer did not meaningfully participate in the
prior preceding, the exception in § 6015(g)(2) applied for 1997 and 1998 and the taxpayer was
not barred from seeking relief for those years. Furthermore, because the petition in the 2004
proceeding did not specifically invoke § 6015(c), and the taxpayer was ineligible to make a
§ 6015 election at the time because her husband was alive, a § 6015(c) election was not an issue
in the prior proceeding, the taxpayer was not barred from seeking § 60 15(c) apportioned liability
for 1996. However, relief from joint and several liability for 1996 was raised by the petition and
thus was at issue in the earlier proceeding, and § 6015(g)(2) barred the taxpayer from claiming
relief from joint and several liability under § 6015(b) and (f) for 1996.
6.
Pyrr~ic victory on the meaning of "no reason to know." Greer v.
Commissioner, 595 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2117/10). The taxpayer sought § 6015(b) relief with
respect to a deficiency attributable to her husband's disallowed tax shelter deductions and
credits. In the Tax Court, Judge Goeke found that "rather than having '''no reason to know' of
the tax understatement, as required for relief, she 'chose not to know,'" and denied relief. In
affirming, the Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Moore, adopted the test of Price v.
Commissioner, 887 F2d 959 (9th Cir. 1989), under which "in erroneous-deduction cases, '[a]
spouse has "reason to know" of the substantial understatement if a reasonably prudent taxpayer
in her position at the time she signed the return could be expected to know that the return
contained the substantial understatement.'" The court rejected application of the knowledge of
the transaction test, which applies to income omission cases, on the following reasoning.
The knowledge-of-the-transaction test leaves room for a taxpayer to claim
innocent-spouse relief in omitted-income claims, because the understatement
arises in such cases from information being left off a return, and the spouse
otherwise may not have known or had reason to know. that information. In
erroneous-deduction cases, the understatement arises from information being
included on the return, so a spouse who signs a tax return necessarily learns of the
transaction. The knowledge-of-the-transaction test writes the innocent-spouse
provision out of the law in such cases. A more nuanced approach is thus required,
especially given that an understatement arising from a deduction usually is not
obvious from the face of a tax return. A taxpayer who knows how much money
the family earned will know that tax has been understated if income is omitted
from the return, as it is common knowledge that income is taxable .... By contrast,
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a taxpayer who is aware of an investment mayor may not know that tax benefits
claimed on its basis are impermissible, depending on that taxpayer's level of
sophistication and how much he or she knows about the investment. .... The Price
test takes account of this difference.
•
Nevertheless, relief was denied because the Tax Court did
not clearly err; "[T]he low level of taxes owed relative to the income reported ... should have given
Mrs. Greer pause." Section 6015(f) equitable relief also was denied, on the ground that the taxpayer
failed to demonstrate economic hardship.
•
Note that current Reg. §1 .6015-3(c)(2)(i)(b)(I), which was
effective for year in which the taxpayer sought relief but which was not cited by the court, expressly
provides: "In the case of an erroneous deduction or credit, knowledge of the item means knowledge
of the facts that made the item not allowable as a deduction or credit."
7.
It's tough to get back money you never paid the IRS, even if you
might be an innocent spouse. Kaufman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-89 (4/27110). The
Tax Court held that - assuming for the sake of argument that the surviving spouse would be
entitled to § 6015(f) relief - no relief was available because she was seeking a refund of amounts
paid by her husband's estate, not amounts paid by her.
H.
Miscellaneous
1.
Claims for a method for hedging risk in commodities trading are held
not to concern patent-eligible subject matter. This leads to the possible conclusion that tax
strategies are not patentable. However, the Federal Circuit did not overrule the State Street
case and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943
(Fed. Cir. 10/30/08) (9-3), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (6/1/09). The
Federal Circuit (Judge Michel) affirmed a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences that claims for a method for managing (hedging) the risks in commodities trading
did not constitute a patent-eligible subject matter. The meaning of a patentable "process" under
35 U.S.C. § 101 ["Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine [etc.] ...
may obtain a patent therefore ....] includes only the transformation of a physical object or
substance, or an electronic signal representative of a physical object or substance."
a.
Federal Circuit is affirmed, in that the hedging method did not
constitute a patent-eligible subject matter, but the Supreme Court's long-awaited opinion leaves
the law farkockteh [utterly messed up] and leaves tax practitioners farblonjet [completely
confused]. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (6/28/10). Tax method patents appear to be
permissible under the Court's opinion if they constitute a process related to a machine (and that
test is not the exclusive test). Moreover, business method patents are not categorically excluded
from patentability. There is much more, but it is patent law and not of interest to non-masochistic
tax practitioners.
2.
Two bites at the apple for the IRS, because the apples are different
varieties. Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No.3 (8/24/09). The
trust was the shareholder of four corporations that sold all of their assets for cash, resulting in
large capital gains. Following the asset sales, the trust sold all of the stock of the corporations to
a midco - actually named Midco - which purportedly sheltered the corporations' capital gains
with losses from newly contributed high basis, low value assets, following which the assets of
the corporations were stripped. Initially, the IRS asserted a deficiency against the trust on the
theory that the corporations had been constructively liquidated while still owned by the trust and
the trust had received the cash balances held by the corporations. A docketed Tax Court case on
this issue was settled with the IRS conceding that there was no deficiency. Subsequently, all four
corporations entered into closing agreements with the IRS under which substantial taxes were
due with respect to the asset sales. At that time, however, all four of the corporations were
insolvent. The IRS asserted transferee liability againstthe trust, and the trust raised the defenses
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Judge Goeke held that neither res judicata nor collateral
estoppel applied. The cause of action in the deficiency cases was different than the cause of
action in the transferee liability case. The deficiency case dealt with the trust's fiduciary income
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tax -liability on the sale of the stock in the corporations. That determination would not have
required the trust to pay the unpaid tax liabilities of the corporations. The trust's liability as
transferee differs from the trust's income tax liability. Collateral estoppel did not apply because
no facts were determined in the earlier proceeding that concluded with the IRS's concession.
Because the question whether there were liquidating distributions to the trust was not litigated
and was not essential to the decisions in the deficiency actions, collateral estoppel did not bar the
IRS from asserting in the transferee action that there were liquidating distributions from the
corporations to the trust.
3.
The taxpayer won the complex legal issue, inadvertently conceded the
critical factual issue, and thus lost the case. Ron Lykins. Inc. v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. No.5
(9/2/09). A deficiency asserted against the taxpayer corporation for 1999 and 2000 was resolved
in a Tax Court case, Ron Lykins, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.e. Memo. 2006-35. The taxpayer
incurred an NOL in 2001, and the taxpayer requested and received a tentative refund attributable
to carrying back the NOL to 1999 and 2000 before the IRS issued the deficiency notice. The
deficiency notice did not refer to the NOL carrybacks from 2001 or take into account the refunds
in its computation of tax liability. Subsequently, the IRS disallowed the tentative NOL
carrybacks and taxpayer raised the issue of the NOL carrybacks, but the Tax Court held that
there was no deficiency without regard to the NOL carrybacks, neither party having put on
evidence as to the NOL carrybacks. After initially allowing the tentative refund attributable to
the NOL carrybacks, the IRS disallowed them and summarily assessed the amounts of the
tentative refunds pursuant to § 6213(b)(3). The IRS gave notice of intent to levy and the taxpayer
requested a CDP hearing. Following the CDP hearing the IRS issued a notice of determination to
proceed with collection, and the taxpayer appealed. The taxpayer did not attempt to prove the
merits of the 2001 NOL in either the CDP hearing or the Tax Court, but argued that under res
judicata, the 2006 decision in the original deficiency case barred the IRS from asserting that it
owed more taxes for 1999 and 2000. The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) first found that collateral
estoppel did not bar the taxpayer from raising the 2001 NOL carryback, because the merits of the
2001 NOL were not "actually litigated" in the prior deficiency case. More importantly, he held
that even assuming that either party could have litigated the NOL in the prior deficiency case, res
judicata did not bar either the taxpayer or the IRS from raising or disputing the 2001 NOL
carryback and its effect upon the 1999 and 2000 tax liabilities. The reason res judicata did not
bar relitigation of the impact of the NOL carryback was that § 6511 (d)(2)(B) explicitly permits
the taxpayer to pay the summary assessments and pursue an overpayment remedy for NOL
carrybacks without the bar of res judicata. On the other side of the coin, although § 6212(c)(l)
generally bars the IRS from issuing a second notice of deficiency after a taxpayer has filed a Tax
Court petition, § 6213(b)(1) and (3) expressly allow the IRS to determine an additional
deficiency that results from a tentative carryback refund even if the IRS has previously issued a
deficiency notice of for the carryback year and the taxpayer has filed a Tax Court petition. The
court emphasized that it was not holding simply that § 6212(c)(1) by itself trumps res judicata,
and that the IRS avoids res judicata whenever it is permitted by § 6212(c)(1) to determine an
additional deficiency, but that §§ 6411, 6212(c)(1), and 6213(b)(3) create a unique procedure for
tentative carryback refunds, because recapture of a tentatively allowed refund is not ordinarily
the subject of a taxpayer's petition in a deficiency case; However, in the end the court held for
the IRS, concluding that because the taxpayer failed to carry the burden of proving its loss in
2001 and establishing the validity of the carrybacks to 1999 and 2000, having conceded the issue
by not raising it the CDP hearing, the proposed levy to collect the summary assessment would be
upheld.
4
Electronic filing to be required beginning in 2011. Section 17 of
WHABA mandates that the IRS require electronic filing by "specified tax return preparers" for
all tax returns filed after 12/31110. Specified tax return preparers are "all return preparers except
those who neither prepare nor reasonably expect to prepare ten or more individual income tax
returns [including returns for estates and trusts] in a calendar year."
50
Burton Kanter got in trouble again, and this time it followed him to
the grave. Investment Research Associates. Ltd. v. Commissioner, ToC. Memo. 1999-407
0
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(12/15/99). In a 600-page opinion, Burton Kanter was held liable for the § 6653 fraud penalty by
reason of his being "the architect who planned and executed the elaborate scheme with respect to
'" kickback income payments ...."
a.
At first, he was unable to wriggle out, the way he did 25 years
ago when he was acquitted by a jury. (His partner was convicted and imprisoned. See United
States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981).) The
taxpayers subsequently moved to have access to the special trial judge's "reports, draft opinions,
or similar documents" prepared under Tax Court Rule 183(b). They based their motion on
conversations with two unnamed Tax Court judges that the original draft opinion from the
special trial judge was changed by Judge Dawson before he adopted it. (Kanter's attorney later
revealed the names of the two judges, when asked at oral argument to the Seventh Circuit, as Tax
Court Judge Julian Jacobs and Chief Special Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos. See the text at
footnote 1 of Judge Cudahy's dissent in the Seventh Circuit Kanter Estate opinion, below.) They
were turned down because the Tax Court held that the documents related to its internal
deliberative processes. See, Tax Court Order denying motion, 2001lNT 23-31 (4/26/00) and (on
reconsideration) 2001 lNT 23-30 (8/30100).
b.
And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer
Ballard loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Eleventh Circuit. Ballard v. Commissioner,
321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2/13/03), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the Tax Court decision and rejected the taxpayers' argument that changes allegedly made to the
original draft opinion from the special trial judge by Judge Dawson before he adopted it were
improper. Judge Fay stated:
Even assuming Dick's [taxpayers' lawyer's] affidavit to be true and affording
Petitioners-Appellants all reasonable inferences, the process utilized in this case
does not give rise to due process concern. While the procedures used in the Tax
Court may be unique to that court, there is nothing unusual about judges
conferring with one another about cases assigned to them. These conferences are
an essential part of the judicial process when, by statute, more than one judge is
charged with the responsibility of deciding the case. And, as a result of such
conferences, judges sometimes change their original position or thoughts.
Whether Special Trial Judge Couvillion prepared drafts of his report or
subsequently changed his opinion entirely is without import insofar as our
analysis of the alleged due process violation pertaining to the application of [Tax
Court] Rule 183 is concerned. Despite the invitation, this court will simply not
interfere with another court's deliberative process.
The record reveals, and we accept as true, that the underlying report adopted by
the Tax Court is Special Trial Judge Couvillion's. Petitioners-Appellants have not
demonstrated that the Order of August 30, 2000 is inaccurate or suspect in any
manner. Therefore, we conclude that the application of Rule 183 in this case did
not violate Petitioners-Appellants' due process rights. Accordingly, we deny the
request for relief and save for another day the more troubling question of what
would have occurred had Special Trial Judge Couvillion not indicated that the
report adopted by the Tax Court accurately reflected his findings and opinion.
c.
And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated and taxpayer
Kanter's Estate loses on appeal on the fraud issue in the Seventh Circuit. Estate of Kanter v.
Commissioner, 337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) (per curiam) (2-1), q/J'g in part and rev 'g in part
T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The court found that the nondisclosure of the special trial judge's original
report was proper, following the Eleventh Circuit's Ballard opinion. It affirmed the findings on
deficiencies, fraud and penalties, but reversed on the issue of the deductibility of Kanter's
expenses for his involvement in the aborted sale of a purported John Trumball painting of
George Washington because "Kanter has shown a distinct proclivity to seek income and profit
through activities similar to the failed sale of the painting."
Burton Kanter died on October 31, 2001.
•
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d.
And the Tax Court's procedures are vindicated but taxpayer
Lisle's Estate wins on appeal on the fraud issue in the Fifth Circuit. Estate of Lisle v.
Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364 (5th Cir. 7/30/03), aff'g in part and rev'g in part T.e. Memo.
1999-407. The Fifth Circuit (Judge Higginbotham) followed the Eleventh and Seventh Circuit·
decisions upholding the nondisclosure of the Special Trial Judge's original report by the Tax
Court.
e.
Justice Ginsburg to Tax Court judges: "You Article I judges
don't understand your own rules, so let me tell you what you meant when you adopted
them in 1983." Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (3/7/05) (7-2), reversing and remanding
337 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) and 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2/13/03). Justice Ginsburg held
that the Tax Court may neither exclude from the record on appeal nor conceal from the taxpayers
the original draft reports of Special Trial Judges under Tax Court Rule 183(b) or under any
statutory authority.
•
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion, joined by
Justice Thomas, states that the "Tax Court's compliance with its own Rules is a matter on which we
should defer to the interpretation of that court."
f.
The Eleventh Circuit orders that the Special Trial Judge's
report be added to the record . .Ballard v. Commissioner, 2005-1 U.S.T.C. '50,393 (11th Cir.
5/17/05).
q.
Tax Court changes its rules. (9/20/05). The Tax Court adopted
amendments to Tax Court Rules 182 and 183, relating.to Special Trial Judges' reports in cases
other than small tax cases. The Special Trial Judge's recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law are to be served on the parties, who may file written objections and responses.
After the case is assigned to a regular Judge, any changes made shall be reflected in the record
and "[d]ue regard shall be given to the circumstance that the Special Trial Judge had the
opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and the finding of fact recommended by the
Special Trial Judge shall be presumed to be correct."
h.
The Eleventh Circuit remands the case to the Tax Court after reinstating the Special Trial Judge's report. Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026
(l1th Cir. 1112/05) (per curiam). The case was remanded to the Tax Court with the following
instructions: (l) the "collaborative report and opinion" is ordered stricken; (2) the original report
of the special trial judge is ordered reinstated; (3) the Tax Court Chief Judge is instructed to
assign this case to a previously-uninvolved regular Tax Court Judge; and (4) the Tax Court shall
proceed to review this matter in accordance with the Supreme Court's dictates and with its
newly-revised Rules 182 and 183, giving "due regard" to the credibility determinations of the
special trial judge and presuming correct fact findings of the trial judge.
i.
And the Fifth Circuit remands it too. Estate of Lisle v.
Commissioner, 431 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 11122/05) (per curiam). The case was remanded to the Tax
Court with orders to: (l) strike the "collaborative report" that formed the basis of the Tax Court's
ultimate decision; (2) reinstate Judge Couvillion's original report; (3) refer the case to a regular
Tax Court judge who had no involvement in the preparation of the "collaborative report," who in
dealing with the remaining issue of tax deficiency must give "due regard" to the credibility
determinations of Judge Couvillion, presuming that his fact findings are correct unless
manifestly unreasonable; and (4) adhere strictly hereafter to the amended Tax Court Rule in
finalizing Tax Court opinions.
j .
On remand, in a 458-page opinion Judge Haines of the Tax
Court pours out Kanter and Ballard. Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-21
(2/1/07). The Tax Court (Judge Haines) found that certain of the Special Trial Judge's findings
of fact were "manifestly unreasonable" because they were "internally inconsistent or so
implausible that a reasonable fact finder would not believe [the recommended finding]" or they
were "directly contradicted by documentary or objective evidence." Judge Haines therefore
found that the Kanter-related entities were shams, that "Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle participated in
a complex, well-disguised scheme to share kickback payments earned jointly by Kanter, Ballard,
and Lisle," and that they earned income during the years at issue which they failed to report.
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Judge Haines found that - based upon factors such as
(1) failure to report substantial amounts of income, (2) concealment ofthe true nature of the income
and the identity of the earners of the income, (3) use of sham, conduit, and nominee entities,
(4) reporting Kanter's and Ballard's income on IRAs [and another entity's] tax returns,
(5) commingling of Kanter's and Ballard's income with funds belonging to others, (6) phony loans,
(7) false and misleading documents, and (8) failure to cooperate during the examination process by
engaging in a "strategy of obfuscation and delay" - the Commissioner demonstrated by "clear and
convincing evidence" that Kanter and Ballard filed false and fraudulent tax returns for each of the
years at issue.
•
Judge Haines held that the Tax Court is "obliged to review
the recommended fmdings of fact and credibility determinations set forth in the STJ report under a
'manifestly unreasonable' standard of review, and ... may reject such fmdings of fact and credibility
determinations only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, [it] conclude[s] that the
recommended finding of fact or testimony (l) is internally inconsistent or so implausible that a
reasonable fact finder would not believe it, or (2) is not credible because it is directly contradicted
by documentary or objective evidence." Furthermore, Judge Haines held that a special trial judge's
credibility determinations may be rejected under the "manifestly unreasonable" standard of review
without rehearing the disputed testimony. "
•
Judge Haines further found that the appropriate standard for
determining whether the assignment of income doctrine should be applied had been appropriately
articulated in United States v. Newell, 239 F.3d 917,919-920, as follows:
To shift the tax liability, the assignor [taxpayer] must relinquish his control over
the activity that generates the income; the income must be the fruit of the contract
or the property itself, and not of his ongoing income-producing activity.... This
means, in the case of a contract, that in order to shift the tax liability to the
assignee the assignor either must assign the duty to perform along with the right
to be paid or must have completed performance before he assigned the contract;
otherwise it is he, not the contract, or the assignee, that is producing the
contractual income - it is his income, and he is just shifting it to someone else in
order to avoid paying income tax on it.
k.
And the beat goes on, with a judicial recognition that
structural complexity is the norm for "a knowledgeable tax attorney." Ballard v.
Commissioner, 522 F.3d 1229 (lIth Cir. 417108). The Eleventh Circuit (Judge Fay) reversed,
vacated and remanded T.C. Memo. 2007-21 (2/1/07) (Haines, J.), with instructions to "enter an
order approving and adopting Judge Couvillion's original report as the opinion of the Tax
Court." The reason assigned was that Judge Haines "did not presume Judge Couvillion's findings
to be correct or give Judge Couvillion's credibility determinations their due deference,"
concluding that
It is no surprise that a knowledgeable tax attorney would use numerous legal
entities to accomplish different objectives. This does not make them illegitimate.
Unfortunately such "maneuvering" is apparently encouraged by our present tax
laws and code.
1.
"One for all and all for one." Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner,
541 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 8/25/08), is to the same effect as Ballard.
m.
A former member of the University of Chicago Law School
faculty, members of which took a pro-Kanter stand during the entire litigation because the
School was getting big bucks from Kanter and/or his estate, decided the last appeal in this matter
in favor of Burton Kanter's estate. Result: The late Burton Kanter = 1; the IRS = zero; the Tax
Court = minus 1. Did we mention that the former faculty member was married to a current
member of the faculty? Kanter v. Commissioner, 590 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 12/1/09). The Seventh
Circuit reversed, vacated and remanded T.C. Memo. 2007-21 (2/1/07), with instructions to "enter
an order approving and adopting the STJ's report as the decision ofthe Tax Court." Judge Wood
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found that the STJ's findings were not "clearly erroneous" but "freely acknowledge[d] that a
rational person could just as easily have come to the opposite conclusion on this record."
On his federal income tax returns for the years 1979 through
•
1989, Burton Kanter reported that he had no income tax liability. That return position has been
vindicated. So it goes.
n.
Chutzpah on steroids by this influential Chicago family. According
to Tax Analysts, the Kanter family has called for removal of several Tax Court judges. "Taxes,
taxes, we don't have to pay no steenking income taxes." 2010 TNT 44-1 (3/8/10). "As attorneys
for the Kanter family, we call on the president, who has the power to remove a Tax Court judge,
to immediately institute an investigation on whether such removal is justified," Lanny J. Davis of
McDermott Will & Emery told Tax Analysts. "We also call on the committees of Congress that
have oversight of the Tax Court to institute an investigation of Judge Dawson and other Tax
Court judges who appear to have been at least complicit in knowing about Judge Dawson's
pattern of deception and not reporting him to senior authorities or, even worse, participated in a
cover-up of his deception in the summer of 2005 after the Supreme Court forced the disclosure
of Judge Couvillion's original opinion."
The Kanter family is also upset because the IRS is auditing
•
Burton Kanter's estate tax return. Why on earth would the IRS do something like that?
6.
When the ms says it's going negative on a private letter ruling you
better withdraw it the way the Rev. Proc says to. Does this taxpayer really think that
captioning the case as "Anonymous v. Commissioner" will help hide from the IRS?
Anonymous v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. No.2 (1/19/10). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that
it lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the issuance of private letter ruling after the taxpayer failed to
withdraw the request following notification that the ruling would be adverse. (The Tax Court
does have jurisdiction to determine whether certain items in a private letter ruling must be
redacted prior to publication.) Judge Goeke summarized taxpayer's argument (before rejecting it)
as follows:
Petitioner ... argues that the [administrative Procedure Act] provides this Court
with the authority to order respondent not to disclose the PLR at issue because the
PLR was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Petitioner alleges
section 6110(:t)(3) grants the Court the express authority to review written
determinations open to public inspection like PLRs. Petitioner contends that the
contents of the PLR are contrary to law and thus respondent acted arbitrarily,
capriciously, and in bad faith in issuing it. Petitioner further argues that for the
same reason the PLR should not be disclosed to Department of the Treasury
officials.
7.
"The whistleblower talks twice." Chief Council Notice CC-2010-004
(2/17/1 0). This Chief Counsel notice clarifies the limitations on contacts between IRS employees
and informants, including informants who have filed claims under § 7623, by permitting more
than one contact with informants [including those informants who are current employees of the
taxpayer]. There are safeguards to prevent the informant from becoming an instrument or agent
of the government, as well as a prohibition on accepting any information from an informant who
is the taxpayer's representative in any administrative matter pending before the IRS.
8.
Congress discovers that corporations as well as unincorporated
businesses might cheat less if payors rat them out to the IRS. The 2010 Health Care Act
amended § 6041 to extend to payments to corporations the information reporting requirement for
all payments by a business to any single payee (other than a payee that is a tax exempt
corporation) aggregating $600 or more in a calendar year for amounts paid in consideration for
property or services. However, the expanded rule does not override other specific Code
provisions that except payments from reporting, for example, securities or broker transactions as
defined under § 6045(a) and the regulations thereunder. The new rule is effective for payments
made after 12/31/11.
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There is a move in Congress to repeal this provision in
exchange for for tax increases on multinational corporations.
9•
Reporting, reporting, there's lots of health care reporting.
a.
Employer reporting, Act 1. The 2010 Health Care Act amended
§ 6051 of the Code to require reporting on each employee's annual Form W-2 the value of the
employee's health insurance coverage sponsored by the employer for taxable years beginning
after 12131110.
b.
Employer reporting, Act 2. The 2010 Health Care Act added new
§ 6056 to the Code and amended § 6724(d) to impose health insurance reporting requirements on
employers. Applicable large employers subject to the employer responsibility provisions of new
§ 4980H, and other employers who offer minimum essential coverage to their employees under
an employer-sponsored plan and pay premiums in excess of 8 percent of employee wages, must
report specified health insurance coverage information to both its full-time employees and to the
IRS. An employer who fails to comply with these new reporting requirements is subject to the
penalties for failure to file an information return and failure to furnish payee statements,
respectively. The new rules are effective for calendar years beginning after 2013.
c.
Insurer reporting. The 2010 Health Care Act added new § 6055
to the Code and amended § 6724(d). Insurers, including employers who self-insure, that provide
minimum essential coverage to any individual must report certain health insurance coverage
information to both the individual and to the IRS. An insurer who fails to comply with these new
reporting requirements is subject to the penalties for failure to file an information return and
failure to furnish payee statements, respectively. The new rules are effective for calendar years
beginning after 2013.
10.
Disclosure of return information is OK if the purpose is verify
eligibility 1 ineligibility for cost-sharing benefits and an advance § 36B premium credit
through an American Health Benefits Exchange. The 2010 Health Care Act amended § 6103
to the Code to allow the IRS to disclose to HHS certain return information of any taxpayer
whose income is relevant in determining the amount of the tax credit or cost-sharing reduction,
or eligibility for participation in the specified State health subsidy programs (Le., a State
. Medicaid program under title XIX of the Social Security Act, a State's children's health
insurance program under title XXI of such Act, or a basic health program under § 2228 of such
Act).
11.
IRS releases recommendations that paid tax return preparers would
be required to register. IR-201O-1, 2010 INT 2-1 (114/10). The IRS released a list of
recommendations that would require that individuals who sign a tax return as a paid preparer pay
a user fee to register online with the IRS and obtain a preparer tax identification number [PTIN].
All preparers - except attorneys, CPAs and enrolled agents - would have to pass competency
exams and complete 15 hours of annual CPE in federal tax law topics. The IRS proposes to
expand Circular 230 to cover all signing and nonsigning return preparers. Registered preparers
would be listed on a publicly-searchable data base and would be required to have PTlNs in 2011.
a;
We wish we had Karen's confidence in Accenture. The IRS Office
of Professional Responsibility is not at all concerned with the task of registering paid tax
preparers. That is because Accenture will be the vendor to establish a system for on-line
registration, with a target date of 9/1110. Accenture will undoubtedly bring to this task the same
thoughtful foresight and judgment it used when it selected Tiger Woods as its leading
spokesperson. 2010 INT 85-24 (5/4110). The IRS announced that Accenture National Security
Services, LLC, will be the vendor to establish a system for on-line registration of paid tax return
preparers. "The vendor will develop and maintain the registration application system and address
related questions." Karen Hawkins, Director of the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility
recently stated that she was not worried about registration of paid preparers because Accenture
would take care of it completely.
b.
Some of us learned about the concept of "fee simple" in school but
these will not be "simple fees"; instead there will be mUltiple fees - some of which will be raked
off by Accenture. REG-139343-08, User Fees Relating to Enrollment and Preparer Tax
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Identification Numbers, 75 F.R. 43110 (7/23110). Registration for an identifying number,
together with a $50 fee will be required for all tax return preparers who prepare all, or
substantially all, of a return or claim for refund of tax after 12/31/10. Accenture may charge a
"reasonable fee" that is independent of the $50 user fee.
•
The IRS later confirmed that the user fee for the first year of
registration will be $64.25; the excess $14.25 will permit Accenture to ''wet its beak."
c.
The ms issued proposed regulations which would regulate tax
return preparers. REG-138637-07, Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal
Revenue Service, 75 F.R. 51713 (8119110). These proposed regulations would amend Circular
230 to apply to all paid return preparers and identify exactly which preparers have a registration
obligation. They would also change the general Circular standard of contact from "more likely
than not" to "reasonable basis" [sic].
Specifically, the proposed regulations establish "registered tax return preparers,"
as a new class of practitioners. Sections 10.3 through 10.6 of the proposed
regulations describe the process for becoming a registered tax return preparer and
the limitations on a registered tax return preparer's practice before the IRS. In
general, practice by registered tax return preparers is limited to preparing tax
retJ,lrns, claims for refund,. and other documents for submission to the IRS. A
registered tax return preparer may prepare all or substantially all of a tax return or
claim for refund, and sign a tax return or claim for refund, commensurate with the
registered tax return preparer's level of competence as demonstrated by written
examination. The proposed regulations also revise section 10.30 regarding
solicitation, section 10.36 regarding procedures to ensure compliance, and section
10.51 regarding incompetence and disreputable conduct.
Proposed regulations under section 6109 of the Code (REG-134235-08) published
in the Federal Register (75 FR 14539) on March 26,2010, also implement certain
recommendations in the Report. The proposed regulations under section 6109
provide that, for returns or claims for'refund filed after December 31, 2010, the
identifying number of a tax return preparer is the individual's preparer tax
identification number (PTIN) or such other number prescribed by the IRS in
forms, instructions, or other appropriate guidance. The proposed regulations under
section 6109 provide that the IRS is authorized to require through other guidance
(as well as in forms and instructions) that tax return preparers apply for a PTIN or
other prescribed identifying number, the regular renewal of PTINs or other
prescribed identifying number, and the payment of user fees.
12.
This whistleblower gets a chance to let the Tax Court decide whether
or not he was whistling in the dark. Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.4 (7/8/10). The
Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) held that it has jurisdiction under § 7623(b)(4) to review the denial of
a claim for a whistleblower award. The court rejected IRS's argument that the Tax Court's
jurisdiction is limited to appeals of a determination of the amount of the award.
13.
Might this case lead to DOMA becoming the Twenty Eighth
Amendment? Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 106 AFTR2d 2018-5184 (D. Mass.
7/8/10). District Court Judge Tauro held that § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7,
which limits the meaning of the word "marriage" to "a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife," and provides that "the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or wife" for purposes of all federal laws is an unconstitutional
denial of equal protection in violation the equal protection principles embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Joint return filing status under the Code was one of the
issues addressed in the case; also addressed were goveniment benefits available to married
individuals, e.g., employee health benefits, social security benefits.
14.
The Constitution does not require Appeals Officers for CDP hearings
to be appointed by the President. Tucker v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. No.6 (7/26/10). The
taxpayer requested a CDP hearing after the IRS issued a notice of filing of a tax lien. After the
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settlement officer had upheld the tax lien notice, the taxpayer requested a remand for a hearing to
be heard by an officer appointed by the President or the Secretary of the Treasury, in compliance
with the Appointments Clause of U.S. Const., art.n; sec. 2, cl. ·2·. Judge Gustafson held that an
"officer or employee" or an "appeals officer" under § 6320 or § 6330 is not an "inferior Officer
of the United States" for purposes of the Appointments Clause. They are instead properly hired,
pursuant to § 7804(a), under the authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The
taxpayer's motion to remand was denied.
WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
XI.
A.
Employment Taxes
1.
Wisdom from the Mount. Medical residents may be students for
FICA taxes. United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Florida Inc., 486 F.3d 1248 (11th
Cir. 5/18/07). Section 3121(b)(1O) provides that employment taxes are not payable with respect
to services performed in the employ of a college or university by a student who is enrolled and
regularly attending classes. The government argued that legislative history with respect to the
repeal of an exemption for medical interns in 1965 (former § 3121(b)(13)) established as a
matter of law that medical residents are subject to employment taxes. The Eleventh Circuit
concluded that § 3121(b)(10) is unambiguous in its application to students and that the statute
requires a factual determination whether the hospital is a "school, college, or university" and
whether the residents are "students."
a.
This is no April fool. The Minnesota District Court· also fmds that
medical residents at the University of Minnesota are students. Regents of the University of
Minnesota v. United States, 101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-1532 (D. Minn. 4/1/08). The university's
summary judgment motion was granted by the District Court, which held that medical residents
at the University of Minnesota are not subject to employment taxes under the student exclusion
of § 3121(b)(l0). The court reiterated its conclusion that the full-time employee exception in
Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d), as amended in 2004, is invalid.
b.
The District Court finds that the Mount Sinai Medical Center
is a school and the residents are students. United States v. Mount Sinai Medical Center of
Florida, Inc., 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5373 (S.D. Fla. 7/28/08). After the decision in Minnesota v.
Apfel, 151 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 1998), Mount Sinai Medical Center obtained refunds for FICA
taxes paid in 1996-1997. The United States filed suit against the Medical Center for erroneous
refunds. Following the Eleventh Circuit's direction to make a factual determination whether the
program qualifies for the § 310 1(b)(1 0) exception, the District Court found that the Medical
Center's residency programs were operated as a "school, college, or university," that residents
were present for training in patient care, which was an intrinsic and mandatory component of the
training, and that the residents were "students" who were regularly enrolled and attending
classes. The court also found that the students' performance of patient care services was incident
to their course of study.
c.
South Dakota medical residents are also students. Center for
Family Medicine v. United States, 102 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-5623 (D. S. Dak. 8/6/08). Following
Minnesota v. Apfel, 151 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 1998), the South Dakota District Court held that
medical residents in the Center for Family Medicine (CFM) and University of South Dakota
School of Medicine Residency Program (USDSMRP) were eligible for the student exception to
the definition of employment under § 3101(b)(l0). The court rejected the government's assertion
that CFM was not a school, college or university because CFM was affiliated with a non-profit
hospital. The court found that CFM's work includes teaching its medical residents the skills
required to practice in their chosen profession. The court also concluded that the students were
"enrolled" in the institution and that their attendance at noon conferences and medical rounds
established that the students regularly attended classes. Tossing a small bone to the government,
the court held that chief residents in the programs, who are essentially coordinators for the
residency programs, were not students.
d.
Residents in Chicago are also students. University of Chicago
Hospitals v. United States, 545 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 9/23/08). The court affirmed the district
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Court's denial of the government's motion for summary judgment based on the government
argument that medical residents are per se ineligible for the student exemption from employment
taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The court indicates that a case-by-case analysis is required to
detenriine whether medical residents qualify for the statutory exemption.
e.
And ditto for medical residents in Detroit. United States v.
Detroit Medical Center, 557 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2/26/09). Reversing the District Court's summary
judgment, the Sixth Circuit joins the lineup holding that medical residents at the seven Detroit
area hospitals operated by the Detroit Medical Center in a joint program with Wayne State
University, which provides graduate medical education, may be students entitled to exemption
from employment taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The court remanded the case for further
development of the record regarding the nature of the residents' relationship to the hospitals and
the education program. The court indicated that further development of the record would not
preclude deciding the matter on summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit also affirmed summary
judgment that the stipends paid to medical residents were not scholarships or fellowships
excludible from income under § 117. The court found both that the stipends were received in
exchange for services and that the medical residents were not candidates for a degree as required
for exclusion under the terms of § 117.
f.
And ditto again for Sloan-Kettering. United States v. Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 563 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 3/25/09). Following similar decisions in the
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal reversed
summary judgment for the United States holding that the District Courts for the Northern and
Southern Districts of New York erred in holding as a matter of law that medical residents at the
Albany Medical Center and the hospitals of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center were
not eligible for exclusion from employment taxes under § 3121(b)(10). The cases were remanded
to the trial courts for factual determinations whether the residents were students and whether the
hospitals were schools.
q.
But the tide turns against the Mayo Clinic; however, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to the Eighth Circuit. Mayo Clinic residents mayor may not be students,
the Supreme Court will decide. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United
States, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 6/12/09), cert. granted, 6/10/10. For purposes of the student
exclusion from FICA taxes under § 3121(b)(10), Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(c) and (d), limit the
definition of a school, college, or university to entities whose "primary function is the
presentation of formal instruction." Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d) provides that to qualify as a
"student" rather than be classified as an employee, any services rendered must be "incident to
and for the purpose of pursuing a course of study" at the institution for which the student
provides the services. Furthermore, under the regulation, a person whose work schedule is 40
hours or more per week is a full-time employee rather than a student. The District Court, in
granting refunds of employment taxes, declared the regulation invalid. Applying the deference
standard of Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Dej Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the
Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment for the United States. The
court concluded that application of the exemption only to students pursuing a course of study
who are not full time employees is a reasonable interpretation of the statute. The court declined
to consider whether the portion of the regulation limiting the definition of a school or college is
valid because the medical residents were not students under the regulation in any event.
h.
And the IRS throws in the towel on refund claims for FICA
taxes paid before April Fools' Day, 2005. I.R. 2010-25 (3/2/10). The IRS has decided to accept
the position that medical residents are exempt from FICA taxes under the student exception and
will issue refunds to hospitals, universities, and medical residents who have filed claims for
refunds of FICA taxes paid before 4/1/05, which is the effective date of amendments to Reg.
§ 31.3121(b)(10)-2 providing that employees who work 40 hours or more during a week are not
eligible for the student exception.
2.
FICA in paradise. Zhang v. United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 263 (Fed. Cl.
9/22/09). Nonresident aliens, Chinese. nationals who were temporary contract workers in the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, were subject to FICA taxes. The
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Commonwealth is statutorily connected to Guam, which is a U.S. territory, through a covenant
that causes the Commonwealth to be considered within the U.S. for FICA purposes. The court
noted that the covenant mandates that, except for FICA tax proceeds, income and other tax
revenues shall be remitted to the treasury of the Commonwealth instead of the U.S. Treasury.
3.
REG-137036-08. Section 3504 Agent Employment Tax Liability, 75 F.R.
1735 (1/12/10). Proposed regulations include Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)
withholding taxes within the scope of current regulatory authority that allows employers to meet
their FICA tax obligations for dom~stic in-home services through an agent as provided in § 3401.
The agent files a single return for multiple employers using the agent's employer identification
number.
4.
The gamble doesn't payoff and this tribe sings the blues. Blue Lake
Rancheria v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-683 (N.D. Calif. 1/7/10). Section 3306(c)
excludes from employment for FUTA purposes "service performed . . . in the employ of an
Indian tribe, or any instrumentality" thereof. Section 3309 also allows Indian tribes to opt out of
paying state unemployment taxes if the tribe reimburses the state for actual costs of providing
unemployment benefits to the tribe's employees. Mainstay is in the business for providing leased
employees. It provides over 39,000 employees to business in three states. Mainstay is controlled
by Blue Lake Rancheria Economic Development Corporation, a tribal corporation. (The tribe has
53 members.) Mainstay sought refund of over $2 million of FUTA taxes claiming that its
employees were the employees of an Indian tribe. The court concluded that the tribal exception
operates to eliminate the existence of statutory employment "where services performed in a
common law relationship between an employer and employee would normally lead to the
existence of "employment." The court then reasoned that "'employment' must be defined by
reference to the common law employer, and that the statutory employer must be liable." The
court holds, "that the exception to the definition of 'employment' for 'services performed ... in
the employ of an Indian tribe, or any instrumentality' thereof, § 3306(c)(7), is only available
when an Indian tribe is the common law employer of the employees in question. When an Indian
tribe is merely the statutory employer, the applicability of this exception depends upon the
employee'S relationship with his or her common law employer. Where the common law
employer is not an Indian tribe, and where no other exemption under § 3306(c) applies, the
statutory employer will be liable under FUTA." The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument
that the Indian tribe was not a common law employer of the leased employees and the exemption
therefore did not apply.
5.
We don't need no steenking payroll taxes! New Code § 3111(d)(I),
added by the 2010 HIRE Act, excuses employers from paying the employer's share of OASDI
taxes from 3/19/10 - sort of, see below - through 12/31/10 for wages paid to newly hired
previously unemployed workers. However, unless employer elects out of the payroll tax holiday,
wages paid to a qualified individual do not qualify for the § 51 work opportunity credit during
the one-year period beginning on the date that the qualified employer hired the employee.
•
A "qualified" employee is an individual who (l) starts
employment after 2/3/10 and before 1/1/11; (2) provides an affidavit, under penalties of perjury,
certifying that he has not been employed for more than 40 hours during the 60-day period ending on
the date his employment begins; (3) has not been hired to replace another employee who was
discharged without cause; (4) is not related to the employer or a more than 50 percent owner of the
stock of a corporate employer, in a manner that would disqualify him for the work opportunity
credit under § 51(i)(l), i.e., a long list of relatives, including, inter alia, all ancestors and
descendants, brothers and sisters, nieces and nephews, and close in-laws; however aunts, uncles,
cousins and outlaws appear to be OK.
•
Wages paid during the first calendar quarter of 2010, i.e.,
between 3119110 and 3/31/10, do not actually qualify for complete forgiveness of the OASDI tax.
Rather, the amount by which the OASDI tax for wages paid during the first calendar quarter of2010
would have been reduced if the tax holiday had been in effect for that quarter is treated as a payment
against the employer's OASDI tax on other employees in the second calendar quarter of2010.
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The tax waiver applies only to non-governmental employers
except that it also applies to a public institution of higher education. The tax waiver ends on
12/31/10.
6.
Funding health care by making the ill tax more progressive; Section
1301, as amended by the 2010 Health Care Act, increases the employee portion of the HI tax is
increased by an additional tax of 0.9 percent on wages in excess of a threshold amount. The
threshold amount is $250,000 of the combined wages of both spouses on a joint return ($125,000
for a married individual filing a separate return. The threshold is $200,000 for all other
individuals. The employer must withhold the additional ill tax, but in determining the
employer's withholding requirement and liability for the tax, only wages that the employee
receives from the employer in excess of $200,000 for a year are taken into account, and the
employer disregards the employee's spouse's wages. I.R.C. § 3102(t). The employee is liable for
the additional 0.9 percent HI tax to the extent the tax is not withheld by the employer. Section
1402(b), as amended, imposes an additional tax of 0.9 percent self-employment income above
the same thresholds, The threshold amount is reduced (but not below zero) by the amount of
wages taken into account in determining the FICA tax with respect to the taxpayer. No deduction
under § 164(t) for the additional SECA tax, and the alternative deduction under § 1402(a)(12) is
determined without regard to the additional SECA tax rate. The additional tax applies to wages
received in taxable years after 12/31/12.
7.
United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 424 B.R. 237, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 20101110 (W.D. Mich. 2/23110). Severance payments made to pre-petition and post-petition
employees who were involuntarily terminated were treated as wage-replacement social benefits
rather than taxable remuneration and wages subject to FICA tax. The court concluded that under
§ 3402(0) (which treats supplemental unemployment compensation benefits as wages for
withholding) supplemental unemployment compensation was not "wages" and therefore was not
taxable for purposes of FICA.
•
The result is contrary to the holding in CSX Corp. v. United
States, 518 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
8.
S corporation "John Edwards gambit" dividends may be treated as
wages. Watson v. United States, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-2624 (S.D. Iowa 5/27/10). Using a
common tax reduction device, David Watson formed an S corporation that was a member of
Watson's accounting firm. The S corporation contracted with the accounting firm to provide
services. Watson was paid a salary of $24,000 as an employee of the S corporation, on which the
S corporation paid employment taxes. The remainder of the S corporation income, approximately
$200,000 per year, was distributed to Watson as a dividend, not subject to employee taxes. The
IRS recharacterized the dividends as wages. The S corporation paid an assessment and brought a
refund action. In a motion for summary judgment the S corporation asserted that its intent
controls whether amounts paid are wages and that it intended to pay dividends in the amount of
cash on hand after the payment of wages. Citing a long line of authorities in support of its
position, the District Court held that the S corporation's "self proclaimed intent" to pay salary
does not limit the government's ability to recharacterize dividends as wages. The court indicated
that whether amounts paid to Watson were remuneration for services is a question of fact.
•
The court's opinion concluded with the following passage:
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff points the Court to the
following oft-cited statement of Judge Learned Hand:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister
in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as law as possible.
Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes
any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more
in the name of morals is mere cant.
See Pl.'s Reply Br. at 5 n. 2 (quoting Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Newman, 159 F.2d 848,850-51 (2d Cir.1947) (L. Hand, J., dissenting)). While the
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Court agrees fully with Judge Learned Hand, it would remind Plaintiff of Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes' succinct, yet equally eloquent statement in Compania
General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue: "Taxes are
what we pay for civilized society." 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, "the greatness of our nation is in no small part due to the
willingness of our citizens to honestly and fairly participate in our tax collection
system." Manley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo 1983-558
(Sept. 12, 1983). Thus, while Plaintiff is free to structure its financial affairs in
such a way as to avoid paying "more [taxes] than the law demands," Plaintiff is
not free to structure its financial affairs in a way that avoids paying those taxes
demanded by the law. In this case, the law demands that Plaintiff pay employment
taxes on "all remuneration for employment," and there is clearly a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the funds paid to Watson, in actuality, qualify as
such.
9.
Contract workers are employees, and taxpayer gets no help from
§ 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978. Bruecher Foundation Services Inc v. United States, 105
A.F.T.R. 2d 2010-_ (5th Cir. 6/18/10). In 1999-2000 the taxpayer employed 13-16 workers as
contractors in its foundation repair, landscaping and grading business. The taxpayer claimed
deductions for the workers' compensation as "contract workers" but filed no Form 1099s for the
workers. The IRS initiated an audit of employment tax liabilities without notifying the taxpayer
and without infonning the taxpayer of the § 530 safe harbor (pub. L. No. 95-600, § 530, 92 Stat.
2763, 2885-86) as required by the statute. When the taxpayer was notified of the audit the
taxpayer filed a Form 1099 for each of the workers. Section 530 bars reclassification of workers
as employees if (l) the worker was not treated as an employee for any period, (2) the employer
filed all returns, including information returns, in a manner consistent with treating the worker as
an independent contractor, and (3) the employer had a reasonable basis under common law
standards for treating the worker as an independent contractor. The court rejected the taxpayer's
assertion that it complied with the § 530 requirement that it filed returns consistent treating the
employees as independent contractors. Although the court was not willing to go as far as the IRS
argument that timely fonns were always required, the court indicated that the taxpayer's strategic
. filing of the required returns after the IRS assessed the tax was not compliance with the statute.
The court also held that the IRS's failure- to give early notice of its audit and the availability of
§ 530 did not shift the burden of proof to the government. Finally, the court accepted the IRS
position that the workers were employees under common law standards.
10.
The Tax Court follows the Sixth and Second Circuits to hold that pre2009 employment tax liability of a disregarded LLC must be paid by the sole-member.
Medical Practice Solutions. LLC v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. No.7 (3/31/09). Following the
decisions in Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007), and McNamee v. Dept. of
the Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007) [both of which upheld the validity of the "check-thebox" .regulations in the same context, applying Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. De!
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)], the Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the check-the-box
regulations treating a single member entity that does not elect to be treated as a corporation as a
disregarded entity, Reg. § 301.7701-3(b), are valid and as a result the sole member of a
disregarded limited liability company is responsible for the L.L.C.'s unpaid employment taxes.
After 1/1/09, under Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv), a disregarded entity is treated as a corporation
for purposes of employment tax reporting and liability. The court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the amendment to the regulations, which reverses the prior rule, demonstrates that
the prior regulation imposing employment tax liability on the sole-member of the disregarded
entity was unreasonable. The court stated that, "In light of the emergence of limited liability
companies and their hybrid nature, and the continuing silence of the Code on the proper tax
treatment of such companies in the decade ·since the present regulations became effective, we
cannot conclude that the above Treasury Regulations, providing a flexible response to a novel
business form, are arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."
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a.
The First Circuit agrees. Britton v. Shulman, 106 A.F. T .R.2d
2010-_ (1st Cir. 8/24110). In a one-paragraph memorandum opinion, the First Circuit finds no
error or abuse of discretion in the Tax Court opinion in Medical Practice Solutions, LLC v.
Commissioner.
B.
Self-employment Taxes
C.
Excise Taxes
1.
Employers who aren't willing to pay health insurance premiums on
their employees must pay Uncle Sam a very healthy nondeductible excise tax. Under
§ 4980H, added by the 2010 Health Care Act and effective after 12/31/13, an applicable large
employer, i.e., an employer that employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees during
the preceding calendar year, that fails to offer its full-tirrie employees and their dependents the
opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage under an employer sponsored health
insurance plan is subject to an assessable excise tax if (l) there is a waiting period, or (2) any of
its employees are certified to the employer as having enrolled in health insurance coverage
purchased through an American Health Benefits Exchange with respect to which a premium tax
credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid to such employee or employees. (An employee
is eligible for the premium credit if the employer does not offer health insurance for all its fulltime employees, it offers minimum essential coverage that is unaffordable ("unaffordable"
means a premium required to be paid by the employee that is more than 9.5 percent of the
employee's household income), or it offers minimum essential coverage under which the plan's
share of the total allowed cost of benefits is less than 60 percent.) For an employer not offering
coverage, the amount of the excise tax amount for any month equals the number by which fulltime employees exceeds 30-employees (regardless of how many employees are receiving a
premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction) multiplied by $166.67 (one-twelfth of $2,000). The
amount is nothing to sneeze at. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS
AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," 3940 (JCX-18-10 3/21110) gives the following example:
For example, in 2014, Employer A fails to offer minimum essential coverage and
has 100 full-time employees, ten of whom receive a tax credit for the year for
enrolling in a State exchange-offered plan. For each employee over the 30employee threshold, the employer owes $2,000, for a total penalty of $140,000
($2,000 multiplie.d by 70 ((100-30)). This penalty is assessed on a monthly basis.
•
For each full-time employee receiving a premium tax credit
or cost-sharing subsidy through an American Health Benefits Exchange for any month, the monthly
excise tax equals one-twelfth of $3,000. The tax is capped, however, by the amount that would have
been the excise tax if the employer had provided no coverage. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION ACT
OF 20 10," AS AMENDED, IN COMBINAnON WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT," 39-40 (JCX-18-1O 3/21/10) gives the following example:
For example, in 2014, Employer A offers health coverage and has 100 full-time
employees, 20 of whom receive a tax credit for the year for enrolling in a State
exchange offered plan. For each employee receiving a tax credit, the employer
owes $3,000, for a total penalty of $60,000. The maximum penalty for this
employer is capped at the amount of the penalty that it would have been assessed
for a failure to provide coverage, or $140,000 ($2,000 multiplied by 70 ((10030)). Since the calculated penalty of $60,000 is less than the maximum amount,
Employer A pays the $60,000 calculated penalty. This penalty is assessed on a
monthly basis.
•
The excise tax is not deductible as a business expense under
§ 162. The restrictions on assessment under § 6213 do not apply.
2.
Did Congress call them fees, instead of excise taxes, because there are
no percentages in the formulae or because they are earmarked to fund PCORTF? New
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§ 4375, added by the 2010 Health Care Act, imposes a fee on each health insurance policy, to be
paid by the insurer, of$2 ($1 for years ending in U.S. fiscal year 2013) multiplied by the average
number of lives covered under the policy, and new § 4376 imposes ~ like fee on self-insured
health plans, to be paid by the employer. The fees are earmarked to fund the Patient Centered
Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF), to carry out provisions in the Act relating to
comparative effectiveness research.
3.
That's not a 'nice healthy" tan, it's a "dangerous pre-cancer glow."
New § 5000B of the Code imposes a 10 percent sales tax on the amount paid for indoor tanning
services. The tax is collected by the service provider and remitted to the IRS quarterly. The tax
kicks in on 6/1/1 0, just in time for the summer tanning season.
4.
A nondeductible tax on Cadillacs, and we're not talking about any
G.M. cars here. New § 49801, added by the 2010 Health Care Act, imposes an excise tax on
insurers if the aggregate value of employer-sponsored health insurance coverage and health
benefits (except separate dental and optic coverage) for an employee (including former.
employees, surviving spouses and any other primary insured individuals) exceeds a threshold
amount. The amount of the tax is 40 percent of the aggregate value that exceeds the threshold
amount. For 2018, the threshold amount is $10,200 for individual coverage and $27,500 for
family coverage, multiplied by the health cost adjustment percentage (a multiplier designed to
increase the thresholds if the actual growth in health care between 2010 and 2018 exceeds the
projected growth for that period), increased by an age and gender adjusted excess premium
amount. The threshold amounts are increased for individuals who have attained age of 55 who
are non-Medicare eligible and receiving employer-sponsored retiree health coverage or who are
covered by a plan sponsored by an employer the majority of whose employees covered by the
plan are engaged in a certain high risk professions. For a self-insured group health plan, a Health
FSA or an HRA, the excise tax is paid by the entity that administers the plan. If the employer
acts as the plan administrator, the excise tax is paid by the employer. Employer-sponsored health
insurance coverage includes both insured and self-insured health coverage excludable from the
employee's gross income; for a self-employed individual, the coverage for any portion of which
a deduction is allowable under § 162(1). If an employer reports to insurers, plan administrators,
and the IRS a lower amount of insurance cost subject to the excise tax than required, the
employer is subject to a penalty equal to the sum of any additional excise tax that each such
insurer and administrator would have owed if the employer had reported correctly and interest
attributable to that additional excise tax. The excise tax is not deductible under the income tax.
•
Although the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation did
not score this provision for revenue effects, because its effective date is outside the 5-year window
for scoring revenue effects, despite being in the "Revenue Provisions" of the Act, Congress does not
really intend that provision raise much revenue. It intends to discourage employers from providing
high cost, i.e., Cadillac, health plans.
XII. TAX LEGISLATION
A.
Enacted
1.
H.R. 3548, the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Act of 2009,
P.L. 111-92 ("WHABA"), was signed by President Obama on 1116/09.
2.
H.R. 3326, the 2010 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 111-118, which
contains the COBRA subsidy extension at § 1010, was signed by President Obama on 12/19/09.
3.
H.R. 4462, P.L. 111-126, was signed into law by President Obama on
1122/10. The law permits donors who itemize deductions on their 2009 tax returns to deduct on
their 2009 returns any charitable contributions for the relief of victims of the Haitian earthquake
made in cash after 1/11/1 0 and before 3/1/10.
4.
H.R. 4691, the Temporary Extension Act of 2010, P.L. 111-144, was
signed by President Obama on 3/2/10. The signing ceremony consisted of a "TEA party" at
which the president was tea-bagged, i.e., tea bags were thrown at him.
5.
The Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment ("HIRE Act"), P.L. 111147, was signed by President Obama on 3/18/10. It is a $17.6-billion ''jobs package."
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6.
H.R. 3590, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA"
- pronounced "pee-pac-a"), P .L.111-148, was signed by President Obama on 3/23/10.
7.
H.R. 4872, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010
("2010 Health Care Act" or "2010 Reconciliation Act"), P.L. 111-152, was signed by President
Obama on 3/30/10.
8.
The Continuing Extension Act of 2010, P.L. 111-157, was signed by
President Obama on 4/15/10. It extends the COBRA subsidy to May 31,2010.
9.
HR 3962, the Preservation of Access to Care for Medicare
Beneficiaries and Pension Relief Act of 2010, P.L. 111-192, was signed by President Obama
on 6/25/10.
10.
The Homebuyer Assistance and Improvement Act of 2010, P.L. 111198, was signed by President Obama on 7/2/10.
11.
The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, P.L. 111-240, was signed by
President Obama on 9/27/10. This Act will create millions upon millions of good paying jobs.
B.
Pending
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